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ABSTRACT
EXPLAINING METAPHOR: A PLURALISTIC APPROACH
SEPTEMBER 1995
DANIEL J. COSTELLO, B.A., MCGILL UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Robert Paul Wolff
Efforts in recent TVnglo-American philosophy to explain
the work of linguistic metaphor can be reduced to four basic
types of position: first, metaphor as an ornament of style,
produced by a transfer of terms related according to some
relevant similarity among their referents, for aesthetic,
rhetorical or didactic ends; second, metaphor as an
instrument of cognition, identified when features normally
associated with disparate subjects are brought together in a
unique and original synthesis, giving expression to a
distinctive metaphorical content, and revealing the
associative procedures that structure all language, thought
and experience; third, metaphor as a type of indirect
speech, occurring when a speaker implies, suggests or means
by an utterance something distinct from what a hearer
unaware of the circumstances of that utterance would be able
to determine simply on the basis of the conventional
V
meanings of the words employed; and finally, metaphor as
well-formed non-sense, used to prompt a hearer or reader to
imagine familiar things in unfamiliar ways, by evoking new
ideas or images without expressing them either directly or
indirectly. I argue that each of these four positions is
inadeguate as a general theory of metaphor, and moreover,
that recognition of the failings of each supports a
pluralistic approach to understanding the work of metaphor,
one that enables us to take account of various distinct
types of metaphor, corresponding to the various distinct
types of function that metaphors serve.
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INTRODUCTION
Although metaphor has long been an object of
philosophical reflection, there is remarkably little
consensus among philosophers today as to just what it is and
how it works. My dissertation is addressed to this problem:
in what follows, I present and defend a pluralistic account
of metaphor. This account is developed as a response to
what I consider to be the inadequacy of each of the dominant
contemporary theories of metaphor. The better part of my
discussion, accordingly, is devoted to a critical
examination of these theories, where I undertake to show the
defects of each. Prior even to the concluding summary in
which I assemble my own account, the originality of this
project consists first and foremost in its systematic
assimilation of a vast and often complex critical literature
to a clear and reasonably simple framework for approaching
the philosophical study of metaphor in language.
My own organization of this material is intended to
show that discussion of metaphor in Anglo-American
philosophy has centered on two basic questions: first,
whether (and if so, how) metaphors can be translated to
equivalent literal terms; and second, whether metaphorical
assertions express a cognitive content that renders them
legitimate 'truth-value candidates' (and if so, how such
content may be discerned)
. In relation to these two
prevailing questions, I identify four distinct types of
position that may be represented schematically as follows:
Metaphorical assertions express
a 'cognitive content'
YES TO
Metaphors YES 1 .
1
2.1
are
accurately
translatable
'
m 1.2 2.2
Here I have labelled each of these four types of position to
correspond to the number of the relevant section below in
which it is discussed. In my first two chapters, I
reconstruct several different versions of these views, in
order to display the insoluble problems raised by each.
In Chapter 1, I consider attempts to explain the work
of metaphor in terms of semantics. Semantic views generally
begin with the assumption that metaphorical assertions,
although most often literally false or nonsensical, are
nonetheless meaningful in a figurative or metaphorical
sense. They then typically proceed with an analysis of what
they consider to be recognizable cases of metaphor, in an
effort to inquire more generally into the way in which we
are able to produce and understand these nonliteral
'metaphorical meanings'. I divide such semantic views into
two types, according to their disagreement over the question
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of whether metaphors may be 'translated' to literal terms
without cognitive loss.
In Section 1.1, 'Reducible Metaphorical Sense,' I
provide a very general account of the traditional view of
metaphor derived from classical philosophy and made famous
by the British empiricists.^ On this familiar view, a
metaphor is just the nonliteral use of words or expressions
as a decorative ornament for stylistic embellishment, a use
that is, consequently, most inappropriate for precise
expression or careful reasoning. Once identified and duly
translated, however--by straight substitution into
corresponding literal terms, or into equivalent literal
comparisons--metaphorical assertions may be said to acquire
cognitive significance. Thus, taking a standard example, to
say metaphorically that Richard is a lion is to mean simply
(by substitution) that he is brave, or (by comparison) that
he is like a lion in being brave. Proponents of this view
often praise metaphor for its compact power of suggestion,
through which the skilled user is able to effect an enhanced
apprehension of the world, by capturing insights and
identifying nuances that might normally be overlooked.
Poets are said to exemplify this activity, in their use of
metaphor as a means of artistic expression, which often
^In particular, I examine ideas drawn from Plato,
Aristotle, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, John Stuart Mill and
Colin Turbayne.
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directs us to subtle or unfamiliar resemblances.
Nonetheless, according to this traditional account, it is
imperative that serious thinkers avoid the metaphorical use
of language, for in shifting a term or expression from one
object to another, and thereby extending the pretense that
something is the case when it is not, metaphors can at best
provide a kind of evocative diversion. Otherwise, they
merely encourage confusion and deception, and are thus grave
impediments to any sincere attempt to communicate knowledge,
which can only take the form of literal truth. To
summarize, then, in reference to the chart above, the
traditional view contends that the artistically concealed
'cognitive content' expressed by a metaphorical assertion is
at once disclosed by and identical to that of its
appropriate 'translation' into standard literal terms.
In Section 1.2, 'Irreducible Metaphorical Sense', I
describe and evaluate the important reorientation that has
come to define the dominant contemporary perspective.
Against the traditional view, metaphors are here considered
most often incapable of literal translation or paraphrase,
as the meaning of a metaphorical assertion is understood to
be the product of a complex comparison and 'interaction' of
distinct concepts, categories, or extended systems of
associations. On this view, initiated in the work of I. A.
Richards and Max Black, and reasserted in various forms over
4
the past thirty years by many prominent American
philosophers and linguists,^ understanding metaphor is a
distinctive intellectual operation involving a complex
procedure of simultaneous selection and suppression, in
effect, a creative and original reorganization of disparate
elements associated with two distinct subjects. As a
result, metaphorical assertions are thought to be bearers of
a unique, irreducible and indispensable 'cognitive content'.
A phrase like 'marmalade sky' is considered to impose a
unique synthesis of features previously attributed to, or
associated with, only one or the other of 'marmalade' and
'sky', expressing something entirely new and unattainable in
literal terms. Advocates of this position, despite their
substantial differences of opinion accounting for the
particular linguistic mechanism that enables us
alternatively to produce and understand this original and
irreducible content, tend to share the view that metaphor is
pervasive in our everyday speech precisely because the human
conceptual process itself is metaphorically structured,
since to conceptualize is just to classify experience in
terms of familiar antecedent categories.
^Though Richards and Black receive primary consideration,
I also make reference in this section to views expressed by
Paul Henle, Monroe Beardsley, Nelson Goodman, George Lakoff,
Mark Johnson, Mark Turner, Eva Kittay, and Mary Hesse.
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In Chapter 2 my discussion turns away from semantics,
in order to consider various efforts to explain metaphor in
terms of pragmatics. Pragmatic views generally begin with
the assumption that understanding the work of metaphor
requires that it be treated as a transgressive act of
language, where what is most important is not what a
metaphor means, but what it is used to do. They then
typically proceed with an analysis of what they consider to
be recognizable cases of metaphor, in an effort to inquire
more generally into the way in which certain aspects of the
context of use support or require a reinterpretation of the
absurd literal meaning of a metaphorical utterance in terms
of the beliefs or intentions it would appear to indicate or
evoke. I divide these pragmatic views into two types,
according to their disagreement over the question of whether
the beliefs or intentions indicated or evoked by a metaphor
may be accurately 'translated' into literal terms by way of
a reliable pragmatic calculus.
In Section 2.1, 'Reducible Non-Sense', I examine and
assess a few of the more prominent attempts to understand
metaphor in terms of the speech-act distinction between word
or sentence meaning and speaker's utterance meaning.^
According to this type of view, a literal utterance occurs
^In this section, I focus primarily on the position of
John Searle, though I also discuss ideas drawn from the work
of Paul Grice, Dan Sperber, Deirdre Wilson and Robert Fogelin.
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when speaker's meaning and sentence meaning are the same;
metaphor, on the other hand, is a special case of a speaker
saying one thing while meaning another. We engage in such
indirect communicative activity quite often, for instance,
in asking 'have you got a kleenex?' in order to request one,
or in stating 'it's cold in here' when what is in fact
intended is please close the window'
. Indirect speech of
this sort is successfully employed and understood due to its
conformity to an implicit procedure or device that permits
its hearers initially to recognize it as such, and then to
infer the speaker's intended meaning from the literal
utterance meaning. One such type of indirect speech is
irony, where the literal inappropriateness of an utterance
to the speech context in which it occurs compels the hearer
to reinterpret it to mean the opposite of what it says.
Thus, if offered the comment 'splendid weather' just seconds
after a loud thunderclap, or when caught in a sudden
downpour, we have no trouble identifying this utterance as
an instance of irony, nor understanding its intended sense.
On this view, metaphor functions in like fashion. It is
signaled by a speaker's violation of one or more of a number
of standard conversational maxims pertaining to such basic
cooperative principles as truthfulness, brevity and
relevance. The vital difference between metaphor and other
kinds of indirect speech, however, consists in the fact that
7
metaphors violate such standards by virtue of the manifest
absurdity or incoherence of their literal meaning in
relation to the circumstances of their utterance.
Metaphorical meaning is just speaker's intended meaning,
which we arrive at by inference from the particular
juxtaposition of the semantic content invoked to utter such
literal absurdity or incoherence, and the alternative
interpretive possibilities provided by its context of use.
Thus, to take an example, the literal absurdity of Ann
Richards's assertion that George Bush 'was born with a
silver foot in his mouth' compels us, first, to assume that
she is speaking metaphorically, and second, to infer, from
our knowledge of both the normal use of these terms and the
broader context of her remarks, that her intended meaning is
that Bush is incompetent, despite all of the advantages
offered to him in virtue of his privileged background. (By
mixing conventional metaphors, she even provides a clever
instance of the sort of verbal gaffe so often delivered in
earnest by Bush, the evocation of which serves to support
her case.) Despite their various differences of opinion
over the precise nature of the pragmatic calculus permitting
us to carry through such inferences consistently and
correctly, defenders of this type of 'indirect speech'
position tend to agree that metaphor may be successfully
8
translated to equivalent literal terms, expressing the
meaning for which it was devised by its author.
In Section 2.2, 'Irreducible Non-Sense', I discuss and
evaluate what might be considered a more strictly pragmatic,
or 'causal' view of metaphor, one which signals a key break
by denying both 'cognitive content' and ' translatability
'
.
Here I focus primarily on the claim that metaphors convey no
coded message, nor indicate anything other than what they
literally say.'’ Instead, they provoke or inspire us to 'see
as' rather than 'see that', imposing a new perspective that
prompts us to imagine familiar things in wholly unfamiliar
ways inaccessible to literal translation or paraphrase.
Briefly put, this type of position may be distinguished from
the two preceding views as follows. Adherents to this type
of pragmatic view agree with ' interactionists
'
(position 1.2
above) in holding that metaphorical assertions cannot be
accurately translated into literal terms--but this agreement
is not because they share the idea that such assertions bear
an irreducible cognitive content, rather, it is because they
believe that there is nothing nonliteral in a metaphor to be
translated. Correspondingly, supporters of these two
positions differ over the cognitive status of metaphor:
against the same 'interactionists', supporters of this
'’The central figure here is Donald Davidson, though in
this section I also consider views expressed by Marcus Hester,
Paul Ricoeur, Marcia Cavell, Samuel Levin and Richard Rorty.
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latter pragmatic view deny that metaphors communicate an
encoded 'metaphorical meaning '
--yet they deny it not because
they accept the 'indirect speech' reduction of metaphor to
speaker's intended meaning (position 2.1 above), but because
they hold that metaphor achieves its wonders with no more
than ordinary word meanings, albeit employed in imaginative
new ways. Here we might consider, for instance, Yeats's
mention of 'the foul rag-and-bone shop of the heart.'
Rather than seeking to explain or decipher a concealed
message in these words, defenders of this type of position
urge that we limit ourselves merely to describing what they
evoke. Upon hearing or reading a metaphor, we often find
ourselves forming new ideas, and occasionally even new
beliefs. On this view, metaphors are best understood as
causes, rather than expressions, of such changes.
In my third and final chapter, I outline a pluralistic
account of metaphor. This account follows from the results
of the preceding chapters, which establish that none of the
four types of position presented above succeed in providing
an adequate account of metaphor. Drawing upon the strengths
and weaknesses of each of these views, I distinguish three
kinds of metaphor, which might be considered to correspond
to three distinct synchronic moments in the same diachronic
process of linguistic innovation, conflict and change.
Finally, in closing, I offer some thoughts on the general
10
social function served by each of these three distinct uses
of language.
To complete these rather drawn out introductory
remarks, a few caveats will be appropriate, regarding
certain matters with which this project is not concerned.
First, behind much of the recent discussion of metaphor
among philosophers there lurks a series of traditional
philosophical problems, and of course, sets of opposing
positions over these problems, which I have sought earnestly
to avoid. I am not convinced that the continuing debates
between various representatives of realism and anti-realism,
foundat ionalism and anti-foundationalism, or absolutism and
relativism need have any immediate bearing on one's
understanding of the work of metaphor.^ Still, granting
Hilary Putnam's claim that 'to accept another philospher's
vocabulary is always to accept a good many of his
philosophical assumptions,'® I have made an effort to employ
^Compare, for instance. Nelson Goodman's discussion of
'ways, metaphorical and otherwise, of making worlds'
( 'Metaphor as Moonlighting, ' in Johnson, Philosophical
Perspectives on Metaphor (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota, 1981, p. 227n) with Thomas Kuhn's self-description
as an 'unregenerate realist' ('Metaphor in Science,' in
Anthony Ortony, Metaphor and Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982) p. 539) . Despite their obvious
metaphysical differences, each advances a view of metaphor (in
the articles cited) that I consider an instance of the
position labelled as 1.2 above.
^Hilary Putnam, 'Truth, Activation Vectors and Possession
Conditions for Concepts, ' Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research Vol. LII, No. 2 (June 1992): 431-444
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terms that would steer clear of these debates insofar as
possible. In certain areas, this pledge has been difficult
(or arguably impossible) to keep— for instance, in relation
to discussion over the nature and limits of linguistic
meaning. Here I have endeavored to maintain only a general,
common— sense understanding of what it is to say that certain
marks or noises have meaning, one that I hope would be both
accessible and plausible to the reader with little or no
exposure to contemporary philosophy of language.
It will be evident, moreover, that my consideration of
the philosophical literature on metaphor is by no means
exhaustive. Rather, I make specific reference only to the
texts that I consider best representative of the most
relevant and interesting positions, which, on my view, have
served to structure much of the subsequent discussion for
recent English-speaking philosophy. It is now clear that
discussion of metaphor and metaphor-related issues has in
recent years become an important cross-disciplinary point of
contact, producing a vast quantity and range of critical
commentary. In reference to this overwhelming secondary
literature specific to debates over a profusion of problems
spanning fields as diverse as linguistics, cognitive
science, psychology, education, theology, philosophy of
science and literary criticism, I make no claim to
12
expertise, nor even, in many cases, to minimal competence.^
The scope of this work is limited to a critical discussion
of metaphor within the parameters set by the positions
outlined in cursory fashion above.
A final word regarding conventions of style:
underlining within guotations invariably indicates the
emphasis of the author cited; square brackets contain
editing of my own. Full references are provided just once
in the footnotes; thereafter, references are indicated only
by parentheses containing page numbers following quotations
in cases where the source is evident.
^As a measure of the extent of recent interest in
metaphor, consider Jean-Pierre van Noppen, ed.. Metaphor II: a
classified bibliography of publications 1985 to 1990
(Philadelphia: J. Benjamins Publishing Co., 1990), a text
containing some three and a half thousand references.
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CHAPTER 1
SEMANTIC THEORIES OF METAPHOR
In this first chapter I consider attempts to explain
the work of metaphor in terms of semantics. Semantics,
broadly speaking, is the study of linguistic meaning.® An
essential aspect of language use is the ability to
distinguish meaningful expression, in accordance with a
conventional system for conveying messages, which permits
language-users to link words with certain meanings, or
specific referring intentions. Any adequate
characterization of linguistic competence must incorporate a
description of this conventional system of meanings--in
short, it must include a semantics. Insofar as our use of
metaphor relies upon or in some way augments this
conventional system, it too may be considered an instance of
meaningful expression, which must be accounted for within a
theory of semantics.
®Here and throughout this chapter, my employment of the
word 'meaning' is intended in a general and non- technical
sense, as an inclusive term that may be understood to
encompass sense, reference, use, and such related ideas. It is
not my intention here to develop or give preference to a
particular theory of meaning, although important aspects of
the discussion below draw upon what I take to be the general
purpose or rationale of any such theory.
14
Semantic views of metaphor generally begin with the
assumption that metaphorical assertions, although most often
literally false or nonsensical, are nonetheless meaningful
in a figurative or metaphorical sense. They then typically
proceed with an analysis of what they consider to be
recognizable cases of metaphor, in an effort to inquire more
generally into the way in which we are able to employ and
understand these nonliteral 'metaphorical meanings'. In
this chapter, following upon the organization of the chart
presented in my introduction, I divide these semantic views
into two types, according to their disagreement over the
question of whether metaphors may be accurately
'translated', by which I mean 'reduced to literal terms
without cognitive loss'.
1 .
1
Reducible Metaphorical Sense
Do not believe his vows, for they are brokers
Not of that dye which their investments show.
But mere implorators of unholy suits.
Breathing like sanctified and pious bards.
The better to beguile.
- Polonius to Ophelia, Hamlet 1,3
Most views of metaphor begin by distinguishing the
metaphorical use of language from its ordinary literal use,
which is taken to be strictly denotative. In ordinary
language, we represent reality to ourselves and to each
other; its denotative capacity allows us to characterize or
15
world. Metaphor,
make reference to different states of the
however, marks a departure from this standard use. It is
discerned when we confront a non-standard conjunction of
standard literal terms, whose strikingly odd concurrence in
a manifestly false or apparently nonsensical assertion
deters us from assigning to them their usual meanings. This
initially unfamiliar use of familiar linguistic expression
may effect a novel comparison of normally unassociated
objects or events, which may in turn lead us to identify
previously unrecognized similarities in their respective
Properties. As such, we have come to accept as meaningful
the languid claims that time is money, the world a stage,
and no man an island, just as we are likely to grant a
certain sense to one who sings 'I'm a Howlin' Wolf,' or 'You
are the Sunshine of My Life.' The point of these trite
examples is only to illustrate that metaphoric attribution
is often understood to involve a distinct shift of meaning,
from ordinary, direct reference to a peculiar form of
innovative, indirect reference. Indeed, such would seem to
be warranted by the etymology of the term, which comes to us
from the Greek meta (usually taken to signify the idea of
displacement, or transfer)
,
and pherein (to carry, or
bear) .
^
®The Oxford English Dictionary.
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The priority awarded to this idea of deviation from
literal use, effecting in turn a transfer of meaning, is
generally considered to have originated with the celebrated
definition of metaphor provided in Aristotle's Poetics.
Aristotle is there concerned with an elaboration of general
rules for the imitation of human action in poetry,
principally tragic poetry. In his discussion of the various
linguistic resources available to the poet for the
construction of his art, he asserts that
Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name
that belongs to something else; the
transference being either from genus to
species, or from species to genus, or from
species to species, or on grounds of analogy.
(1457b)
Critics have often pointed out that this account applies
only to isolated words; most recent considerations of
metaphor expand the same treatment to include phrases,
sentences and even poems and other texts in their
entirety. Many have even suggested that Aristotle's
'name' can here be construed to incorporate any sign or
collection of signs, so that other works of art such as
^°Aristotle ' s Rhetoric and Poetics (New York: Random
House, 1954), Rhetoric translated by Rhys Roberts, Poetics
translated by Ingram Bywater. Hereafter, as with all future
series of citations where source is evident, simply page
numbers (standard edition pagination where available) in
parentheses following quotations, as above.
^^In particular, cf. Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977; Robert Czerny
trans.), chapter one, pp. 9-35.
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paintings and sculptures can be granted metaphorical status.
For the moment, I postpone discussion of this critical
’question of demarcation', along with its concern for
distinguishing various types of metaphor within a general
definition . Presently, I want only to underline two key
features of Aristotle's view: first, the idea of deviant
usage, 'in giving the thing a name that belongs to something
else; ' and second, the condition that such deviance involves
a 'transference' among related terms.
The basis for this transference is made explicit in the
following section. While considering the elements of poetic
diction, Aristotle tells us that 'a good metaphor implies an
intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars .
'
(1459a) A third significant component of his definition,
then, is that the successful transfer of meaning is assured
by the presence of a subtle, underlying resemblance between
normally unassociated things; the author of a good metaphor
recognizes and gives expression to a striking 'similarity in
dissimilars.' Yet this is not easily accomplished. In the
course of the same discussion of Diction, Aristotle praises
the 'fine' verse of Euripides over the comparatively 'poor'
^^This designation is David Cooper's; see his Metaphor
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 5ff. My own response to
what he calls the ''external' demarcation problem' is provided
in chapter 3 below.
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work of Aeschylus, and then proposes a test for
distinguishing such inferior use. There he notes tnat
the rule of moderation applies to all the
constituents of the poetic vocabulary; even
with metaphors, strange words, and the rest,
the effect will be the same, if one uses them
improperly and with a view to provoking
laughter. The proper use of them is a very
different thing. To realize the difference
one should take an epic verse and see how it
reads when the normal words are introduced.
The same should be done too with the strange
word, the metaphor, and the rest; for one has
only to put the ordinary words in their place
to see the truth of what we are saying.
(1458b)
An inappropriate metaphor is foolish or idiotic; it follows
from immoderate use, which can only provoke laughter. More
interesting for my purposes here, however, is Aristotle's
claim that such improper use may be readily discerned 'when
the normal words are introduced. ' Such a test presupposes,
of course, that these words are accessible--in other words,
that a metaphor is capable of being rendered in equivalent
literal terms. The ready availability of such terms assures
that there is no special or irreducible figurative meaning
imparted by metaphor; consequently, for Aristotle, the
essential function of metaphor is strictly decorative. When
we 'put the ordinary words in their place, ' we strip
language of its ornamental 'poetic vocabulary, ' in order to
better evaluate a metaphor for its appropriateness. This
translation procedure in no way alters sense. Rather, it
appears intended to clear away any ambiguity or uncertainty
19
associated with poetic language, in order that we may focus
exclusively on the unadorned literal sense of an expression,
and the degree of relevant 'harmony,' or 'similarity in
dissimilars' to which it attests.
This account of metaphor is maintained and reinforced
in Aristotle's Rhetoric
. Although this text is concerned
with a distinct discipline—namely, the various
'argumentative modes of persuasion' in spoken discourse--the
Rhetoric carries over from the Poetics the same definition
of metaphor, and emphasizes its equal value for prose
composition.^^ Once again, Aristotle addresses the question
of the proper and improper use of metaphor, and in
particular, the importance of the latent similarity that a
metaphor identifies through its transgressive naming. There
again we are told that the appropriateness of a metaphor
will depend upon the degree of relevant similarity that it
indicates, for
Metaphors, like epithets, must be fitting,
which means that they must fairly correspond
to the thing signified: failing this, their
inappropriateness will be conspicuous: the
want of harmony between two things is
emphasized by their being placed side by
side. (1405a)
Inappropriate use of metaphor proceeds despite this 'want of
harmony between two things, ' which marks a standard form of
'bad taste in language' (1405b). Such bad taste is evident
^^Most notably, at 1404b-1405a.
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in instances of metaphor that are 'ridiculous,' 'too grand
and theatrical,' 'far-fetched,' or 'obscure' —metaphors that
'fail, for the reasons given, to carry the hearer with
them.' (1406b)
If proper use requires attention to similarity, then it
would seem that one obvious way to interpret a metaphor
would be to treat it as equivalent to a corresponding
statement of comparison. In a well-known passage of the
Rhetoric
,
Aristotle defends a version of this view, arguing
that
The Simile also is a metaphor; the difference
is but slight. When the poet says of Achilles
that he
'Leapt on the foe as a lion,
'
this is a simile; when he says of him 'the
lion leapt, ' it is a metaphor--here, since
both are courageous, he has transferred to
Achilles the name of 'lion'. (1406b)
These lines are often credited with having inspired the
enduring view that metaphors are nothing other than
elliptical similes, that is, abridged or compressed
statements of comparison, whose want of an explicit
comparative term in no way alters their informative content.
As the comparison in question may be construed literally or
figuratively, we may identify in this proposal at least two
distinct positions; I return to a discussion and critical
appraisal of each of these positions below.
take up the view that metaphors can be reduced to
literal comparisons later on in this section; in accordance
with the organization of the critical literature set out
in my
21
For the moment, it will do to summarize what is most
fundamental in Aristotle's important and abiding legacy for
all succeeding discussion of the nature and function of
metaphor. On his view, metaphor is a striking, yet purely
ornamental deviation from ordinary language use, involving a
transfer of terms that are related by virtue of some
appropriate similarity between their referents, a similarity
which may be alternatively expressed in equivalent literal
form
.
Already in this account we may identify the rationale
for the longstanding occupational aversion to metaphor among
philosophers. As a forceful, yet strictly decorative
instrument of vital importance in both poetry and rhetoric,
metaphor is capable of being employed as a seductive and
dangerous means of persuasion, for manipulation of the
emotions in order to effect praise or blame, without any
regard for truth. Of course, it is well known that such
misgivings about metaphor precede Aristotle's influential
account. Plato, a master of figurative language himself,
repudiated both rhetoric and poetry on the basis of their
potential for duplicity. In several of the dialogues,
rhetoric is condemned as the art of creating illusion for
the purpose of deception. This accusation provides the
introduction, I address the claim that metaphors are best
understood as figurative comparisons in section 2.1 below.
^"Most notably, in the Protagoras , Gorgias and Phaedx^.
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substance of his case against the sophists, assailed by
Socrates for 'mak[ing] trifles seem important and important
points trifles by the force of their language. With
regard to poetry, evidence of the 'ancient quarrel between
it and philosophy' occupies much of Book X of the Republic
,
most notably in the form of warnings against the
intoxicating allure of mimetic art.^^ Socrates there argues
that the imitative poet has 'neither knowledge nor right
opinion about the beauty or quality of the things he
imitates;' (602a) rather, with his 'artistic coloring [and]
ornaments,' (601b) his imitative work only 'relates to the
excitable and varied character...' (605a) Hence the famous
verdict pertaining to the poet, maker of metaphors:
So we are right not to admit him into a city
which is to be well governed because he
arouses this [excitable] part of the soul and
strengthens it, and by so doing destroys the
reasonable part... [and] sets up a bad
government in the soul of every private
individual by gratifying the mindless part...
(605b)
This conception of metaphor as an enchanting and
deceitful form of stylistic embellishment of our ordinary
literal talk has retained a lasting influence. As one would
expect, the endurance of this view has been accompanied by a
^^Phaedrus 267a~b, translated by R. Hackforth, in Edith
Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (eds.). The Collected Dialogue
of Plato (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961)
.
^"^Republic 607b, G.M.A. Grube translator (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Company, 1974)
.
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persistent distrust of metaphorical expression among
philosophers. Aversion to the use of metaphor in any
serious context, or for any meaningful pursuit, has found
particularly impassioned expression in certain classic works
of the English-language philosophical canon. Thomas
Hobbes, for one, cautioned that our standard attempts to
communicate knowledge (by registering our thoughts with
words) are frequently obstructed by 'abuses of speech.'
Prominent among these abuses is the case 'when [men] use
words metaphorically; that is, in other sense than that they
are ordained for; and thereby deceive others. In his
Leviathan (1651), Hobbes conceives of human reason as
'nothing but reckoning
,
that is adding and subtracting, of
the consequences of general names agreed upon, for the
^®What follows is by no means an attempt to provide a
complete history. For a general historical survey of work on
metaphor in philosophy, see: Mark Johnson, 'Metaphor in the
Philosophical Tradition,' in Mark Johnson (ed.). Philosophical
Perspectives on Metaphor (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota, 1981), pp.3-47; Fred Dallmayr, Language and
Politics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984),
Ch. 6, pp. 149-173; James D. Edie, Speaking and Meaning: The
Phenomenology of Language (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1976), pp. 161-180; David Cooper, Metaphor (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1986), Ch. 1, pp.1-34; Eva Kittay, Metaphor:
its cognitive force and linguistc structure (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1987), pp.1-13; and Paul Ricoeur's
unrivalled account in The Rule of Metaphor (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1977), translator Robert Czerny,
originally published as La metaphore vive (Paris: Editions du
Seuil, 1975)
.
^^Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1947), 1,4, p. 19.
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marking and signifying of our thoughts.' (1,5) To be
rational or meaningful, our linguistic expression must
adhere strictly to the agreed-upon designations that permit
accurate tabulations. Accordingly, 'metaphors, and
senseless and ambiguous words, are like ignes fatui ; and
reasoning upon them is wandering amongst innumerable
absurdities; and their end, contention and sedition, or
contempt.' (1,5) Hobbes is thus abruptly dismissive of 'the
use of metaphors, tropes, and other rhetorical figures,
instead of words proper,' concluding that 'in reckoning and
seeking the truth such speeches are not to be admitted.
'
( 1 , 5 )
A corresponding hostility to the use of figurative
language for any kind of direct and sincere communicative
exchange later emerges in the work of John Locke. For
Locke, the 'right use and perfection of language' consists
in having our meaning understood, that is, in communicating
our thoughts by words, which are the instruments for
conveying our ideas into the minds of others. In a chapter
of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1695) entitled
'Of the Abuse of Words, Locke treats of the 'several
wilful faults and neglects which men are guilty of (122)
when they employ words. There he contends that apprehension
^°John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
(Edited by A.C. Fraser; New York: Dover, 1959), volume 2, book
III, chapter X, most notably section 34.
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of 'dry truth and real knowledge' requires that we 'speak of
things as they are.' (146) With respect to alternative
formulations, however, he concludes that
all the artificial and figurative application
of words eloquence hath invented, are for
nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas,
move the passions, and thereby mislead the
judgement; and so indeed are perfect cheats:
and therefore, however laudable or allowable
oratory may render them in harangues and
popular addresses, they are certainly, in all
discourses that pretend to inform or
instruct, wholly to be avoided; and where
truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but
be thought a great fault, either of the
language or the person that makes use of
them. (146)
Much later still, John Stuart Mill expressed a
comparable distrust of metaphorical expression, even while
relegating it a certain limited use as a form of analogical
illustration. While denying to metaphor any type of
independent cognitive status. Mill does provide it with a
suggestive role, as a kind of temporary placeholder to mark
the existence of an intuition not yet well-formulated, but
accessible nonetheless by way of analogy. In a key chapter
of his System of Logic (1865) dealing with 'Fallacies of
Generalization,'^^ however, he cautions that 'it is apparent
(especially when we consider the extreme facility of raising
up contrary analogies and conflicting metaphors) that so far
^'John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic (Edited by J.M.
Robson; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), Book V,
Chapter V, especially section 7.
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from the metaphor or analogy proving anything, the
applicability of the metaphor is the thing to be made out.’
(799) In other words: 'metaphors, for the most part,
therefore, assume the propositions which they are brought to
prove.' (800) So even while offering potential benefit as a
figure of illustration, such benefit must be secured with
vigilance, since 'a metaphor is not to be considered an
argument, but as an assertion that an argument exists; that
a parity subsists between the case from which the metaphor
is drawn and that to which it is applied.
'
(801)
In drawing attention to this analogical role. Mill
anticipates the idea that in certain contexts, metaphor
functions much like a scientific model, in serving as an
heuristic or inventive device. This idea remains consistent
with the traditional suspicion of metaphorical expression
among philosophers insofar as it identifies in this
functioning a disquieting capacity for deceit, realized when
the metaphor or analogy itself is unknowingly accepted at
face-value. Implicit here again is the idea that through
such analogical or figurative applications, metaphorical
expression obscures the precise truth of the matter, and
thus requires translation into equivalent literal terms if
it is to have cognitive import.
To offor an idea of the enduring influence of this
account, it will be worthwhile to consider in closer detail
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a more recent study of metaphor that reiterates and further
develops this position. Here I refer to Colin Turbayne’s
The Myth of Metaphor (1970),^^ a text devoted primarily to
questions concerning the proper role of metaphor in the
context of ordinary prose explanation. For his effort to
establish strict guidelines for the legitimate employment of
metaphorical expression, Turbayne may be considered a
significant modern representative of the traditional view of
metaphor in philosophy. His approach to the subject has
been lauded as ’both sympathetic and tough,’ and ’exciting
and original ...[ for its] clarification of how one may avoid
being victimized by metaphor. Indeed, a principal aim of
his book is to instruct the reader on how to excavate
metaphors that have unknowingly become fossilized in
thought, there to claim an illegitimate cognitive or
referential significance. The book’s initial section
headings are at once indicative of this project: the first
chapter, ’The Nature of Metaphor,’ is divided into two
parts, ’Using Metaphor’ and ’Being Used by Metaphor’.
Turbayne begins by professing his fidelity to
Aristotle's basic intuitions about metaphor, even while
^^Colin Murray Turbayne, The Myth of Metaphor (Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press, 1970) , revised edition;
originally published 1962.
^^Foster Tait, ’Foreword II [to revised edition],’ in
Turbayne (1970), p. xii-xiv.
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expressing a desire to extend and more clearly delineate
what he considers to be the intended meaning of the
celebrated Aristotelian definition. Borrowing a phrase from
Gilbert Ryle, he asserts that
Metaphor consists in 'the presentation of thefacts of one category in the idioms
appropriate to another.' As with Aristotle'sdefinition the fundamental notion expressedhere is that of transference from one sort to
another or, for short, of sort-crossing. (12)
To this definition he is quick to add that although every
metaphor involves sort-crossing, not every instance of sort-
crossing is a metaphor. The vital further condition that
distinguishes metaphorical cases of sort-crossing provides
the central thesis of his book: 'The use of metaphor
involves the pretense that something is the case when it is
not .
' (13)
In order to substantiate his view, Turbayne asks us to
compare a series of pairs of assertions. The first of these
pairs juxtaposes 'The timber-wolf is a wolf with 'Man is a
wolf.' Here 'the timber-wolf and 'man' are given the same
name, yet we are likely to consider only the second of these
a metaphor. We understand the former claim to mean simply
that 'the timber-wolf is a sort included in the larger sort
wolf . . .or that timber-wolves are included in the denotation
of 'wolf';' yet we take the latter claim to 'intend that
[man] shares some of the properties of wolves but not enough
to be classified as an actual wolf--not enough to let him be
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ranged alongside the timber-wolf and the Tasmanian wolf.'
(14-15) We read 'man is a wolf metaphorically by adopting
the vital pretense. As Turbayne explains,
though I give [man] the same name I do notbelieve he is another sort of wolf. I only
make believe he is. My words are not to be
taken literally but only metaphorically. That
is, I pretend that something is the case when
it is not, and I implicitly ask my audience
to do the same. (14)
An important consequence of this view is that where
there is no such pretense, there can be no metaphor. We
often represent facts of one sort in words that may be
Gqually appropriate to the facts of another— this is mere
duality of sense. For even the most conservative
lexicographer, phrases such as 'the point of a needle' and
'the point of a joke' today express distinct literal
meanings that pose no problems of comprehension. For
Turbayne, 'the use of metaphor involves both the awareness
of duality of sense and the pretense that the two different
senses are one.' (17) It follows that an instance of
duality of sense may acquire--or return to--metaphorical
status only when 'the ^ prescription is filled.' (18)
Turbayne takes up this task; indeed, the better part of his
book is devoted to restoring the 'make-believe' pretense to
a few prominent cases for which it has been lost. He
explains that
to the plain man there may be no metaphor in
Aristotle's 'substance,' Descartes' 'machine
of nature,' Newtonian 'force' and
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attraction,
' Thomas Young's 'kinotic
energy,' and Michelangelo's figure of Leda.
Placed in their customary contexts these
present to him nothing but the face of
literal truth. To the initiated, however, who
are aware of the 'gross original' senses as
well as the now literal senses, they may
become metaphors
. There are no metaphors per
se. (18) —
This conclusion directs us to the subject of his second
section, 'Being Used by Metaphor.' Turbayne begins by
considering some of the benefits of a good metaphor: it can
change one's point of view, offer a new perspective, even
provoke a shift in attitude. Effective sort-crossing
imposes a 'screen' or 'filter' through which we look at some
part of the world. It may succeed in stressing certain
less familiar aspects of that part, while suppressing
features that are more commonly known. It is just this
success, however, that baits the potential snare in any
effective metaphor. If the new association produced by
metaphorical sort-crossing becomes conventional, the vital
pretense of 'make-believe' may be obscured, and even lost.
Aspects stressed and features suppressed by the sort-
crossing may then begin to appear as such quite naturally,
just as 'a story often told--like advertising and
propaganda--comes to be believed more seriously.' (21) Once
this happens, we are used by metaphor.
^'’Turbayne borrows these terms from the important work of
Max Black, which I take up in section 1.2 below.
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When the pretense is dropped either by the
original pretenders or their followers, what
was before called a screen or filter is now
more appropriately called a disguise or mask.
There is a difference between using a
metaphor and being used by it, between using
a model and mistaking the model for the thing
modeled. The one is to make believe that
something is the case: the other is to
believe it. (22)
Turbayne underlines that it is not necessarily a mistake
simply to cross sorts, for to do so can be pleasing,
productive and interesting. Rather, 'it is a mistake to
present the facts of one sort in the idioms of another
without awareness. For to do this is not just to fuse two
different senses of a sign; it is to confuse them.' (22)
To be used by a metaphor, then, is simply to take it
literally. Yet just as duality of sense alone does not
account for use of metaphor, errors about duality of sense
do not necessarily entail being used by metaphor. For
instance, we may confuse the distinct literal senses of
homonyms, or words and signs that are ambiguous. An error
about duality of sense becomes a case of taking a metaphor
literally
[o]nly when one of the two different senses
confused is metaphorical and this is taken
for the literal .. .But since a metaphor is not
a metaphor per se but only for someone, from
one point of view it is better to say that
sometimes the metaphor is not noticed; it is
hidden. That is, if X is aware of the
metaphor while Y is not, X says that Y is
being taken in by the metaphor, or being used
by it, or taking it literally. But for Y it
is not a case of taking the metaphor
literally at all, because for him there is no
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metaphor. He is speaking literally or taking
it literally. (23-4)
In these terms, Turbayne proceeds to describe the three
potential stages in the life of a metaphor. 'At first a
word's use is simply inappropriate. This is because it
gives the thing a name that belongs to something else.
'
Once duality of sense and the vital pretense are recognized,
'the effective metaphor quickly enters the second stage in
its life; the once inappropriate name becomes a metaphor.
It has its moment of triumph. We accept the metaphor by
acquiescing in the make-believe.' (24) At this point, we
use the metaphor quite attentively, often to significant
artistic or explanatory effect; for Turbayne, '[t]his is the
stage at which the metaphor, being new, fools hardly
anyone.' (25) In time, however, we may grow complacent and
tend to overlook the sense of make-believe that is necessary
to the proper use of metaphor. This is the third stage: we
no longer pretend that sounds are vibrations, and the human
body a machine, for now 'sounds are nothing but vibrations,
and the human body is nothing but a machine. What had
before been models are now taken for the things
modeled. .. reducibility has become reductionism. . . ' (25-6)
For Turbayne, eminent victims of metaphor in history
are easy to find. Among them are some of the most original
and influential sort-crossers we have known. Plato,
Descartes, Newton, Berkeley, and Freud are cited as flagrant
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cases of authors who, '[h]aving invented their new
metaphors,
. . .were then so beguiled by the charm of their
creations that they mistook these interpretations for the
things interpreted.’ (6) This unwarranted passage— from
make-believe to belief, and thereby from attentive use to
complacently being used— is perhaps most plausibly explained
by the principle of association made famous in the writings
of David Hume. As Turbayne notes, ' [t]he long continued
association of two ideas, especially if the association has
theoretical and practical benefit, tends to result in our
confusing them.
' (26) In the case of metaphor, this common
confusion is abetted by the fact that distinct ideas share a
common label and set of properties.
Fortunately, Hume also suggested a means of exposing
and overcoming this type of confusion. Turbayne observes
that
The burden of David Hume’s refutation of the
argument for the nature of God from the order
or design found in the world amounts to the
exposure of a metaphor, directly, by showing
a weak analogy, and indirectly, by extending
the metaphor. (57)
In the famous argument from design, Hume identified hidden
metaphors such as ’the world is a ship or a house,’ and ’God
is a builder.’ To attack the argument, he simply attributed
further properties of (the literal senses of) ’ship’ and
’house’ to the world, and of ’builder’ to God. By alluding,
for instance, to many worlds ’botched and bungled’ before
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this one, and to multiple builders, male and female,
possessing the most ordinary human features, he focused
attention upon some of the absurd implications of a literal
reading of the hidden metaphors— thereby exposing them as
metaphors, and restoring the 'as if pretense. By way of
further illustration, Turbayne applies this same method to a
literal reading of 'man is a wolf.'
We take 'wolf literally and transfer
properties such as four- legged and tailed to
man. We then ask the victims to test the
wolf-hypothesis. Any man they meet is now a
disconf irming instance, and it is hoped that
they will reject the hypothesis. (58)
In similar fashion, the remainder of Turbayne 's book is
devoted to a critical comparison of the machine model of
nature, as tendered by each of Descartes and Newton, with
his own proposal for an alternative, which he derives from
Berkeley's language model of vision. In carrying out this
study, he undertakes 'to explode the metaphysics of
mechanism. . .by exposing mechanism as a case of being
victimized by metaphor.' (5)
Without going into any further detail about this
particular case, we may enumerate certain key features of
Turbayne 's general account of metaphor. The novelty of his
view lies in its detailed emphasis on the potential
^^Cf. David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
(New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1966) , Part V, p. 39;
edited by Henry Aiken. Originally published in 1779.
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educative function of metaphor. While most of the authors
associated with the traditional view address themselves
primarily to aesthetic or rhetorical considerations (that
is, metaphor as it is used to persuade, please or
influence)
,
Turbayne is concerned above all with the
appropriate explanatory role of metaphor. As to this role,
he concludes that metaphors may be of value as models, for
pedagogical or inventive purposes--in short, as a form of
convenient heuristic fiction. Still, his account conforms
to the traditional view in virtue of its opposition to the
use of metaphor in attempting to communicate any type of
direct cognitive claim. Despite its potential heuristic
value, metaphor remains above all a fiction, which must be
recognized as such if it is to be literally rendered. From
his opening pages, Turbayne warns of the grave confusion
dormant in hidden metaphors, which lead us inevitably ’to
mistake, for example, the theory for the fact, the procedure
for the process, the myth for history, the model for the
thing, and the metaphor for the face of literal truth.' (4)
To avert this confusion, he prescribes three steps:
first, the detection of the presence of the
metaphor; second, the attempt to 'undress'
the metaphor by presenting the literal truth,
'to behold the deformity of error we need
only undress it'; and third, the restoration
of the metaphor, only this time with
awareness of its presence. (56)
In this call to expose and 'undress' metaphors, thereby
to reveal facts free of theory and history free of myth, we
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have excellent testimony to what I have called the
traditional view of metaphor among English-speaking
philosophers. As earlier indicated, adherents of this view
contend that although such clever figurative adornment may
direct us to delightful, interesting and even valuable new
perspectives, metaphor ultimately obscures literal truth.
In transferring a sign from one referent to another,
metaphor suggests that something is the case when it is not,
thus inviting confusion and deception. For Turbayne, as for
Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke and Mill, metaphorical assertions
may be said to express cognitive claims only once they have
been detected and translatea into equivalent literal terms.
Accordingly, use of metaphor in the process by which we
acquire and communicate knowledge must be considered
cautiously, with an appropriate measure of suspicion, if not
aversion
.
The enduring attraction of this view consists in its
strong common-sense appeal to the way in which we often
seek, at least initially, to interpret instances of
metaphor. At an intuitive level, we attempt to reduce such
instances to more accessible literal terms that will permit
us to 'make sense' of the statement or expression in which
they occur. The guiding intuition for this reduction,
derived from Aristotle, is that a keen eye for resemblance
will yield the appropriate literal translation that is the
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meaning of a metaphor. As this literal translation is
assumed to be always available in principle (at least to
those sufficiently clever at solving the puzzle or riddle
posed)
,
metaphor is regarded as just a more imaginative or
artistic way to say the same thing. A related virtue of
this position, then, is its implicit defence of the adequacy
of standard literal semantics for explaining the process by
which we create and understand metaphorical utterances. By
resisting appeal to an alternative type of meaning, the
traditional view avoids the potential complications of a
parallel, nonliteral semantics, and preserves the unrivalled
integrity of literal truth.
The basic problem with this position, however, is that
adequate literal translations are simply not available for
most instances of metaphor. Indeed, many of us are more
likely to regard the readily-translatable cases as just
everyday ambiguity or painful cliche, rather than metaphor
.
For innumerable reasons, literal translations of even the
most ordinary metaphors often fail miserably to accomplish
what they do in their original form. At best, our proposed
translations dopond upon a series of inferences from
context-- inferences sufficiently loose to forbid any
unambiguous literal rendering. If I call Rush Limbaugh a
pig, for instance, I may be saying something about his size,
shape, odour, appetite, table manners or political views--
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but not necessarily any or all of these. The intended sense
of my statement, like that of so much of our ordinary
literal talk, can only be determined with confidence in
light of relevant information about its particular context
^se . Moreover, for a vast number of occurrences of
metaphor, there seems to be no evident literal translation
available at all, or at least, no translation that may be
assured of evading reasonable charges of crude reductionism,
interpretive prejudice, or general incompleteness. What
strictly literal phrasing, for instance, will do justice to
the physicist's discussion of 'curved space', the poet's
reference to 'marmalade skies', or the social critic's
attack on 'the spirit of the times'? Attempts at literal
paraphrase are most often inadequate simply because the
successful metaphor--whether it be strikingly fresh, or
fading terminally into literal use--is successful precisely
^^This is true not only of utterances that employ
ambiguous terms or expressions; for instance, contextual
knowledge is always required to interpret signs that serve a
semantic function indexically, such as 'this', 'here' or
'him'. Cf. Charles Sanders Pierce (1897), in Justus Buchler
(ed.) The Philosophy of Peirce: Selected Writings (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956)
,
who draws a clear distinction
between signs that can be interpreted independently of a
referring situation (symbols and icons) and those that may
only be understood through the actual situation in which they
occur (indices) . For discussion of the importance of this
distinction, cf. Elizabeth Bates, Language and Context (New
York: Academic Press, 1980), and Carol A. Kates, Pragmatics
and Semantics (Itahaca, Cornell University Press, 1980), most
notably chapter 5. I consider attempts to explain the work of
metaphor by reference to contextual knowledge in my second
chapter below.
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because it contributes something vital. For the moment,
this is only to say that an effective metaphor seems (to
those for whom it is effective) every bit as fitting as it
does pleasing, and as such, it can only be considered
delightfully or disturbingly appropriate as it is.
By way of reply to these criticisms, advocates of the
traditional position might concede that metaphors seldom
admit of direct replacement terms, in order to retreat to a
qualified version of the view that the meaning of a metaphor
is equivalent to that of its ever-accessible literal
translation. Such a qualified version might contend that
metaphorical meaning resides not in individual words, but in
their comparative juxtaposition--most notably, in the tacit
assertion of a relation of similarity between (the referents
of) individual words employed in their ordinary literal
senses. As we have seen, support for such a strategy can be
drawn from Aristotle’s claim that a good metaphor exhibits a
'perception of similarity in dissimilars
' ,
or from
Turbayne's opinion that a proper reading of 'man is a wolf
identifies the shared properties of men and wolves. On this
alternative account of the traditional view, metaphors are
nothing other than abridged or compressed statements of
comparison, whose omission of certain words marks a mere
difference of style rather than substance. Accordingly,
insertion of the missing comparative term ('like' or 'as')
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only renders explicit in an ordinary literal statement the
same comparison and ensuing perception of similarity
operating implicitly in the metaphor to which it
corresponds. Thus, taking one of the standard examples, to
assert metaphorically that Richard is a lion is to mean
simply that he is like a lion (in being brave) . In general
terms, the meaning of the metaphorical claim ’X is Y' is
just that of the literal statement 'X is like Y'; in this
way, a metaphorical assertion may be considered to acquire
cognitive significance once it has been translated into its
corresponding literal comparison.
This variant of the traditional view is no less
deficient, however, for several reasons. First, relatively
few occurrences of metaphor take the form of an identity or
predication ('X is Y’).^^ In the case of metaphorical
phrases such as Whitman's 'Lilac and star and bird twined
with the chant of my soul', or Eliot's 'yellow smoke that
rubs its muzzle on the window-panes', for instance, no
corresponding statement of comparison is evident at all.
Second, for still other cases, even such familiar oldies as
^^Christine Brooke-Rose offers the most complete survey of
the many various grammatical forms of metaphor, considered by
syntactic group; her detailed study of the syntax of metaphor
in the work of fifteen poets ranging from Chaucer to Dylan
Thomas identifies the 'Genitive Link' ('the A of B') as the
most frequently-occurring type of metaphor. Cf. Christine
Brooke-Rose, A Grammar of Metaphor (London: Seeker and
Warburg, 1958), p. 288.
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'you are the apple of my eye', or 'Babe Ruth was the sultan
of swat', introduction of the comparative term ('like' or
'as') yields not literal comparison, but simile--that is,
smother nonliteral statement, itself requiring some form of
additional nonliteral interpretation. The move from
metaphor to simile is in fact no more than a move from
figurative assertion to figurative comparison (where we may
take 'figurative' to be synonymous with 'metaphorical'). As
figurative comparison resists reduction to the sure and
immediate account of shared properties that we associate
with standard literal comparison, this move only postpones
the interpretive burden imposed by the initial metaphor.^®
^®Lynne Tirrell has argued that
no simile can be understood wholly literally.
A sentence of the form 'A is like B' is not
ipso facto a simile. In 'A bicycle is like a
tricycle except a bicycle has two wheels
instead of three', 'a bicycle is like a
tricycle' is not a simile. It is a
straightforward literal comparison. I can
justify my assertion of 'The engine of my boat
is like the engine of my car' with a long
tedious list of properties both have— in the
same literal sense. (Both are physical
objects, made of metal, plastic, and rubber,
both power vehicles, both are of internal-
combustion design, both run on gas, and so
on.) Although of the correct syntactic form,
such a comparison is not a simile. Neither the
inferences it licences nor the justification
it requires involves figurative discourse in
any way.
'
Cf. Lynne Tirrell, 'Reductive and Nonreductive Simile Theories
of Metaphor, ' The Journal of Philosophy , Volume LXXXVIII, No.
7, July 1991, p. 343. Her conclusion, which I accept
unreservedly, is that 'the distinction between simile and
literal comparison lies in the sort of interpretation an
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It cannot, therefore, be considered a translation to the
strict literal terms required by the traditional view.
It would appear that this abridged comparison position
applies only to metaphors occurring (or easily rendered) as
identities or predications, for which insertion of 'like’ or
'as' yields direct literal comparison, rather than simile.
Even for cases adhering to these restrictive formal
requirements, however, there remains an additional problem,
which is that literal comparisons by themselves often fail
to preserve anything like the clarity and succinctness of a
good metaphor. The difficulty here, simply put, is that
everything is endlessly similar to everything else.^^ As
audience assigns (or ought to assign) to the expression.
'
(345)
^^Cf. Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1981), for the claim that
everything is similar to everything else in
infinitely many respects . For example, my
sensation of a typewriter at this instant and
the quarter in my pocket are both similar in
the respect that some of their properties (the
sensation's occurring right now and the
quarter's being in my pocket right now) are
effects of past actions . . .Both the sensation
and the quarter exist in the twentieth
century. Both the sensation and the quarter
have been described in English. And so on and
so on. The number of similarities one can find
between any two objects is limited only by
ingenuity and time. (64-65)
Robert Fogelin has sought to deny this claim by arguing that
similarity statements are asymmetrical. Cf. Robert Fogelin,
Figuratively Speaking (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1988), pp. 58-67. I consider Fogelin's own view of metaphor,
and this argument, in sections 2.1 and 2.2 respectively.
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similarity always admits of degrees, any thorough effort to
understand metaphor in terms of literal comparison must take
the form of an extended report of the many various respects
in which the two distinct subjects in question may be
relevantly said to resemble each other. Here we might
well put aside the well-worn examples concerning the
'^olfishness of men, or Richard's lion-heart, and ponder
instead a case like Nietzsche's 'Man is a rope over an
abyss'. To the extent that a report of the relevant
similarities that this statement calls to mind approaches a
reasonable degree of completeness, it loses the vivacity and
concise effectiveness of the original metaphor from which it
is derived. This is not to say that our efforts to
interpret this (or any other) metaphor are without merit; it
is, however, to cast doubt on the claim that metaphors can
be equivalently translated as literal comparisons, since
these comparisons will often provide only arbitrary
reductionism, on the one hand, or relative indistinctness on
the other.
The traditional account of metaphor is inadequate
because its defense of the idea of reducible metaphorical
sense--whether it be construed in terms of straight literal
^°This point is well made by Max Black, his conflation of
simile and literal comparison notwithstanding. Cf. Max Black,
'Metaphor, ' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , N.S. 55
(1954-55), pp. 273-294.
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substitution, or abridged literal comparison--cannot be
sustained. For most contemporary critics and theorists of
metaphor, this inadequacy is considered instructive. Our
chronic difficulty in furnishing satisfactory literal
translations might be said to account for the fact that so
many metaphors are more quickly and easily 'grasped', or
intuitively appreciated, than they are 'unpacked' or
explained. In my next section, I turn to a rival set of
semantic theories of metaphor, theories that acknowledge and
indeed celebrate this very difficulty, by proposing several
versions of a more elaborate analysis of the notion of
metaphorical meaning.
Before proceeding to discuss this alternative set of
semantic views, however, I must append a further word
concerning my choice of Turbayne as a significant
contemporary representative of the traditional account.
This word concerns a few striking passages in which Turbayne
seems less certain about the notion of unique literal truth
than the rest of his book would indicate. In the very last
paragraph of his section on 'Being Used by Metaphor,' he
adds, curiously, that
The victim of metaphor accepts one way of
sorting or bundling or allocating the facts
as the only way to sort, bundle or allocate
them. The victim not only has a special view
of the world but regards it as the only view,
or rather, he confuses a special view of the
world with the world. He is thus.
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unknowingly, a metaphysician. He has mistaken
the mask for the face. ( 27 )
Here, the victim of metaphor is no longer merely one who
takes a metaphor literally; rather, he is anyone who claims
s unigue, authoritative status for his own particular
bundling of the facts. The implicit suggestion that all
descriptions are just alternative metaphorical bundlings,
however, is at once undermined by customary references to
’the factS/ ' 'the world, ' and 'the face, ' all of which point
to the accessibility of just such a privileged (literal)
description. Thus concludes, rather enigmatically,
Turbayne's key section and chapter on how it is that we
unwittingly fall victim to the compelling charms of
metaphor. His apparent equivocation on this point is not
altogether cleared away until the completion of his general
discussion of metaphor, where, in a passage just preceding
his extensive study of the central metaphors employed in the
work of Descartes, Newton and Berkeley, Turbayne reveals his
hand
:
The attempt to re-allocate the facts by
restoring them to where they 'actually
belong' is vain. It is like trying to observe
the rule 'Let us get rid of the metaphors and
replace them by the literal truth.' But can
this be done? We might just as well seek to
provide what the poet 'actually says.' I have
said that one condition of the use of
metaphor is awareness. More accurately
speaking, this means more awareness, for we
can never become wholly aware. We cannot say
what reality is, only what it seems like to
us, imprisoned in Plato's cave, because we
cannot get outside to look. The consequence
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is that we never know exactly what the facts
are. We are always victims of adding some
interpretation. We cannot help but allocate,
sort, or bundle the facts in some way or
another. (64)
It is not my intention here to assess this affirmation
of what would appear to be a type of metaphorical relativism
with respect to truth.
I
want only to exhibit what I take
to be a lingering tension in Turbayne's work, one prominent
enough to require that an asterisk be fixed to his
affiliation with the traditional view. This tension
presents itself when we recall his central thesis that 'the
use of metaphor involves the pretense that something is the
case when it is not,' (13) which provides the basis for his
indictment of so many complacent and confused theorists who
have fallen victim to a literal reading of their own
metaphors. If Turbayne is indeed of the view that it is
vain to seek to restore the facts to where they 'actually
belong, ' or to attempt to replace the metaphors with literal
truth, then it is hard to see what remains of the critical
force in his denunciation of our frequent neglect of the
'make-believe' pretense that entails 'being used by
metaphor'. His revised condition for the proper use of
metaphor, in demanding only ' more awareness, for we can
never become wholly aware', would seem to amount to little
comparable view is developed in greater detail in the
work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, which I discuss in
section 1.2 below.
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more than a call for humility, for recognition of the
existence of competing descriptions that we cannot
demonstrate to be false. To be humble in this way, however,
would be to rescind the very basis of his earlier
distinction between literal and metaphorical expression, and
thereby undermine the central thesis of his book. For this
reason, I have elected to treat the passages immediately
above as aberrations from (or perhaps afterthoughts to) what
is an otherwise consistent viewpoint. Though much of his
work lends itself well in support of the traditional
account, Turbayne is perhaps not, at the end of the day, its
most unfailing advocate. Indeed, the reservations expressed
in the passages I have cited might best be understood as a
certain measure of self-criticism, prompted by the charges
leveled against the traditional view in the early work of
the so-called ' interactionists, ' of which Turbayne would
certainly have been aware.
I turn now to consider a few prominent versions of this
work
.
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1-2 Irreducible Metaphorical Sense
How pregnant sometimes his replies are; ahappiness that often madness hits on, which
reason and sanity could not so prosperously
be delivered of.
-Polonius (aside), Hamlet II, 2
The reservations expressed by Turbayne concerning the
availability of equivalent literal translations for all
metaphorical expression might be regarded as an indication
of the rising influence of an alternative perspective on
metaphor that challenges the traditional account. This
innovation is generally considered to have emerged with I.
A. Richards's Philosophy of Rhetoric (1936)^^ a critical
study of the field in large part intended 'to put the theory
^^Ivor A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (London:
Oxford University Press, 1936); references are to the 1976
reprint. Kittay (1987) points out that Richards, a student of
Coleridge, was greatly influenced by 'the Romantic heritage,'
and in particular, the view that language is above all a
medium for imaginative expression. 'Hence,' she writes, 'the
lineage of current discussions of the cognitive import of
metaphor is traced back to that Romanticism, tempered with
Kantianism, epitomized by Coleridge.' (4-6)
On my organization of the principal approaches to
metaphor in philosophy, this Romantic ' expressivism' falls
rather uneasily between sections 1.2 and 2.2, which is to say,
between standard conceptions of 'irreducible metaphorical
sense' and 'irreducible non-sense'. Although Romantic views
endorse the idea of artistic expression as a direct source of
higher knowledge, they tend to distinguish sharply this more
perfect 'artists' knowledge' from the rather mundane ordinary
knowledge expressed by the cognitive claims of literal
discourse. As this separation of distinct cognitive and
emotive uses of language later forms an important basis for
the positivist refusal of the idea of metaphorical sense, I
have elected to treat of this 'Romantic heritage' (albeit
briefly), in section 2.2 below.
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of metaphor in a more important place than it has enjoyed in
traditional Rhetoric.' (95) Richards's assault on the
classical view begins with his repudiation of the customary
means of distinguishing the literal and figurative use of
words, which he labels the 'Proper Meaning Superstition.'
(11) For Richards, words can never be said to possess a
'proper' meaning, in the sense of a fixed and direct link to
distinct ideas. Citing the multiple meanings of certain
words, the existence of meaning variance over time, and
ultimately, the fact of evolution and change in language,
through which significations wax and wane amid a constant
' movement among meanings,
' (48) Richards calls into question
the customary idea of the word as an independent semantic
unit, contending instead that the meaning of a word can only
be determined by reference to its role within a more general
context of discourse. This contention is central to his
'context theorem of meaning,' with which he seeks to depose
the semantic priority of the word endorsed by conventional
studies of rhetoric. The meaning of an utterance is not the
result of a tabulation of independent word meanings; rather,
^^Richards here echoes what Saussure considered 'the
organizing principle for the whole of linguistics, considered
as a science of language structure,' namely, that 'the
linguistic sign is arbitrary, ' in the sense that it is
'unmotivated: that is to say arbitrary in relation to its
signification, with which it has no natural connection to
reality.' Cf. Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General
Linguistics (Translated by Roy Harris; La Salle, Illinois:
Open Court, 1986), pp. 67-69.
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as IS familiar to any translator of languages, word meanings
are always construed organically, in relation to the more
general sense of the utterance in which they occur. The
components of discourse are in this respect always
interdependent. Words do indeed refer, but they do so only
by virtue of being already embedded within a broader
linguistic context of other ' interanimated' words. (47)
Consequently, the relative stability of a word's meaning
over time and in different circumstances follows from a
relative stability of its place within a particular
linguistic context. As polar instances of such variable
stability, Richards contrasts technical vocabulary, where
rigid univocal meanings are rooted in explicit definitions,
with poetic images, where construal of meaning relies upon
an extensive and diverse range of interpretive possibilities
at play in the greater semantic constellation that is the
poem. (48)
Most of our everyday speech situations fall somewhere
between these poles, drawing upon linguistic resources from
a significant range of contexts. For Richards, this routine
combining of terms from various contexts reveals the full
extent of our reliance upon metaphor, without which 'we
cannot get through three sentences of ordinary fluid
discourse.' (92) The inescapable semantic interdependence
of words entails that in all but the most artificial or
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technical contexts, metaphor is not a deviant or decorative
use of language, but 'the omnipresent principle of all its
free action.' (90) To defend this rather startling claim,
appeals to his own 'context theorem of meaning. '
If in most ordinary speech contexts, meaning is produced by
a union of signs, then
a word is normally a substitute for (or
means) not one discrete past impression but a
combination of general aspects. Now that is
itself a summary account of the principle of
metaphor. In the simplest formulation, when
we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of
different things active together and
supported by a single word, or phrase, whose
meaning is a resultant of their interaction.
(93)
Richards here introduces a term that has since acquired
an unrivalled currency among philosophical efforts to
explain the work of metaphor. Today, ' interactionism'
,
in
all of its assorted and elaborate renderings--and despite
the challenges posed by competing pragmatic views--would
have to be considered the dominant contemporary perspective.
The common point of departure for most versions of this
position, following Richards, is one of opposition to the
traditional view, where 'metaphor has been treated as a sort
of happy extra trick with words... a grace or ornament or
added power of language, not its constitutive form. ' (90)
On Richards's account, by contrast, metaphor is pervasive in
ordinary speech contexts because it gives expression to our
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most fundamental thought processes, which are unavoidably
relational
.
The traditional theory noticed only a few of
the modes of metaphor; and limited its
application of the term metaphor to a few of
them only. And thereby it made metaphor seem
to be a verbal matter, a shifting and
displacement of words, whereas fundamentally
it is a borrowing between and intercourse of
thoughts
,
a transaction between contexts
,
Thought is metaphoric, and proceeds by
comparison, and the metaphors of language
derive therefrom. (94)
In an effort to be more precise about this metaphorical
'borrowing between and intercourse of thoughts, ' Richards
proposes two technical terms for separating the distinct
ideas that a metaphor brings together in one. In this, he
intiates what would be a long series of attempts among his
followers to arrive at the appropriate analytical
nomenclature for a precise and accurate account of how a
metaphor works. He proposes the name 'tenor' for the intial
or primary idea under consideration, and 'vehicle' for the
idea through which it is described or imagined, stipulating
that we may speak of 'the tenor [as] the underlying idea or
principal subject which the vehicle or figure means.' (97)
While employing this distinction to clarify the role of each
of the distinct component parts of a metaphor, he warns of
the potential for confusion in regarding either part in
isolation. 'We need the word 'metaphor' for the whole
double unit;' (96) tenor and vehicle cannot be considered
apart from one another since a metaphor exists only when
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each IS apprehended through the other. Metaphor requires
the participation of both in their interaction. Against the
traditional view, then, Richards insists that in a metaphor,
the tenor does not remain unaffected; as such, it cannot be
accurately depicted apart from the vehicle, as if the latter
was a merely ornamental redescription of the former. In
other words, a metaphor is not capable of being translated
into equivalent literal terms, since
the co-presence of the vehicle and tenor
results in a meaning (to be clearly
distinguished from the tenor) which is not
attainable without their interaction. The
vehicle is not normally a mere embellishment
of a tenor which is otherwise unchanged by it
but that vehicle and tenor in co-operation
give a meaning of more varied powers than can
be ascribed to either. (100)
For Richards, the defining feature of a metaphor is
that it gives us two ideas in one. This would seem to imply
that despite the pervasive influence of metaphor that he
identifies in most speech contexts, we may nonetheless
continue to distinguish between literal and metaphorical
expression in the same terms, identifying the literal with
cases for which we are unable to discriminate tenor and
vehicle. Richards's account is unclear on this point and
several others. Although he does discuss a few instances of
metaphor drawn from the work of his adversaries in order to
call into question their views, he fails to carry through
any further analysis of examples in terms appropriate to his
own theorem and definitions, which remain rather obscure as
54
a result. Obscurity notwithstanding, however, Richards's
insistence that metaphor marks neither a deviant nor
ornamental use of language, but rather, a pervasive and
fundamental aspect of thought and expression, marks a
decisive shift in the way that English-speaking philosophers
have come to understand metaphor.
This shift did not take hold until it was widely
popularized in an article by Max Black some eighteen years
later. Black's article may be read as an effort to
provide a more extended and rigorously systematic treatment
to Richards's seminal ideas. A measure of the success of
this effort is that his article remains even today the
authoritative statement of the interactionist position. As
the views expressed in this article constitute the primary
point of reference for an enormous contemporary
philosophical literature on metaphor, it will be important
to examine them in some detail.
Black sets himself the task of working out a 'logical
grammar' of our use of the word metaphor, in the form of
answers to questions about how it is that we detect and
understand metaphorical expression. To this end, he elects
to begin with an analysis of what he takes to be 'clear
cases' of metaphor, starting with the sentence 'The chairman
^^Black (1954), reprinted in Johnson (1981); page
references are to the latter.
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plowed through the discussion.- (64) m this instance, our
attention is quickly drawn to the word
-plowed,- which we
read in a different way than we do the other words of the
sentence. Yet there is nothing special about the word
plowed- in itself. Taken in isolation, we would not
consider it (or any other word) a metaphor. it is the
entire sentence that we identify as a metaphor, even though
our justification for this attribution refers to a single
word,
-plowed,
- which functions in a distinct fashion that
we want to call
-metaphorical.- in identifying a case of
metaphor, observes Black,
-we are referring to a sentence or
^^other expression, in which some of the words are used
metaphorically, while the remainder are used non-
metaphorically .
-
This observation is useful for two reasons. First, it
enables us to distinguish metaphor from certain other
tropes, since - [any] attempt to construct an entire sentence
of words that are used metaphorically results in a proverb,
an allegory, or a riddle.- (65) Second, it permits a clear
separation of the component parts said to be 'active
together- in a metaphor, by switching from Richards's rather
obscure reference to 'co-present thoughts' to a more precise
analysis based on particular words and the sentences in
which they occur. This switch is accomplished once Black
replaces Richards's 'tenor' and 'vehicle' with technical
56
terms of his own. in reference to 'the chairman plowed
through the meeting,' he proposes that '[we] call the word
plowed the focus of the metaphor, and the remainder of the
sentence in which that word occurs the frame .
' ( 65 - 66 ) in
these terms, further insight into how it is that we
recognize and make sense of metaphor requires that we
understand how the presence of one frame calls attention to
a focus that we read metaphorically, while the presence of a
different frame for the same complementary word yields no
such separation, but only literal sense.
One account of this variance holds that metaphor is
called upon to fill gaps in our vocabulary, in contexts
where no literal equivalent is available. 'So viewed,'
argues Black, 'metaphor is a species of catachresis
. . . the
pu.tting of new senses into old words. But if a catachresis
serves a genuine need, the new sense introduced will quickly
become part of the litera l sense.' Metaphors, on the other
hand, have an enduring quality, even in cases where 'there
is, or there is supposed to be, some readily available and
equally compendious literal equivalent.' As such, metaphor
cannot be reduced to catachresis simply because '[i]t is the
fate of catachresis to disappear when it is successful.'
An alternative account maintains that 'the focus of a
metaphor, the word or expression having a distinctively
metaphorical use within a literal frame, is used to
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communicate a meaning that might have been expressed
literally.' (69) The fundamental problem Black identifies
in this type of view, however, is that it does not
adequately justify the use of metaphor in the first place.
If an equivalent literal expression is always accessible,
then metaphor offers no new information. Rather, its use is
P^^sly decorative, and intended only to please the reader,
'who is taken to enjoy problem-solving
—or to delight in the
siJthor s skill at half-concealing, half-revealing his
meaning.
' So for those who 'have something more important
to do than give pleasure to their readers, ' Black concludes,
'metaphor can have no serious place...' (70)
Still another view holds that metaphor is just a
'condensed or elliptical simile, ' which presents an implicit
analogy or similarity; on this account, 'the metaphorical
statement may be replaced by an equivalent literal
comparison While improving significantly upon the
preceding view by suggesting that a metaphorical statement
actually has two distinct subjects, this view is impaired by
the fact that comparisons lack determinate rules of
interpretation. Reducing metaphor to comparison is
worthwhile only if we can make better sense of the latter.
^^As noted (in section 1.1) above. Black here conflates
simile and literal comparison; separating them yields distinct
positions, which I address in sections 2.1 and 1.1
respectively.
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As Black points out, however, our attempts to express
briefly and in clear literal terms the basis of similarity
between compared subjects usually fail. Hence his
determination that '[t]he main objection against a
comparison view is that it suffers from a vagueness that
borders upon vacuity.' (71)
Against the standard views, then. Black submits that
’ [m] etaphorical statement is not a substitute for a formal
comparison or any other kind of literal statement but has
its own distinctive capacities and achievements.' To
Provide support for this claim, he turns to the work of
Richards in order to clarify and develop 'an interaction
of metaphor.' (72) In short, this view hinges on the
idea that the distinguishing feature of metaphor is its
capacity to produce 'a new meaning, which is not quite its
meaning in literal uses, nor quite the meaning which any
literal substitute would have.' In Richards's notion of two
thoughts 'active together,' in 'connexion,'
'interillumination,' or 'co-operation,' Black identifies
'the secret and mystery of metaphor,' (73) where figurative
meaning emerges from the active engagement of distinct sets
of connotations associated with each of the subject terms.
To illustrate this process. Black takes up a familiar
example
.
Consider the statement, 'Man is a wolf.
Here, we may say, are two subj ects--the
59
principal subj ect
^
Man (or: men) and the
subsidiary subj ect
^
Wolf (or: wolves)
. Now
the metaphorical sentence in question will
not convey its intended meaning to a reader
sufficiently ignorant about wolves. What is
needed is not so much that the reader shall
know the standard dictionary meaning of
'wolf —or be able to use that word in
literal senses--as that he shall know what I
will call the ^stem of associated
commonplaces
. . . . The idea of wolf is part of
a system of ideas, not sharply delineated,
and yet sufficiently definite to admit of
detailed enumeration. (73-74)
In these terms. Black urges that we 'think of metaphor
as a filter " (73) that selects certain aspects of the
principal subject, while suppressing others; or further, as
a 'screen,' whereby 'the principal subject is 'seen through'
the metaphorical expression. . .or 'projected upon' the field
of the subsidiary subject.' (75) These images serve to
underline that the metaphorical transfer of meaning is
accomplished not through any kind of simple decoding
procedure, but rather, by way of a distinct intellectual
operation invoking entire systems of implications associated
with the terms in question. The original and important
result of this interactive operation is a wholly new
arrangement of associations applied to each subject. As
Black continues.
The effect, then, of (metaphorically) calling
a man a 'wolf is to evoke the wolf-system of
related commonplaces. If the man is a wolf,
he preys upon other animals, is fierce,
hungry, engaged in constant struggle, a
scavenger, and so on. . .Any human traits that
can without undue strain be talked about in
'wolf-language' will be rendered prominent.
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and any that cannot will be pushed into the
background. The wolf—inetaphor suppresses some
details, emphasizes others--in short,
organizes our view of man. (74-75)
Moreover, it is of particular importance that the
'filtering' or 'screening' process that generates such a
reorganized view runs in two directions, as the system of
'related commonplaces' evoked by a metaphor is itself
altered by the character of its metaphorical application.
Thus, advises Black, 'i]f to call a man a wolf is to put him
in a special light, we must not forget that the metaphor
makes the wolf seem more human than he otherwise would.' In
this way, he adds, metaphors assist in determining the very
system of associations that they apply, 'as though the stars
could partly determine the character of the observation-
screen by which we looked at them.' (77)
The vital contribution of the ' interactionist
'
position
is to be found in this recognition that metaphors play an
important role in the creation of meaning, as distinct
systems of associations are fused in a new and original
synthesis. Black's key contention, against the traditional
view, is that the semantic shift effected by a metaphor is
'not expendable, ' for it cannot be adequately captured in
literal terms. While allowing that to a point, we may
succeed in recounting a number of relevant aspects of the
system of implications that a good metaphor delivers, he
underlines that 'the set of literal statements so obtained
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will not have the same power to enlighten and inform as the
original.' In his concluding remarks, Black reiterates this
opinion as follows:
One of the points I wish most to stress is
that the loss in such cases is a loss of
cognitive content; the relevant weakness of
the literal paraphrase is not that it may be
tiresomely prolix or boringly explicit--or
deficient in qualities of style; it fails to
be a translation because it fails to give the
insight that the metaphor did. (79)
This passage fittingly sums up the decisive principle common
to the many various semantic views that have risen to
prominence in opposition to the traditional account.
Metaphors confer an insight that is irreducible to literal
terms; they transmit new information that cannot be
alternatively expressed.
Their shared support for the idea of irreducible
metaphorical sense notwithstanding, advocates of such
alternative semantic views have continued to debate the
question of just how it is that metaphors carry out their
creative work. Here Black's influence is pervasive, for in
his effort to provide a clear and yet adequately precise
explanation of the distinctive mechanism through which the
metaphorical transfer of meaning is accomplished, he defined
the task that has framed nearly all subsequent philosophical
discussion of metaphor. Among the many defenders of
comparable semantic views, a few merit brief consideration
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here for their attempts to elucidate and extend the
interaction position.
One such effort has been carried out by Paul Henle,^''^
who invokes the distinction, derived from C.S. Pierce,
between signs that refer directly in accordance with an
arbitrary conventional bond (symbols), and those that
signify indirectly by virtue of their resemblance to the
signified (icons). Metaphor is said to occur when a 'clash
of terms' at the level of their literal meanings leads us to
discern the figurative sense of the expression in which they
appear according its 'iconic element. ' By way of example,
Henle asks us to consider a segment of verse from Keats,
'When by my solitary earth I sit,/ And hateful thoughts
enwrap my soul in gloom. ' Here we remark that two distinct
situations are evoked by the second line, 'the one of
someone or something enveloping a person in something ... a
cloak or a blanket or something of the sort... The other
situation is that of hateful thoughts making one gloomy.
'
(86) The metaphor in this passage presents the second
situation in terms of the first, as 'envelopment in a cloak
is used to present the notion of gloom. ' More generally
speaking, 'we are led to think of something by a
consideration of something like it, and this is what
^®Paul Henle, (ed.), Language, Thought and Culture (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958). References are to
the reprint of pages 173-195 in Johnson (1981), pp. 83-104.
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constitutes the iconic mode of signifying.' (87) On Henle's
view, then, metaphors refer to iconic objects, whose
capacity for indirect signification is the source of
metaphorical meaning. Accordingly, metaphorical assertions
may be said to express 'a double primary cognitive content,'
corresponding to 'two situations
— that symbolized literally
and that symbolized figuratively.' While some initial
similarity between these two situations makes metaphor
possible, there is often 'supervening on this initial
similarity ... an additional similarity suggested or caused by
the use of the metaphor.
' This additional similarity is the
induced content of the metaphor,
' a 'modification of the
way of thinking of what the metaphor symbolizes indirectly,
'
(100) which forms a distinct 'part of the effect of the
metaphor ...[ for which] no paraphrase can be adequate.' (102)
Accordingly, '[t]he function of metaphor in general is to
extend language, to say what cannot be said in terms of
literal meanings alone.' (95)
Against this type of ' thing-approach ' that attends
primarily to the objects referred to by a metaphor, Monroe
Beardsley has sought to defend a 'word- approach, ' or
'Verbal-opposition Theory, ' relying upon the resources of
language alone. He proposes that
^^Monroe Beardsley, 'The Metaphorical Twist,' Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research Volume XXII, Number 3 (March
1962), pp. 293-307.
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when a term is combined with others in such a
way that there would be a logical opposition
between its central meaning and that of the
other terms, there occurs a shift from
*^6^tral to marginal meaning which shows us
the word is to be taken in a metaphorical
way. (299)
On the revised and updated version of this view, Beardsley
specifies that his use of the phrase 'logical opposition'
should be understood to include 'both direct incompatibility
of designated properties and a more indirect incompatibility
between the presuppositions of the terms,
' (299) and
further, that with 'marginal meaning, ' he intends to name
'the total set of accidental properties either found in or
attributed to [an] object,' or more succinctly, 'the
potential range of connotation ' of a word. (300) When we
encounter a metaphorical expression like ' th ' inconstant
moon, ' he observes, we seize upon the 'logical opposition'
it displays, in order to begin looking for a way to provide
it with sense. In so doing, 'we look about among the
accidental or contingent properties of inconstant people in
general, and attribute these properties, or as many as we
can, to the moon.
'
(301-302) New meaning thus emerges as
'metaphor transforms a property (actual or attributed) into
a sense .
'
(302) This transformation marks an enduring
semantic innovation that 'expands our verbal repertoire
^^Beardley's initial position is set out in his
Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism (New York:
Harcourt-Brace, 1958), Chapter III.
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allowing 'for
beyond the resources of literal language,
'
novelty, for change of meaning... [and for] the surprising
Ideas that may emerge even from chance juxtapositions of
words .
'
(303-304)
Still another view refuses appeal to any genuine
transfer of properties, in an effort to furnish an
alternative 'word-approach' based exclusively upon the
activity of predication. On this nominalistic account
recommended by Nelson Goodman, metaphor is simply 'a
matter of teaching an old word new tricks—of applying an
old label in a new way. ' Beyond routine occasions of new
naming, Goodman tells us, 'metaphor is an affair between a
predicate with a past and an object that yields while
protesting.' While new naming applies a label to a
previously undecided case, the ' [a] pplication of a term is
metaphorical only if to some extent contra-indicated.' (69)
We say, for instance, that a picture is 'sad,' even though
its being insentient implies that it cannot be; the conflict
is resolved only as 'sad' takes on a second range of
application that 'springs from' and is 'guided by' the
first. As opposed to mere ambiguity, then, metaphor occurs
when 'a term with an extension established by habit is
applied elsewhere under the influence of that habit, ' both
^^Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art (2nd edition;
Indianapolis: Hackett, 1976), most notably II, 5, pp. 68-75.
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in 'departure from and deference to precedent.' (71)
Because no term functions in complete isolation, but rather,
as part of a network of labels belonging to the same general
realm, the metaphorical reassignment of a discrete predicate
may effect a sweeping reorientation, as ' [a] whole set of
alternative labels, a whole apparatus of organization, takes
over new territory.' (73) In addition to the novel
organization of this territory, 'new associations and
discriminations are also made within the realm of transfer;
and the metaphor is the more telling as these are the more
intriguing and significant.' (80)
Without undertaking to pass judgement over their
specific points of disagreement , we may return, by way of
summary, to the common ground held by these competing
semantic views. To recapitulate, they are united in their
opposition to the traditional account, on the grounds that
metaphors are most often incapable of literal translation or
paraphrase. Instead, they take the cognitive content of a
metaphorical assertion to be the unique, irreducible and
indispensable product of a distinct intellectual operation.
‘*°Israel Scheffler offers a useful way to distinguish many
of these views with his six-fold classification (intuitionist,
emotive, formulaic, intensional, interactional, and
contextual) of how we interpret metaphors. Cf. Israel
Scheffler, Beyond the Letter: A Philosophical Inquiry into
Ambiguity, Vagueness, and Metaphor in Language (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), and the discussion of his
work in Kittay (1987), chapter 5, section 1, pp. 178-195.
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involving a complex procedure of simultaneous selection and
suppression, in effect, a creative and original
reorganization of disparate elements attributed to or
associated with two distinct subjects. Advocates of this
type of position, despite their substantial differences of
opinion accounting for the particular linguistic mechanism
that enables us alternatively to produce and understand this
innovative and irreducible content, tend to share the view
that metaphor is pervasive in our everyday speech precisely
because human thought processes are themselves
metaphorically structured, since to conceptualize is just to
classify experience in terms of familiar antecedent
categories
.
The virtues of this type of position are many. In
defending the idea of irreducible metaphorical meaning (or,
to include Goodman's strictly referential approach, the idea
of distinct metaphorical application)
,
it acknowledges the
sense of inescapable loss accompanying our attempts to
provide a literal rendering of most metaphors. More
generally, this view offers valuable insight into the manner
in which meaning is produced in language, as old words are
employed in new ways. Indeed, the 'interaction' position,
in all of its subtle variations, is perhaps most significant
for its recognition of the important role of metaphor in the
acquisition of knowledge and in the evolution of language.
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In terms familiar to this view, for instance, many acclaimed
philosophers of science^^ have argued that scientific models
can be understood as extended metaphors. In transposing the
particular facts (and anomalous data) of one theory to the
vocabulary of another theory that is more familiar to us,
models offer a powerful tool for discovery. Accordingly, we
have light waves and nuclear meltdowns, black holes and big
bangs--metaphors that have called forth previously
unrecognized similarities through a complex 'interactive'
process. In this function, metaphors are seen to be
'constitutive of the theories they express, and thus an
essential part of scientific progress.
Despite its many virtues, however, there remains an
insuperable problem with the 'interaction' position, as
detailed above. Stated simply, its account of the cognitive
irreducibility of metaphor invariably verges on incoherence.
The principal objection may be put as follows: sponsors of
such a position hold that a metaphorical assertion expresses
'^^Cf. Richard Boyd, 'Metaphor and theory change: What is
'metaphor' a metaphor for?' in Andrew Ortony (ed.). Metaphor
and Thought (2nd edition; Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993, first published in 1979), pp. 481-532; Thomas
Kuhn, 'Metaphor in science,' in Ortony (1993), pp. 533-542;
Mary Hesse, Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy
of Science (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980;
Michael Arbib and Mary B. Hesse, The Construction of Reality
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); David Bohm and
David Peat, Science, Order, and Creativity (New York: Bantam
Books, 1987) .
'’^Boyd (1979), p. 360.
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something that literal language cannot—but then claim that
this 'something' is a 'cognitive content', which is
precisely what literal language expresses. The minimal
point here is that our cognitive claims, insofar as they can
be said to express something 'cognitive' at all, must be
recognized and understood as meaningful claims. To be
meaningful, they need only employ terms that appeal to
shared standards of meaning— standards that distinguish the
relatively unambiguous clarity of conventional literal
sense. Metaphorical expression, on the other hand,
announces itself by way of a judicious disregard for such
standards; indeed, it is recognized as metaphorical
precisely in virtue of its considered abdication of the
requisite means for cognitive expression. This is not to
say that any particular metaphor must ever remain incapable
of such expression. To the contrary: well after its
initial formulation and use, the successful metaphor is
often retained by its enthusiasts, in order to be later
^^While earlier suggested by Anthony M. Paul, 'Metaphor
and the Bounds of Expression,' Philosophy and Rhetoric 5, no.
3
(1972): 143-157, Martin Warner, ' Black ' s Metaphors, ' British
Journal of Aesthetics 13, no. 4 (1973): 367-372, and William
Charlton, 'Living and Dead Metaphors,' British Journal of
Aesthetics 15, no. 2 (1975): 172-178, this objection has been
most forcefully articulated in Donald Davidson's essay, 'What
Metaphors Mean,' Critical Inquiry 5, no.l (1978): 13-30,
reprinted in Johnson (1981), pp. 200-220. Cf. in particular p.
216 of the latter; citations below also to this reprint. I
discuss Davidson's positive views on metaphor in detail in
section 2.2 below.
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repeated, and gradually construed in relation to a regular
context of use. In this way, over time and with wear, it
may come to acquire just such an accepted, conventional
sense. Correspondingly, it will gradually be employed to
assert cognitive claims, as this very acquisition of a
fixed, conventional use marks its death as a metaphor, and
Its successful integration into the lexicon of standard
literal sense, where its cognitive value is plainly
recognizable
.
Of course, the same sponsors of the 'interaction' view
may reply that this objection is spurious, for begging the
very question of the cognitive status of metaphor, by
assuming illegitimately that whatever is cognitively
may be expressed literally
. Against this
assumption, some have argued that the cognitive
irreducibility of metaphor is assured by the fact that
metaphor is essentially conceptual, rather than linguistic.
In the broadest sense, it occurs whenever we understand or
experience one kind of thing in terms of another. Prior to
its appearance in language, they claim, metaphor functions
as an inescapable principle of human understanding. The
linguistic utterances we call metaphors are really just
surface manifestations of the more basic conceptual
'’'‘Cf., in particular, Mary Hesse, 'Tropical Talk: The Myth
of the Literal, ' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
,
Supplemental Volume 61 (1987), pp. 283-296.
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metaphors that structure all language, thought and
experience. Once we accept, in this way, that metaphor is
essentially conceptual, it will be a mistake to distinguish
the metaphorical from the literal in the traditional manner,
that is, according to whether or not it is cognitively
significant. Rather, it will be more accurate to say that
the metaphorical stands to the literal as scheme to content,
or as theory to observation. On this type of account,
ordinary language will be regarded as inevitably shot
through with metaphor, since all (literal) linguistic
expression is always relative to an antecedent
(metaphorical) scheme, which is both nonliteral and yet
cognitively vital.
This kind of reply marks a considerable extension of
the ’ interactionist
'
position, one that has instigated
discussion accounting for a substantial portion of the
contemporary literature on metaphor. Most prominent among
the defenders of 'conceptual' metaphor are George Lakoff and
Mark Johnson, who have maintained through a lengthy series
of books and articles'’^ a set of views that may be
summarized as follows:
“’^Cf. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, 'Conceptual Metaphor
in Everyday Language,' The Journal of Philosophy 77, no.
8
(1980): 453-486, reprinted in Johnson (1981), references to
the latter, hereafter simply Lakoff and Johnson (1980a);
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1980) , hereafter simply Lakoff
and Johnson (1980b); George Lakoff, Women, Fire and Dangerous
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[M] etaphor is pervasive in everyday life, notjust in language but in thought and action.
Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of
which we both think and act, is fundamentally
metaphorical in nature .... the way we think,
what we experience, and what we do every day
is very much a matter of metaphor.''^
Lakoff and Johnson claim empirical support for their
position in the ordinary expressions of our everyday
language, which they consider to reveal the metaphorical
nature of the concepts upon which they are based. A
standard example they cite concerns our ordinary talk of
'attacked premises,' 'indefensible claims', 'argumentative
strategies,' and 'targeted criticisms,' formulations which
they take to provide linguistic evidence for the existence
of the underlying conceptual metaphor 'Argument is War'. (4-
6) Or similarly: in speaking of our propensity to 'save',
'spend', 'invest', 'budget' and 'waste' time, we reveal that
Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1987) ; Mark Johnson, The Body in
the Mind: the Bodily Basis of Meaning, Reason and Imagination
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); George Lakoff
and Mark Turner, More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to
Poetic Metaphor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989);
George Lakoff, 'Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used To
Justify War in the Gulf, ' distributed via electronic bulletin
boards, January 1991, reprinted in Brien Hallet (ed.).
Engulfed in War: Just War and the Persian Gulf (Honolulu:
Matsunaga Institute for Peace, 1991) ; also in Journal of Urban
and Cultural Studies , volume 2, number 1, 1991; in Vietnam
Generation Newsletter , volume 3, number 2, November 1991; and
in The East Bay Express , February 1991; George Lakoff, 'The
contemporary theory of metaphor,' in Andrew Ortony (ed.).
Metaphor and Thought , 2nd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993, pp. 202-251.
^^Lakoff and Johnson (1980b), p. 3.
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such utterances are structured by the metaphorical concept
'Time is Money' (7-9). Lakoff and Johnson emphasize
repeatedly that these are 'metaphors we live by' in this
culture, for they structure not just our respective talk
about arguments and time, but entire systems of thought that
sustain and direct the actions we perform in relation to
argumentation and the experience of time. Our lives are
inescapably organized around these and other like systems,
which we are urged to regard as 'experiential gestalts,
which give coherence and structure to our experience. In
these terms, metaphor is just 'the projection of one common
gestalt structure onto another,
' a procedure giving rise to
'a new gestalt that restructures aspects of our experience,
thought, and language.' (31) Or alternatively, as Lakoff
has more recently put it, 'metaphors are mappings, that is,
sets of conceptual correspondences.'^® Accordingly, our
descriptions of relationships 'unable to turn back', 'going
nowhere,' 'off the track,' or 'at a crossroads' are governed
by the conceptual metaphor 'Love is a Journey,' in effect,
an 'ontological mapping across conceptual domains, from the
source domain of journeys to the target domain of love.'
This mapping, we are reminded, is no mere matter of
language; rather, 'it is a fixed part of our conceptual
'’^Johnson (1981), p. 31.
'®Lakoff (1993), p. 207.
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system, one of our conventional ways of conceptualizing love
relationships.' (208) in transposing one distinct ontology
onto another, and along with it, a distinct set of
linguistic expressions, inference patterns, and affiliated
values and motivations, this example attests to a key
consequence of the 'conceptual' account, which is that
metaphor plays a very significant role in determining what
is real for us
.
'
Further inquiry along these lines, most notably,
concerning the way in which conceptual metaphor might be
considered to establish systematic relations of meaning
among distinct words and expressions, has been carried out
by Eva Kittay.^° Her investigation centers on metaphor as a
linguistic utterance, in order 'to advance our understanding
of the conceptual and cognitive significance of
metaphor ... through the elucidation of metaphorical meaning.'
(15) She begins by invoking a holistic view of language as
an interconnected system of signs, whose individual meanings
can only be determined in opposition to one another. This
view, derived from the work of Ferdinand de Saussure (and
later echoed in reference to metaphor by I. A. Richards^^)
,
provides the basis for her extensive analysis of metaphor in
^^Lakoff and Johnson (1980b), p. 146.
^°Cf. Kittay (1987).
^^Cf. note 33 above.
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terms of semantic field theory, the study of lexical items
according to sets bound by assorted relations of affinity
and contrast. The conclusion she reaches is that
metaphorical meaning is produced by more than a mere shift
of properties, predicates or implications; rather, 'in
metaphor what is transferred are the relations which pertain
within one semantic field to a second, distinct content
domain.
' (36) By way of illustration, we are asked to
consider the statement, made of a basketball player, that
her playing has been 'hot' lately. In this instance, Kittay
remarks
,
'hot' is the vehicle, and its semantic field
is the field of temperature terms; the domain
of the topic is athletics. and cold are
graded antonyms in the temperature field;
when they are transferred to sports, we can
construe a hot player as one who plays well
and scores, while a cold player does not. The
antonymy of the pair is preserved. Moreover,
if a player scores only moderately well, we
can say 'she was lukewarm in the third
quarter'. Since 'hot' and 'cold' are not
absolute but graded antonyms, we can capture
all sorts of performances in between, and
even on the outer extremes, for example, 'Her
performance on the court today is sizzling'.
In this way metaphor can, through a
transposition of relations, structure an as
yet unstructured conceptual domain or reorder
another semantic field, thereby altering,
sometimes transiently, sometimes permanently,
our ways of regarding the world. (36-37)
The cognitive significance of metaphor arises from this
capacity to restructure conceptual domains. While this
restructuring activity will certainly generate many new
implications, no one literal statement of paraphrase can
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capture its full import. 'The irreducibility of metaphor,'
Kittay explains, 'is importantly tied to the incongruity
between the domains of the topic and vehicle. That
incongruity guarantees that a metaphorical predication
cannot easily accomodate itself in the conceptual scheme
^^^ich lies behind literal and conventional language.
Without such accomodation it cannot be paraphrased.' (37)
With the shift to the descriptive resources of a distinct
semantic field, then, we arrive at an altered conceptual
organization of matters previously accessible to us only by
way of standard categories. This process, notes Kittay, is
vital to our capacity to learn; indeed, ' [m] etaphor is a
primary way we accomodate and assimilate information and
experience to our conceptual organization of the world.
'
( 39 )
This range of work on behalf of 'conceptual' metaphor
has done much to suggest interesting considerations for the
study of patterns of inference among certain of our various
lexical groupings. Of particular interest is the evidence
it provides for the generative character of conventional
linguistic practice. In compiling an impressive body of
empirical research to show that so much of our ordinary talk
reflects and upholds habitual ways of representing one type
of experience or activity in terms of another, the defenders
of 'conceptual' metaphor convincingly demonstrate our
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capacity to fashion ever new locutions that are readily
understandable in virtue of their conformity to such habits.
Moreover, by identifying metaphor with the establishment of
these conceptual correspondences underlying and structuring
our conventional speech, they have, along with their
’interactionist’ predecessors, gone further than any other
theorists of the subject in explaining the various ways in
which we interpret metaphorical expression.
Returning to matters at hand, however, we must note
that this view of metaphor does not answer the principal
objection to the notion of irreducible metaphorical sense,
as stated above. The 'conceptual' approach would apparently
defend the general significance of metaphor for cognition,
even though such is nowhere in guestion. To appreciate the
^ital role of metaphor in effecting new attitudes, theories,
beliefs and intentions, we are by no means bound to accept
the priority of conceptual over linguistic metaphor, nor
indeed, the notion of irreducible metaphorical sense. We
can affirm the power of metaphor to evoke such important
changes, even while denying that metaphors are bearers of an
irreducible yet still-somehow-determinate meaning, or more
particularly, that metaphorical assertions express a
distinct 'cognitive content'.
That this cannot be the case is perhaps best
illustrated by the well-worn character of the many examples
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offered and examined by the sponsors of irreducible
metaphorical sense as paradigm instances of metaphor. We
are told, in a few such typical analyses, of distinctive
interaction effecting a unique cognitive synthesis in talk
of wolfish' men, 'sad' paintings, and thinkers 'wrapped up'
in thought; or alternatively, of conceptual correlations
such as 'argument is war,' 'time is money,' and 'hot players
play well and score' governing our respective claims to
defend' premises, 'waste' time, and issue 'sizzling'
performances on the basketball court. Clearly, any complete
account of the presumed 'interactive' or 'conceptual' basis
of metaphor relies upon semantic or referential content
already well-established in advance, as a necessary
condition of its ©xplication. Whether we elect to
understand this content as the product of an 'intercourse of
thoughts (Richards), a 'system of associated commonplaces'
(Black)
,
an 'iconic signification' (Henle)
,
a 'potential
range of connotations' (Beardsley), a 'reassignment of
labels' (Goodman), a 'projected gestalt structure' (Lakoff
and Johnson), an 'ontological mapping across conceptual
domains' (Lakoff), or a 'reordered semantic field' (Kittay)
is immaterial
. To the extent that any such report of the
^^Goodman faces the same dilemma, despite his elegant
assimilation of metaphor to nominalist principles. Recall that
on his view, the metaphorical application of a term is always
'contra-indicated' by its prior habitual use. Thus, a picture
can be at once sad and not sad because ''sad' has two
79
interactive or conceptual process animating a metaphorical
expression is made coherent or defensible, the informative
content of that expression will have been laid bare. Both
'interaction' and 'conceptual' views of metaphor thus
confront the same predicament. To identify and explain in
literal terms the workings responsible for the creation of a
presumed 'metaphorical meaning' is equally to demonstrate a
capacity to render that meaning in equivalent literal terms.
This dilemma assures that effective analysis of this kind
will be limited to only the most trivial cases of metaphor.
Indeed, the above instances might sooner be deemed former
metaphors, which have over time been successfully
lexicalized, by virtue of having acquired a conventional
sense. As is the case for any utterance, their semantic
value and capacity to express cognitive claims varies
different ranges of application.' This does not leave 'sheer
ambiguity, ' however, since metaphorical application always
'springs from' and 'is guided by' prior habit. The problem is
that Goodman never provides us with a clear sense of what it
means to 'spring from' or 'be guided by' prior habit. To
distinguish metaphor from the routine application of a
familiar label to a new case, he must separate literal and
metaphorical ranges of application of the same label. But this
separation is possible only where an alternate application has
been established in relation to a regular context of use, as
is evident for the 'sad' picture and 'blue' mood that he takes
as examples. Cf. Goodman (1976), pp. 123-135, and (1978), pp.
221-227. For critical discussion of Goodman's view, see
Ricoeur (1977), pp. 231-239; Davidson (1978), pp. 209-211;
Cooper (1986), pp. 27-30 and 208-210; and Kittay (1987), pp.
192-195. For related discussion of examples and mechanisms of
importance to 'interaction' theories, see Ricoeur (1977), pp.
83-100; Davidson (1978), pp. 200-220; Cooper (1986), pp. 59-
66; and Kittay (1987), pp. 181-192.
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directly with the extent to which they have fallen into a
regular pattern of use, and thereby been integrated into
ordinary literal language. To side with the defenders of
irreducible metaphorical sense, and retain such familiar,
conventional instances as paradigm cases of metaphor,
therefore leaves two related problems: first, how to
account for the origin and assimilation of new metaphor; and
second, how to distinguish the metaphorical from the literal
at all.
As we have seen, defenders of 'conceptual' metaphor see
no indictment here. Lakoff, for one, argues that new
instances of linguistic metaphor issue from the same
underlying conceptual correlations that structure all
metaphorical expression. 'The problem with all the older
research on novel metaphor,' he claims, 'is that it
completely missed the major contribution played by the
conventional system. This systematic organization of our
metaphorical talk according to standard conceptual
associations, according to Lakoff, is what permits us both
to generate and understand novel utterances. By way of
example, he asks us to consider two well-known poetic
figures, Dickinson's coachman ('Because I could not stop for
Death-- / He kindly stopped for me-- / The Carriage held but
just Ourselves-- / And Immortality.') and Eliot's footman
“Lakoff (1993), p. 237.
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Cl have seen the moment of my greatness flicker, / And I
have seen the eternal Footman hold my coat, and snicker, /
And in short, I was afraid.) We are able to make sense of
these lines of verse because they evoke the same underlying
conceptual metaphor 'Death is Departure.'^'' The two poets
thus draw upon and allude to the same standard conceptual
correlation expressed by our ordinary metaphorical (and
euphemistic) talk of someone having 'passed away,' 'left
us,' joined the 'dearly departed' or those 'no longer with
us. Hence Lakoff's conclusion: 'Poetic metaphor is, for
the most part, an extension of our everyday, conventional
system of thought
This conclusion in itself is unobjectionable, as it
stops short of endorsing the idea that novel or poetic
metaphors express a ciphered message of some kind, which the
reader must endeavor to decipher properly. Here again, the
above point concerning the limits of cognitive expression
applies equally to first-time locutions, whose semantic
value and capacity to express cognitive claims extends only
as far as the immediacy and facility with which they are
assimilable to conventional practice. For new utterances
generated from our most familiar and firmly-entrenched
semantic or conceptual correlations, satisfactory literal
^'’Lakoff and Turner (1989), pp. 1-10.
^^Lakoff (1993), p. 246.
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New
paraphrase will normally be swift and certain.^®
utterances defying the standards of conventional practice,
however, will resist such easy assimilation. Consider a few
instances of what we might want to deem new metaphor:
speculations among physicists about a ’reverse universe,’ or
that ’time is space’; reports of recent communications
technology describing ’hackers surfing through cyberspace,’
or warning of ’roadkills on the information superhighway’;
political protest against ’environmental racism,’ ’socialism
of morality,’ or ’ eco-feminist correctness’; or, more
obviously perhaps, Stephane Mallarme’s ’poetry of
mathematics,’ Sylvia Plath’s ’world of bald white days in an
empty socket,
’ or Tolstoy’s ’eternity is a spider in a
Russian bathhouse. ’ ’Making sense’ of these utterances
requires interpretation and reflection, in relation to the
relevant context in which they are issued, and according to
the ideas, images or perspectives they may bring us to
appreciate. Confusion enters the picture only if we are
tempted to call the result of this kind of creative
procedure a ’metaphorical meaning’ or ’cognitive content’.
As Donald Davidson has observed, ’ [t]he common error is to
fasten on the contents of the thoughts a metaphor provokes
and to read these into the metaphor itself.
consider this type of case more closely in section
2 . 1 .
^^Davidson (1978), p. 216.
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But is it an error? Why must we distinguish
literal from metaphorical in this way, or for that matter,
at all? As earlier noted, supporters of 'conceptual'
metaphor claim that their discovery of 'a huge system of
everyday, conventional, conceptual metaphors has ... destroyed
the traditional literal-figurative distinction.'^® With
respect to 'the cognitive claims of metaphor,'^® Mary Hesse
has alleged that 'there is no [sound] argument for a
distinction between the knowledge-bearing properties of the
literal and the metaphorical,
' because any such argument
must assume an untenable 'ideal of literal language,
transcending particular schemes and metaphors.'®® Instead,
she argues that every application of a general term, however
apparently 'literal' or 'metaphorical,' is simply a matter
of classification according to similarity.
In learning a language, we learn to structure
our perceptions of similarity, so that the
general terms of that language implicitly
classify the furniture of the world in
conformity with the classifications of our
culture. Different natural languages
generally presuppose different
classifications, which, like theories, are
underdetermined by the world. This is a
fundamental fact about language: the world
does not come naturally parcelled up into
sets of identical instances for our
^®Lakoff (1993), p. 204.
^®This is the title of Hesse's paper in J.P. van Noppen
(ed.), Metaphor and Religion, Theolinguistics 2 (Brussels,
1984) pp. 24ff.
®°Hesse (1987), pp. 307-308.
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inspection and description. What we calllinguistic 'metaphor' is only a complex
extension of the same process into novel andstriking contexts, and does not differ in
decision to recognize
That's an X again'. (311)
If metaphorical utterances classify the 'furniture of the
world' in the same way that literal utterances do, there can
be no legitimate reason for denying that they are capable of
expressing cognitive claims. Indeed, if metaphorical
expression is therefore just 'a complex extension of the
same process' that we carry out for instances of ordinary
literal expression, then there can be no rightful
justification for rejecting the possibility of a future
semantics of metaphor,
' or theory of 'metaphorical
meaning.
'
Hesse suggests that metaphor is just ordinary
classification in extraordinary ('novel and striking')
contexts. What is extraordinary about the metaphorical
context, however, is just that it is unfamiliar to the
ordinary classifications of familiar language--for a
metaphor is recognizable as a metaphor only in virtue of its
break with standard classification. This break assures that
metaphorical statements, unlike ordinary literal statements,
do not yield immediately assimilable meanings; they are
unable to display the same manifest informative content.
Recognizing this inability, defenders of semantic theories
of metaphor assume that metaphorical utterances must conceal
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^ distinctiv© iriBtsphor'icsl rn.©3ning, ' As ws hsvs s©sn
above, however, this assumption is defensible only in
relation to familiar utterances that have already been
integrated with the ordinary classifications of our
language, and to novel utterances that are promptly
assimilable to standard classification owing to their direct
descent from our most time-worn semantic or conceptual
correlations. Cases of new metaphor, by contrast, prompt us
to engage in a strategy of imaginative construal, according
to the various ideas or images they may happen to inspire or
evoke. So once again, the relevant question is: why must
we refrain from granting to interpretation of these
'ordinary classifications in extraordinary contexts' the
status of a 'metaphorical meaning,' or 'cognitive content'?
An informed response to this question will have to consider
what it means to confer this status. Our consideration thus
brings us back to the general discussion with which this
chapter began.
Semantics, broadly speaking, is the study of linguistic
meaning. An essential aspect of language use is the ability
to distinguish meaningful expression, in accordance with a
conventional system for conveying messages. Such a
conventional system, though ever evolving, delineates the
regularities of present usage that enable language-users to
link words with certain meanings, or specific referring
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intentions. The function of a conventional system of
meanings, then, is to help us to understand one another on
the basis of our respective utterances. The point of the
notion of linguistic meaning is to facilitate this project,
by enabling us to correlate in a coherent and systematic way
the various marks and noises of others with various beliefs
and expectations about their conduct and demeanor, in order
that we might render our behaviour intelligible to one
another. The value of a meaning is just this explanatory
capability, which words possess in accordance with
convention, and independently of any particular speaker who
might decide to use them, or purpose to which they might be
put.®^ When we extend the notion of meaning to include the
individual associations and inventive readings that a
metaphorical utterance may happen to inspire or evoke, we
employ the term where it does no such work. Instead, we
only permit a measure of ambiguity to obscure and obstruct
the conventional explanatory function that it serves. To
preserve this function, we must concede that metaphors
express no such distinctive meaning or informative content.
Moreover, we must grant that this concession marks the
^^Cf. Davidson (1978), p. 202 and 210, and Cooper (1986),
pp. 89-117. I return to this rationale for the notion of
meaning in discussing its positive implications for
understanding the work of metaphor in section 2.2 below.
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failure of the many repeated attempts to understand the work
of metaphor in terms of semantics.
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CHAPTER 2
PRAGMATIC THEORIES OF METAPHOR
In this second chapter I consider attempts to explain
the work of metaphor in terms of pragmatics. Pragmatics is
the study of language use in relation to context, and in
particular, the study of what we use language to do.®^ The
preceding chapter emphasized that a satisfactory description
of linguistic competence must incorporate our knowledge of a
conventional system of meanings that words may be said to
possess prior to and apart from any particular context of
use . Yet this knowledge even when combined with an
awareness of syntactic rules—cannot account for all cases
of successful linguistic exchange. We routinely employ and
understand a broad range of terms and expressions in ways
that the meaning conventions of our language can only begin
to approximate. For example: indexical terms such as 'he,'
'she,' 'there' and 'this'; ambiguous talk of finding a 'bat'
^^Here and below I maintain a general reading of the term
'pragmatics, ' in an effort to resist reduction of its domain
to the strictly 'communicative' intentions of speakers. A
confined understanding of this sort is outlined in the
editor's introduction to Steven Davis (ed.). Pragmatics: a
reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 11. One
instance of a more general view is elaborated in Adrian
Akmajian, Richard Demers, Robert Harnish (eds.). Linguistics
:
An Introduction to Language and Communication
,
2nd edition
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1987), p. 391.
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in the closet, or being unable to 'bear' children; indirect
speech alluding ironically to 'fine friends,' or
hyperbolically to 'mammoth mosquitos'; or performative
utterances along the lines of 'I promise,' 'l apologize,'
and 'I'll bet'. Successful communication in these cases
relies upon more than the semantic resources of language.
It requires additional knowledge about the speech context
relevant to the utterance in question, and in particular,
knowledge of the shared understandings and inference
procedures implicit to that context, which allow us to
determine the intentions, purposes, beliefs or desires of
speakers that supplement or replace the conventional
meanings of their words. Insofar as our use of metaphor
similarly relies upon or in some way extends these shared
understandings or inference procedures, it too may be
counted as an instance of using language to do something
discernable only in reference to context, and consequently,
it must be accounted for within a theory of pragmatics.
Pragmatic views of metaphor generally begin with the
assumption that understanding the work of metaphor requires
that it be treated as a transgressive act of language, where
what is most important is not what a metaphor means, but
what it is used to do. They then typically proceed with an
analysis of what they consider to be recognizable cases of
metaphor, in an effort to inquire more generally into the
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way in which certain aspects of the relevant context of use
support or require a reinterpretation of the absurd literal
meaning of a metaphorical utterance in terms of the beliefs
or intentions it would appear to indicate or evoke. In this
chapter, heeding once again the plan of the chart presented
in my introduction, I divide these pragmatic views into two
types, according to their disagreement over the question of
whether the beliefs or intentions thought to be indicated or
evoked by a metaphor may be accurately 'translated' into
literal terms by way of a reliable pragmatic calculus.
2 . 1 Reducible Non-Sense
There s matter in these sighs, these profound
heaves
.
You must translate, 'tis fit we understand
them.
- Claudius to Gertrude, Hamlet IV, 1
Interest in pragmatic theories of metaphor arises, not
surprisingly, as a response to the deficiencies of the
various semantic accounts. As noted at the conclusion of
section 1.2 above, the principal objection to semantic views
of metaphor takes the form of a staunch defence of the
explanatory capacity standard sense. To retain any such
explanatory force, the cognitive or propositional content of
an utterance must be explicit, and determined by conventions
governing the use of the words it employs. Metaphors, by
contrast, are identified only on the basis of a break with
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semantic convention. « Consequently, they cannot be
considered to express a cognitive content, or distinctive
metaphorical meaning.
Pragmatic theories of metaphor often recognize this
break with convention by claiming that metaphorical
assertions are 'patently false' when taken literally. But
this IS a potentially misleading claim. If we understand a
patently false' assertion to be an assertion that is
obviously false, or even widely believed to be false, then
patent falsity is neither a sufficient nor a necessary
condition for metaphor. 'Vermont is a state bordering Utah'
is a sentence that is patently false, though not
metaphorical (under ordinary circumstances)
. 'No man is an
island is true on a literal reading, yet we are more likely
to interpret it metaphorically. A phrase like Plath's
'world of bald white days in a shadeless socket' asserts
nothing. It is neither true nor false; nonetheless, it
®^For pragmatic theorists of metaphor, this claim is not
undermined by what Ted Cohen (in his 'Notes on Metaphor,
'
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
,
XXXIV (1976) : 249-59)
has called 'twice-true' cases— for instance, when a company
president, staring out the boardroom window at the cloudy sky
just before meeting with union leaders, says to her assistant,
'There's a storm brewing.' While it is clear that this
statement (and many others like it) can be unproblematically
assigned both a literal and a figurative interpretation
consistent with the context in which it is uttered, this
quality is not a sufficient condition of metaphor. In
metaphor, standard literal interpretation problematic;
accordingly, 'twice-true' cases might be more fruitfully
considered in the company of figurative devices like idiom,
allegory or pun.
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somehow encourages us to imagine a state of affairs to which
It might refer, in the same way that metaphorical statements
invite us to imagine readings that might make sense. These
examples suggest that what prompts us to interpret an
utterance metaphorically is not patent falsity, but semantic
incompatibility. Compare, for instance, 'Vermont is a state
bordering Utah' with 'Vermont is a state of mind,
' or
'Vermont is a symphony of colors.' All three assertions are
obviously false on a literal reading, but only the first is
demonstrably so. The latter two, read literally, do not
reguire falsification; like Plath's 'world of bald white
days, they employ words in ways that violate the semantic
conventions of our language. In each case, the (literal)
result is not so much false as it is absurd or
nonsensical.^'’ On behalf of the various pragmatic views,
then, one might say that metaphorical expression is most
often announced as a peculiar type of non-sense;
^^Cf. Samuel R. Levin, Metaphoric Worlds: conceptions of a
romantic nature (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), pp.
14-15:
It is in my opinion a mistake to conflate, as
is so frequently done, absurd sentences and
false sentences. False sentences are false in
virtue of a disagreement between what they
assert and facts in the world; 'absurd', or
semantically deviant, sentences, if they are
reckoned false, are so reckoned because there
are held to be no facts in the world of which
they may be properly asserted.
In metaphor, he concludes, there is 'no propostional falsity;
there is only a lexical misuse.'
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accordingly, where these views refer to 'patent falsity,' i
have elected to read 'non-sense'. Here and below I insert a
hyphen in order to distinguish the non-sense that metaphors
express from both conventional sense and sheer nonsense. A
metaphor is an instance of well-formed non-sense; that is,
an utterance in violation of semantic convention, whose
adherence to correct syntax nonetheless appeals to the
hearer for construal, in order that meaning might be
preserved.
One way in which we often proceed to construe metaphors
is by treating them as cases of indirect communication.
Upon hearing a well-formed but apparently non-sensical
utterance, we normally assume that it is intended in some
sense other than the absurd literal meaning provided by the
conjunction of its constituent terms. Where this assumption
is correct, we are most often able to discern the intended
message with relative ease according to information and
®^My 'non-sense' is just Husserl's notion of Unsinn (the
'absurd' or ' counter-sensical
' ) , which he distinguishes from
Widersinn (the 'senseless' or 'nonsensical') as 'a sub-species
of the significant.' Cf. Edmund Husserl, Logical
Investigations (New York: Humanities Press, 1970; J.N. Findlay
trans.), vol. 2, pp. 516ff. This distinction (or some similar
version of the relevance of syntax) has been variously invoked
in reference to metaphor in the following works: Christine
Brooke-Rose, A Grammar of Metaphor (London: Seeker and
Warburg, 1958) ; J. Tamine, 'Metaphore et syntaxe, ' in
Langages
, 54, Paris, 1979, pp. 65-82; David Cooper, Metaphor
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) ; Michele Prandi, Semantique du
contresens (Paris: Minuit, 1987); and Jean-Jacques Lecercle,
The Violence of Language (London: Routledge, 1990)
.
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inferential procedures implicit to the context in which it
occurs. This manner of explaining metaphor finds
endorsement in the work of Paul Grice, most notably, as an
extension of his more general effort to defend and develop
the Idea that successful communication requires a mutual
recognition of intentions among interlocutors. As this idea
forms an important basis for the class of pragmatic views
that treat metaphor as an instance of indirect
communication, or 'reducible non-sense,' it will be worthy
of preliminary consideration here.®®
In the course of his inquiry into 'the nature and
importance of the conditions governing conversation,' (24)
Grice observes that linguistic exchange does not normally
consist of a succession of disconnected remarks, and would
not be considered rational if it did. Our speech
encounters, he argues, are generally cooperative in nature.
Participants in conversation can normally be said to
recognize a common purpose or mutually accepted direction
which, at a minimum, forms a part of their initial
motivation for entering into discussion. This common
®®Cf . Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1989) . His analysis of communication
is well set out in the essay entitled 'Meaning,
'
pp. 213-223
of the same volume. Indication of its significance for
metaphor appears in the essay 'Logic and Conversation,' pp.
22-40 of same, hereafter simply page numbers in parentheses
following passages cited. 'Logic and Conversation' was
originally published in P. Cole and J.L. Morgan (eds.). Syntax
and Semantics, volume 3 (New York: Academic Press, 1975) .
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purpose or direction may be fixed explicitly at the outset,
or It may remain rather indefinite, and evolve considerably
during the exchange. Its existence at any particular
moment, however, is confirmed by the fact that 'at each
stage, some possible conversational moves would be excluded
as conversationally unsuitable.' (26) To capture this
aspect of what it means to carry on a conversation
reasonably and in good faith, Grice formulates a
'Cooperative Principle,' which participants in any
linguistic exchange may be expected to observe: 'Make your
conversational contribution such as is required, at the
stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or
direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.
'
(26) Contributions that accord with this Cooperative
Principle, he adds, will adhere to a series of more specific
conversational maxims, which together delineate the most
important expectations or presumptions of cooperative
linguistic practice. These maxims he arranges, with a nod
to Kant, under four basic categories: Quantity ('Make your
contribution as informative ... [but no] more informative than
is required.' (26)); Quality ('Try to make your contribution
one that is true . .
.
[ i . e
. ,
]
Do not say what you believe to be
false . .
.
[nor
]
that for which you lack adequate evidence.'
(27)
); Relation ('Be relevant.' (27)); and Manner ('Be
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perspicuous .. .Avoid obscurity.
.. [and] ambiguity. Be
brief
... [and] orderly.'
( 26 )).
Of course, it is quite often the case that we fail to
uphold one or another of these maxims. At times we intend
to deceive others, and so knowingly violate a maxim. Or
maxims may clash in such a way that we are obliged to defy
oris in order to fulfill another— for instance, in a
situation where there is inadequate evidence for the only
adequately informative commentary we are able to offer. On
occasion, we may even elect to abandon altogether the
Cooperative Principle and its attendant maxims, out of sheer
unwillingness to communicate or cooperate further. Finally,
and for Grice, most significantly, we may decide to 'flout a
maxim'; that is, we may 'blatantly fail to fulfill it.' ( 30 )
This last type of violation, he argues, when carried out in
such a way that it is reasonable to assume that the speaker
faces no clash of maxims, is not opting out of cooperation,
and (in view of the flagrancy of his violation) intends no
deceit, may be taken to indicate that a maxim is being
exploited willfully for the sake of a conversational
implicature
.
Conversational implicature occurs when what a speaker
implies, suggests or means by an utterance is distinct from
what she says. Or, to be clear as to the intended sense of
'says': it occurs when what she implies, suggests or means
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by an utterance is distinct from what a hearer competent in
the same language and yet unaware of the circumstances of
her utterance would be able to ascertain simply on the basis
of the conventional meaning of her words. Grice here
introduce [s]
,
as terms of art, the verb implicate and the
related nouns mplicature (cf. implying ) and implicatum (cf.
wh^ is implied ) ...to avoid having, on each occasion, to
choose between this or that member of the family of verbs
for which implicate is to do general duty.' (24) The
initial example he provides concerns two people talking
about a mutual friend, who works in a bank: A asks B how C
is getting on in his job, and B replies with the comment 'Oh
fine, he hasn't been to prison yet.' B thus flouts the
maxim 'Be relevant', and A might well inquire what he has
intended in so doing. In a suitable setting, where A has no
reason to suppose that B is facing a clash of maxims, or
that B should want to deceive him, or opt out of cooperation
altogether, A may justifiably conclude that B's irrelevance
is intended to implicate that C is potentially dishonest.
(31)
In recognizing a conversational implicature, then, we
rely upon at least three distinct types of information: the
conventional meaning of the words uttered; their status with
respect to the Cooperative Principle and its maxims; and
relevant knowledge about the particular context in which
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they occur. Moreover, of critical importance is that
invariably,
-a conversational implicature must be capable of
being worked out'. (31) if communication is to succeed,
both speaker and hearer must know or have reason to assume
that all relevant information and interpretive procedures
are available to the other. in summarizing these
conditions, Grice offers a 'general pattern for the working
out of a conversational implicature,
' which the hearer
pursues as follows:
He has said that p; there is no reason to
suppose that he is not observing the maxims,
or at least the Cooperative Principle; he
could not be doing this unless he thought
that q; he knows (and knows that I know that
he knows) that I can see that the supposition
that he thinks that q is required; he has
done nothing to stop me thinking that q; he
intends me to think, or is at least willing
to allow me to think, that q; and so he has
implicated that q.
' (31)
Among the many distinct types of conversational
implicature that he proceeds to consider, Grice counts
figurative expression as a case in which the first maxim of
Quality ('Do not say what you believe to be false') is
flouted. Ironic utterances, for instance, implicate the
contradictory of what they say. If A says of B, a close
colleague who has just betrayed a secret of A's to a
business rival, that B is a 'fine friend,' an informed
hearer will know that A has said something he does not
believe. 'So, unless A's utterance is entirely pointless, A
must be trying to get across some other proposition. .
.
[and]
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the most obviously related proposition is the contradictory
of the one he purports to be putting forward.' (34)
Metaphorical utterances, according to Grice, are
' categorially
' false statements that implicate the
attribution of a resemblance. This rather casual
observation leaves many questions unanswered. To be fair,
we must recall that it is offered not as an autonomous
account, for careful scrutiny in and of itself, but merely
as evidence of yet another distinct type of conversational
implicature. The relevant passage nonetheless merits
quotation in full:
Metaphor . Examples like You are the cream in
my coffee characteristically involve
categorial falsity, so the contradictory of
what the speaker has made as if to say will,
strictly speaking, be a truism; so it cannot
be that that such a speaker is trying to get
across. The most likely supposition is that
the speaker is attributing to his audience
some feature or features in respect of which
the audience resembles (more or less
fancifully) the mentioned substance. (34)
It remains unclear, for instance, just how the hearer
manages to discern the particular feature or features in
respect of which she is considered to resemble the cream in
the speaker's coffee. Having earlier determined that 'a
conversational implicature must be capable of being worked
out, ' Grice is obliged to show that with respect to this
example, there is in fact a recognizable procedure according
to which the hearer is able to identify the unstated message
the speaker is 'trying to get across'. The presence of an
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implicature here is well signaled by the 'categorial'
falsity (that is, the assignment of something to the wrong
category) of the statement uttered. Its propositional
content, however, would appear to be something seized upon
immediately and intuitively by the hearer, without recourse
to pragmatic calculation. If this were in fact Grice's
position, he might have been more appropriately considered
as a proponent of the 'traditional view' outlined in section
1.1 above. But this is not his view. In subsequent
discussion, for instance, he reminds us that 'to calculate a
conversational implicature is to calculate what has to be
supposed in order to preserve the supposition that the
Conversational Principle is being observed. ' There he
concedes, however, that
since there may be various possible specific
explanations, a list of which may be open,
the conversational implicatum in such cases
will be disjunction of such specific
explanations; and if the list of these is
open, the implicatum will have just the kind
of indeterminacy that many actual implicata
do in fact seem to possess. (40)
Identifying an implicature is indeed a matter for
calculation according to recognizable argumentative
procedures, but the best obtainable result may occasionally
be disjunctive, or ultimately indeterminate. Grice thus
concedes that in certain cases, conversational implicature
is in fact incapable of being worked out, if by 'worked out'
we are to insist upon something as strict as 'translated
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into equivalent literal terms.' As it stands, then, his
theory of conversational implicature cannot sustain a
defensible version of the pragmatic approach to metaphor
that I have labelled 'reducible non-sense'. Still, his work
provides a foundation for this type of view, insofar as it
identifies metaphor as an instance of indirect speech, whose
distinctive manner of violating the conventional dictates of
conversational practice is to be construed in terms of the
implict communicative intentions of its speaker.
The most complete version of this type of approach has
been advanced by John Searle. Searle's detailed account of
metaphor emerges from his extensive work in developing a
theory of speech acts.®’' Following Grice, he treats
metaphorical expression as a distinct type of indirect
Searle's analysis of speech acts in turn issues from
many of the important ideas presented by J.L. Austin in his
1955 William James Lectures at Harvard, published posthumously
as How to Do Things with Words
,
edited by J.O. Urmson
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), and more
recently re-edited by J.O. Urmson and Marina Sbisa and
published as a second edition in 1975. Cf. J. R. Searle,
Speech Acts (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969) ; 'A
Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts,' in K. Gunderson (ed.).
Language, Mind and Knowledge: Minnesota Studies in the
Philosophy of Science (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1975); and 'Indirect Speech Acts,' in P. Cole and J.L.
Morgan (eds.), Syntax and Semantics
,
vol. 3: Speech Acts (New
York: Academic Press, 1975), pp. 59-82. Searle's account of
metaphor is confined to the essay 'Metaphor, ' in his
Expression and Meaning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1979), pp. 76-116, reprinted in Mark Johnson (ed.).
Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1981), pp. 248-285. References
below are to the latter; hereafter simply page numbers in
parentheses following cited passages.
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speech, where communication succeeds even though both
speaker and hearer know that the conventional meanings of
the words uttered do not express what they are intended to
mean. To understand how this is possible, Searle poses v/hat
he takes to be the 'fundamental question' as follows:
The problem of explaining how metaphors work
is a special case of the general problem of
explaining how speaker's meaning and sentence
or word meaning come apart. It is a special
case, that is, of the problem of how it is
possible to say one thing and mean something
else ... (249)
In formulating the 'problem of metaphor' in this way,
however, he is quick to point out that distinguishing
'speaker's meaning' from 'sentence or word meaning' should
not permit us to conclude that there are two kinds of
sentence meaning, literal and metaphorical. Rather,
'sentences and words have only the meanings that they have.'
(249) To hold otherwise, he claims, is to fall victim to
the 'endemic vice' of 'semantic interaction theories,' in
their 'failure to appreciate the distinction between
sentence or word meaning, which is never metaphorical, and
speaker or utterance meaning, which can be metaphorical.'
(257) Indeed, this failure accounts for what Searle regards
as inevitable confusion associated with the idea that
metaphors involve a transfer of meaning. To remove such
confusion, we need only concede that
strictly speaking, in metaphor there is never
a change in meaning; diachronically speaking,
metaphors do indeed inititate semantic
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changes, but to the extent that there hasbeen a genuine change in meaning, so that a
word or expression no longer means what it
previously did, to precisely that extent the
locution is no longer metaphorical.
( 257 - 8 )
So called dead' metaphors are thus no longer genuine
metaphors, since they mark an actual shift of meaning,
effected over time through increasingly familiar use.
Though it is often said of genuine metaphors that they mean
something other than the meaning of the words they employ,
this is not because there has been any change in the
meanings of those words; rather, it is only because what the
speaker intends by them is different from what they mean.
Searle underlines the importance of this distinction in
terms of the 'fundamental guestion' posed above. The
'problem of metaphor' is to explain how speaker's meaning
and sentence meaning can differ: 'Such an explanation is
impossible,' however, 'if we suppose that sentence or word
meaning has changed in the metaphorical utterance .'
(
258 )
Our rather loose talk of 'metaphorical meaning' should
thus be taken to refer exclusively to the communicative
intentions of the speaker of a metaphorical utterance,
rather than to the meaning of the words she utters. As his
criticism of 'semantic interaction' theories would indicate,
Searle aims to avoid this familiar equivocation over our use
of the term 'meaning' by introducing a pair of qualifiers,
which in turn permit a clear statement of his own central
thesis
:
104
strictly speaking, whenever we talk about the
metaphorical meaning of an utterance, we are
talking about what a speaker might utter it
to mean, in a way that departs from what the
word, expression or sentence actually
means...! shall call the former speaker '
s
utterance meaning
,
and the latteF^ word
,
or
sentence
,
meaning . Metaphorical meaning is
always speaker's utterance meaning. (249-50)
For Searle, the fact that we do succeed in communicating
indirectly entails that there must be a set of general
principles or procedures, known to speakers and hearers
alike, according to which speakers are able to convey
something more or other than what they say. 'Our task in
constructing a theory of metaphor,' he avows, 'is to try to
state the principles which relate literal sentence meaning
to metaphorical utterance meaning.' (250) A viable theory
is one that will reveal principles allowing us to
distinguish metaphorical utterances both from their literal
counterparts, and from other sorts of utterances where
speaker's utterance meaning does not coincide with word or
sentence meaning.
In literal utterances, speakers mean what they say;
speaker's utterance meaning and word or sentence meaning are
one and the same. (253) With a metaphorical utterance, what
a speaker means is distinct from what he says; thus in its
simplest form, the question we are trying to answer is. How
is it possible for the speaker to say metaphorically 'S is
P' and mean 'S is R' , when P plainly does not mean R? ' (273)
The success and systematicity with which this type of
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expression is employed in our everyday language assures that
speakers and hearers must share a common set of 'principles
of metaphorical interpretation.' (273) To discover these
principles, Searle examines a few 'simple sorts of cases' of
metaphor, such as 'Sally is a block of ice,' 'Richard is a
gorilla,' and 'Sam is a pig.' In reflecting upon these
examples from the position of the hearer, he proposes 'a
rational reconstruction of the inference patterns that
underlie our ability to understand such metaphors.' (274)
This ability, he claims, consists of 'at least three sets of
steps '
:
First, [the hearer] must have some strategy
for determining whether or not he has to seek
a metaphorical interpretation of the
utterance in the first place. Second.
. .he
must have some set of strategies, or
principles, for computing possible values of
R, and third, he must have a set of
strategies, or principles, for restricting
the range of R's--for deciding which Rs are
likely to be the ones the speaker is
asserting of S. (274)
Briefly, and in accordance with these steps, the vital
ingredients of Searle 's theory may be enumerated as follows:
first, metaphors are identified when a hearer confronts an
utterance that is 'radically defective' when read literally,
a condition he takes to include 'obvious falsehood, semantic
nonsense, violations of rules of speech acts, or violations
of conversational principles of communication.' (274)
Second, the hearer proceeds to infer possible values for R
according to a range of strategies including (though not
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necessarily confined to): 'Things which are P are by
definition R' (enabling us to infer, for example, that the
utterance 'Sam is a giant' may be intended to mean that Sam
is big) (276); 'Things which are P are contingently R, ...a
salient or well known property of P things' (such that 'Sam
is a pig' may be taken as uttered to mean that Sam. is
filthy, gluttonous and sloppy); 'Things which are P are
often said or believed to be R, even though both speaker and
hearer may know that R is false of P' (so 'Richard is a
gorilla' may be uttered to mean that Richard is nasty and
prone to violence, despite the fact that gorillas are in
reality timid and sensitive creatures) (277); 'Things which
are P are not R, nor are they like R things, nor are they
believed to be R; nonetheless ... [we] perceive a connection,
so that P is associated in our minds with R properties'
(thus 'Sally is a block of ice' may be understood as
intended to mean that she is unemotional) (277-8); and so
on. Finally, the hearer restricts the range of possible
values of R to the actual value of R, by imposing as a
'basic principle' that 'only those possible values of R
which determine possible properties of S can be actual
values or R. ' (281) These principles Searle deems
'individually necessary and collectively sufficient to
enable speaker and hearer to form and comprehend utterances
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of the form 'S is P'
,
where the speaker means metaphorically
that S is R (where P differs from R) .
'
(281)
That these principles are specific to metaphor, he
argues, may be seen by comparing them with those that apply
to irony and indirect speech acts, two other sorts of
utterances in which speaker meaning does not coincide with
literal meaning. When taken literally, an ironic utterance
is 'obviously inappropriate to the situation;' consequently,
'the most natural way to interpret it is as meaning the
opposite of its literal form.' (282) For instance, if A
says to B 'what a brilliant thing to do' just after B has
broken a priceless vase, B may correctly infer that A's
intended meaning is that it was a stupid thing to do.
Indirect speech acts, on the other hand, differ
significantly from both irony and metaphor. 'In the
indirect speech act, the speaker means what he says.
However, in addition, he means something more. Sentence
meaning is part of utterance meaning, but it does not
exhaust utterance meaning. ' When during mealtime one asks
'can you pass the salt?,' this question would lack any
conversational point if not for the fact that the hearer to
whom it is addressed 'knows that the ability to pass the
salt is a preparatory condition on the speech act of
requesting him to do so.' (282)
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Finally, as to the question 'whether all metaphorical
utterances can be given a literal paraphrase, ' Searle
contends that either way, the answer is trivial. If we
interpret the question to ask whether we are capable of
restating in literal terms a speaker's intended meaning in
uttering any given metaphor, his answer is clearly yes,
since '[i]t follows trivially from the Principle of
Expressibility . . . that any meaning whatever can be given an
exact expression in the language.' (283) If, on the other
hand, we understand the question to ask whether we have
'exact devices for expressing literally whatever we wish to
express in any given metaphor, ' then the answer is just as
obviously no, since 'in metaphorical utterances, we do more
than just state that S is R. . .we state that S is R by going
through the meaning of S is P. ' Here literal paraphrase
understandably fails, 'because without using the
metaphorical expression, we will not reproduce the semantic
content which occurred in the hearer's comprehension of the
utterance . ' (283)
By way of summary, it will be instructive to compare
the pragmatic approach to metaphor represented by Searle
with the account I have called the traditional view
(discussed in section 1.1 above). Their affinities, which
may seem striking at first glance, are in many respects
quite superficial. True, both identify metaphor as an
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i^stancG of dGviant languags usg, uttGTGd to convoy a
rriGSsagG that is Gvor capablo of boing altornativoly rondorod
in GquivalGnt litoral tGrms. ClosGr scrutiny rovoals,
howGVGr, that they aro at odds over just how a metaphor
deviates from, and is translated to, ordinary literal talk.
According to the traditional view, deviation is ornamental,
and translation automatic. Terms related by virtue of an
appropriate similarity between their referents are
transferred for decorative or analogical ends. A metaphor
is therefore really no more than a clever or unusual synonym
for a standard literal term or expression, which users must
be aware of for there to be metaphor at all. As Turbayne
puts it, 'there are no metaphors per se
'
;
rather, metaphors
exist only where there is both 'duality of sense' and 'the
pretense that something is the case when it is not.' Where
duality of sense or the vital pretense is lost or obscured,
we fail to recognize the relevant expression as a metaphor;
unaware of its literal translation, we stumble into grave
confusion by taking it at face value. Hence the widespread
aversion among representatives of the traditional view to
the use of metaphor for serious attempts to communicate
knowledge
.
Despite its influence, however, the traditional account
is inadequate. The problem, we may recall, is that such
immediate and intuitive literal translations are rarely
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available, even for the most simple cases of metaphor. New
metaphors in particular evade such easy paraphrase; at best,
our efforts to restate them in literal terms depend upon
relevant information drawn from the context in which they
are employed. The indirect speech account of metaphor would
make up for this deficiency, by differing on several counts.
Here deviation yields semantic incongruity (rather than
ornamental synonymy)
,
and translation proceeds in accordance
with an inferential calculus relying upon supplemental
information drawn from context (as opposed to a presumed
direct intuition of similarity)
. Strictly speaking, then,
metaphors are on this view cognitively meaningless; they are
distinguished on the basis of the well-formed non-sense they
express, which must be provided with a non-literal
interpretation if it is to be fathomed in the least.
Moreover, if such interpretation is to be accurate, it must
adhere to a fixed set of principles, distinctive to
metaphor, which permit us to advance from the absurd or non-
sensical utterance meaning to its speaker's intended
meaning
.
This type of pragmatic approach rightly claims many
distinct virtues. First among these is its candid
acknowledgement that metaphorical assertions express no
cognitive content. Though the constituent terms of a
metaphor may be read as meaningful in isolation, they are
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nevertheless recognized as metaphorical because of the
absurdity or semantic incongruity they express when taken
literally in relation to their immediate context of use. In
virtue of this transgression of the limits of sense,
metaphors function effectively as a type of indirect speech.
The non-sense they express is considered to be of importance
only insofar as it enters into the pragmatic calculus we
employ to discern its speaker's intended meaning, the
cognitive content that metaphors are used to indicate. As
opposed to the various competing semantic views, then, this
view of metaphor as indirect speech would apparently have no
problem accomodating cases of new metaphor--provided that
such cases may be explicated by reference to a reliable
inferential rule or procedure revealing their respective
communicative intentions. To the extent that this procedure
enables us to move successfully from utterance meaning to
speaker's meaning, and thus from non-sense to sense, it
succeeds where semantic theories have failed, that is, in
providing a set of fundamental governing principles for the
way in which we create and understand metaphorical language.
The simple problem with this position, however, is that
no such procedure or set of principles is available. This
is so for at least two reasons. First of all, this type of
indirect speech account assumes that metaphor can always be
traced to a unique and unequivocal speaker's intended
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meaning. Yet upon hearing Hamlet assert that ’the time is
out of joint', or in pondering his mention of 'the slings
and arrows of outrageous fortune', we may have good reason
to infer several plausible intended meanings, or for that
matter, a single meaning that is multi-layered and
ambiguous. Metaphors are very often contrived from
intentions that are imprecise, open-ended, and impervious to
a single correct reading. Indeed, certain types of lyric
poetry explicitly disavow any pretension to intended
meaning. Instead, they encourage only a convulsive flow of
words in spontaneous combination, a practice that has been
known to produce arresting metaphor. The point is that
speaker's intended meaning is frequently elusive,
indeterminate, or even non-existent.^® Secondly, our
attempts to 'make sense' of metaphor rarely focus uniquely
on the speaker's or writer's intended meaning. Often we
lack the relevant contextual information that would permit
an informed judgement concerning authorial intent.
Ignorance of Greek mythology, or of 17th century views
concerning sexual morality, for instance, does not prevent a
reader from appreciating Marvell’s pledge (to his coy
mistress) that 'though we cannot make our sun / Stand still.
®®Cf. Cooper (1986), pp. 74-77, for a detailed discussion
of this point.
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yet we will make him run' Moreover, express knowledge of
authorial intent does not restrict further interpretation.
Bosnian Serbs may insist that the phrase 'ethnic cleansing'
was intended only to indicate a reasonable policy of
relocating certain segments of the population, but this has
not altered its widespread acceptance into conventional
terms as the latest horrifying euphemism for mass murder.
When Wittgenstein described all talk of ethics or religion
as a 'running against the walls of our cage', members of the
Vienna Circle effectively downplayed his frequent insistence
that he was seeking to defend the intrinsic, absolute value
of the unsayable.^® Derrida's efforts to clarify his
purpose in having penned the famous claim that there is
'nothing beyond the text' have apparently done little to
settle questions concerning its final or proper
interpretation--a circumstance that may be considered
nothing less than an ironic vindication of his very claim.
The point here is that once it has been issued, a metaphor
often takes on a life of its own, a life determined at least
as much from the perspective of the hearer as by the
^^Zeus, having seized power from Chronos to become chief
of the gods, made the sun stand still in order to lengthen his
night of passion with Alcmene; in 17th century England, it was
popularly believed that each sex act reduced the length of
one's life by a day. Cf. J. Paul Hunter, Poetry (New York:
Norton, 1973, p. xxxvi
.
^°Cf. Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius
(New York: Macmillan-The Free Press, 1990), pp. 211ft.
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intentions of its original author. By confining himself
merely to 'simple sorts of cases' of metaphor, Searle
obscures this point, and confers an unwarranted legitimacy
upon the idea that 'metaphorical meaning is always speaker's
intended meaning. Instead, our endorsement and construal
of new metaphors must be regarded as a creative activity in
itself, adhering to no single, universal, rule-governed
procedure
.
This conclusion, if in fact sound, raises questions
about the presumed communicative function of metaphor. In
particular, one might ask whether recognition of a creative
audience contribution entails that metaphors can be
appropriately understood--or at least acceptably
interpreted--without any concern whatsoever for the beliefs
or intentions of their authors; or furthermore, if such be
^^Searle's view thus recalls the position of a well-known
Wonderland character:
'When 1 use a word, ' Humpty Dumpty said,
in a rather scornful tone, 'it means just what
I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.'
'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether
you can make words mean so many different
things .
'
'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty,'
which is to be master--that ' s all.'
Cf. Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass , VI, here taken
from Alice's Adventures in Wonderland; and, Through the
Looking Glass (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 190.
For an extended discussion of 'Humpty Dumpty' s Theories of
Language, ' and of the above passage in terms of the Saussurean
thesis concerning the 'arbitrary character of the sign,' cf.
Jean-Jacques Lecercle, The Philosophy of Nonsense (New York:
Routledge, 1994), pp. 134-161.
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the case, one might wonder how indeed our use of metaphor
can be said to conform in the least to conventional dictates
of conversational practice, through which parties to any
successful exchange arrive at a mutual recognition of
intentions. In my next section, I turn to a series of views
emphasizing the radically unconventional and non-
communicative character of metaphorical expression. Before
doing so, however, I would like to give brief consideration
to two more recent 'speaker intention' views that would
defend and explain the place of metaphor in regular
communication--views which may be read as attempts to build
upon the work of Grice and Searle, by assigning a creative
role to the hearer within the framework of an indirect
speech account of metaphor.
The first of these belongs to Dan Sperber and Deidre
Wilson, who have developed a theory of pragmatics to
challenge the standard distinction between literal and
metaphorical uses of language. 'Literal talk, loose talk
and metaphorical talk, ' they argue, 'differ not in kind but
only in degree of looseness, and... are understood in
essentially the same way. ' (540) To defend this view, they
invoke a conception of linguistic exchange based upon a
^^Cf . Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, 'Loose Talk,
'
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 86 ^
Reprinted in Steven Davis ed.. Pragmatics: A Reader (Oxford.
Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 540-549. Page numbers
in
parentheses below refer to this reprint.
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single pragmatic principle for identifying the relation
between an utterance and the thought it is used to convey."^
In order to communicate, a speaker must claim the attention
of another, and in effect, demand that he or she expend
whatever time and effort it might take to hear and
understand what that speaker has to say. Attempts to
communicate are thus accompanied by an implicit assurance
that such time and effort will be worthwhile--that the
information the hearer may expect to obtain will merit the
mental effort reguired to obtain it. 'Any utterance
addressed to someone automatically conveys a presumption of
its own relevance. This fact, ' the authors remark, 'we call
the principle of relevance .
' (544) According to this
principle, 'humans automatically aim at maximal relevance,
i.e. maximal cognitive effect for minimal processing
effort.' Conversational exchange is thus doubly bound, by
'a presumption of adequate effect on the one hand, and a
presumption of minimally necessary effort on the other.'
Relevance at this basic level, we are told, is not a matter
of convention to be learned; rather, 'it is an exceptionless
generalization about human communicative behaviour.' (544)
^^For the most detailed account of their general view of
communication, cf. Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, Relevance:
Communication and Cognition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1986)
.
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The primary importance of the principle of relevance is
that it allows us to account for successful communication in
the face of 'linguistic underdetermination ' --the fact that
the literal meaning of an utterance is often ambiguous,
elliptical, vague, or simply not the sense in which the
utterance is intended. (544-45) For the austerity of their
solution to this enduring problem, that is, the problem of
explaining how we are able to determine correctly the
thoughts that such linguistically underdetermined utterances
are intended to communicate, Sperber and Wilson claim to
have improved upon the work of their predecessors (among
whom we may count Grice and Searle)
.
Various pragmatic theories appeal to complex
sets of rules, maxims, or conventions to
explain how this linguistic
underdetermination is contextually overcome.
We claim that the principle of relevance is
enough on its own to explain how linguistic
structure and background knowledge interact
to determine verbal comprehension. (545)
Consider, by way of example, an instance of ordinary
'loose talk'. Marie, who lives in issy-les-Moulineaux, just
one block outside the city limits of Paris, meets Peter
at a
party in London. When Peter asks Marie where she
lives, she
replies: 'I live in Paris.' Although this reply is
literally false, it is perfectly appropriate in
context, for
it adheres to the relevance principle, by
employing minimal
effort to maximum effect. In the most obviously
economical
way, Marie enables Peter to infer a substantial
amount of
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plausible information about her (that she knows Paris well,
lives an urban life, and so on)
,
in a way that telling him
she lives near Paris would not. (545-46) In the latter
case, the qualification 'near' would demand of Peter a
degree of processing effort which would not be offset by a
corresponding cognitive effect. On the presumption of
relevance, this qualification would be misleading, as it
would encourage Peter to draw certain false inferences (that
she lives a suburban or rural life, etc.). Of course, in an
alternative context, say, an electoral meeting for a Paris
local election, the truth of the statement expressed would
be more crucially relevant, and thus more likely to be
understood literally. Knowing this, Marie would adjust her
reply accordingly (if indeed she were intending to be
truthful) . Loose talk, conclude Sperber and Wilson, is no
different from any other kind of talk, in that it is both
motivated and explained by the pursuit of relevance.
Whenever a proposition is expressed, the
hearer takes for granted that some subset of
its logical and contextual implications are
also logical or contextual implications of
the thought being communicated, and aims to
identify this subset. He assumes (or at least
assumes that the speaker assumed) that this
subset will have enough cognitive effects to
make the utterance worth his attention. He
also assumes (or at least assumes that the
speaker assumed) that there was no obvious
way of achieving these effects with less
processing effort. He aims for an
interpretation consistent with these
assumptions, i.e. consistent with the
principle of relevance. (545)
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Metaphor, they contend, is employed and understood in
the same way. Here again, the utterance expressed is not
intended literally; instead, the hearer recognizes that the
speaker is endorsing some subset of what that utterance may
be taken to imply. In the case of 'highly standardized'
examples, such as 'Jeremy is a lion,' there is 'one very
strong implicature which constitutes the main point of the
utterance: thus ['Jeremy is a lion'] implicates, in the
context of stereotypical assumptions about lions, that
Jeremy is brave.' (547) Less standard cases will demand
greater processing effort, which should in turn be offset by
added effect. Taking a 'marginally more creative' example,
we might consider the statement of a mother to her child,
'you're a piglet.' Here a double implication is at work,
Sperber and Wilson explain, since young animals are
endearing, even when adults of the same species are not;
'the child may feel encouraged to derive not only the
obvious contextual implication that he is dirty, but also
the further contextual implication that he is, nevertheless,
endearing .
'
( 548
)
In general, the wider the range of potential
implicatures, the more creative the metaphor. More creative
cases thus entail a more active role for the hearer, who
must endeavor to understand what a speaker or writer intends
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to convey, by first determining, and then selecting from,
this broadened range of warranted implicatures
.
In the richest and most successful cases, thehearer can go beyond just exploring the
immediate context and the background
knowledge directly invoked, accessing a wider
area of knowledge, entertaining ad hoc
assumptions which may themselves be
metaphorical, and getting more and more very
weak implicatures, with suggestions for still
further processing. The result is a quite
complex picture, for which the hearer has to
take a large share of the responsibility.
( 548 )
To illustrate, we are asked to consider the words of
Prospero to his daughter Mirandas 'The fringed curtains of
thine eyes advance / And say what thou see'st yond. ' The
success of this creative metaphor lies in its 'extreme
condensation, ' whereby a relatively simple expression,
loosely employed, allows of a complicated range of
acceptable weak implicatures. There are, consequently, many
different ways in which Shakespeare's metaphor might be
understood. On one critical reading, for instance,
Coleridge estimated that something was about to appear to
Miranda ''as unexpectedly as if the hearer of a drama were
to be on the stage at the instant when the curtain is
elevated. . . '
'
Yet this image represents just one
interpretive path available to the reader. As Sperber and
Wilson duly note.
Merely retaining the implication that
Prospero is telling Miranda to raise her
eyelids--no doubt the strongest implicature--
would result in an interpretation requiring
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too much effort for too little effect. A more
creative hearer will invest a little more
effort and get much more ef feet ... [moreover ]
,
different hearers with different background
knowledge and different imaginations will
follow somewhat different routes. (548)
The principle of relevance thus accounts for our
interpretation of creative metaphors in much the same way
that it explains our processing of ordinary loose talk.
Indeed, when considered in terms of relevance, the standard
distinctions between literal, loose, and metaphorical talk
would appear to evaporate. All such acts of communication,
regardless of their degree of 'looseness,' (that is, the
extent to which they are linguistically underdetermined)
presume only an interpretive ' ef fort-to-ef fect
'
correspondence between an utterance and the thought it is
intended to convey. Hence the concluding remarks of Sperber
and Wilson, in which they summarize their principal thesis:
[Metaphors] are in no sonse departures from a
norm or breaches of a rule or maxim of
communication. They are simply creative and
evocative exploitations of a basic feature of
all verbal communication: the fact that every
utterance resembles, with a degree of
closeness determined by considerations of
relevance, a thought of the speaker's. (549)
This is a most compelling account, if only for its
elegant simplicity. As a general rule, speakers utter
words
that resemble their thoughts. In adhering to this
rule, our
use of metaphor is an act of communication not
significantly
different from any other. True, for certain metaphors,
the
resemblance in question may span a considerable
'creative
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and. evocative' distance; nonetheless, hearers process such
cases in the same way they process any utterance--by
determining, in relation to the proper ' ef fort-to-ef fect
'
considerations of relevance, which 'subset of its logical
and contextual implications are also logical or contextual
implications of the thought being communicated.
'
Despite its economy and proficiency, however, this
effort to understand the work of metaphor in terms of
relevance does leave certain problems. A closer look at the
distinction between literal and metaphorical, for instance,
suggests a difference of more than degree. What
characteristic feature of creative metaphor, after all,
signals to the hearer that greater processing effort will
yield greater cognitive effect? Sperber and Wilson point
only to its relative looseness, discernable in context,
according to which the hearer is justified in assuming that
' [t]he greater effort imposed indicates that greater effect
is intended.' (547) As we have seen, the most creative
metaphors exhibit a degree of looseness requiring that
hearers assume primary responsibility for assembling and
selecting from collections of warranted implications, to
such an extent that different hearers will interpret the
same creative metaphor differently. Here already we have a
significant distinction, for it is difficult to see how
divergent interpretations of the same utterance can all be
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said to resemble (other than trivially) the thought that
utterance may have been intended to convey. To be employed
for communicative purposes, an utterance must be capable of
being paired with the intentions of its speaker. Once
again, with respect to certain metaphors, it remains unclear
how we are to reconcile the creative role of the hearer, who
engages in the task of open-ended, imaginative construal,
with a conception of metaphor as a type of indirect speech,
bound by way of shared implications to the thought its
speaker aims to communicate. As a general principle for
interpreting various instances of linguistically
underdetermined 'loose talk,' relevance stands out as a
fundamental guiding consideration. It does so, however, at
the price of a vagueness that renders it virtually
ineffective in dealing with our more inventive (and less
strictly communicative) uses of language.
corresponding indirect speech account follows Sperber
and Wilson in emphasizing the importance of resemblance to
understanding the work of metaphor. According to Robert
Fogelin, metaphors call our attention to similarities by
presenting figurative comparisons.^^ Unlike so many of his
predecessors, Fogelin does not conflate figurative with
literal comparison; on his view, metaphors 'differ from
^^Cf. Robert Fogelin, Figuratively Speaking (New
Haven:
Yale University Press, 1988)
.
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siinilGs in only a trivial grainiuatical way: mataphors ara
similes with the term of comparison suppressed; they are
elliptical similes.' (25) To understand this position well,
it will be necessary to consider it in the context of the
more general theory of figurative speech in which it
appears
.
For Fogelin, our figurative use of language 'derives
its force by including the respondent in a mutually
recognized task of making sense of what is said.' (112)
From the outset, he acknowledges his methodological debt to
the work of Grice and Searle (among others)
,
most notably,
for assuming that in carrying out this task, both speaker
and hearer proceed according to a set of general strategies
or rules governing communication. Fogelin concerns himself
above all with two distinct 'families' of the figures of
speech: the first of these he labels 'figurative
predications, ' of which irony is the paradigm instance; the
second he identifies as 'figurative comparisons,' counting
metaphor and simile as standard cases. (3) 'Making sense'
of these two types of figures, he claims, proceeds along
contrary lines: 'With figurative predications, this
involves replacing the speaker's utterance with one that
squares with the context. With figurative comparisons, this
involves finding ways of adjusting the context so that it
squares with the speaker's utterance.' (112-13)
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Figurative predications, which also include hyperbole
and meiosis (understatement)
,
are false statements uttered
with the intention of producing a corrective response.
Hyperbole and meiosis invoke weakening and strengthening
corrections, respectively. Irony reverses polarity, to
varying degrees. Ironic praise, for instance, is understood
as blame: ''Great throw' can have the force of 'horrible
throw' if that's the proper corrective judgement in context
(for example, when the shortstop has just thrown the ball
into the dirt, wide of first base).' (9) The vital feature
of figurative predications, then, 'is a mutually recognized
intention by the speaker that the respondent not take the
speaker's words at face value, but instead, replace them
with a correct judgement.' (87)
On Fogelin's view, 'something very similar takes place
with figurative comparisons.' (87) Here again, one utters
'a pointless and mutually recognized falsehood' in order to
call forth a correction—but with an important difference.
With figurative predications, the context is
held steady, and the assertion made within
that context is adjusted or corrected. With
figurative comparisons, the comparison is not
rejected; the claim that A is like B is not
withdrawn, corrected, or modified in any way.
Instead, the context is adjusted to
accomodate it. (87-88)
Just what it means to 'adjust the context' can be seen in
the distinction Fogelin draws between figurative and literal
comparison. Literal comparisons draw or evoke a comparison
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of two things in terms of their most salient features.
Thus, 'a road grader is like a bulldozer,' because both are
'used to push about large quantities of dirt, the chief
difference being that road graders have their blades beneath
their chassis rather than in front of them.' (88) In saying
that two things are similar, we assert that they share a
sufficiently large number of salient features to convey
information relevant to the context of discussion.
Figurative comparisons, on the other hand, also draw or
evoke a comparison of two things, but they do so only upon
summoning a context or frame of reference in which 'the
order of dominance in salient features is reversed.' (91)
Interpreting a figurative comparison, for instance,
'Margaret Thatcher is [like] a bulldozer, ' thus involves a
'two-step process':
By comparing a person with a bulldozer, we
invoke a feature space dominated by
bulldozer-salient qualities. But under that
reading, the comparison seems plainly false.
In order to avoid attributing a pointlessly
false statement to the speaker, the
respondent now prunes the feature space of
the falsifying features and, if the metaphor
is sound (I'm not saying striking ; I'll come
back to that later)
,
then the comparison,
figuratively taken, is true. (89)
Margaret Thatcher is not a machine, nor can she move large
quantities of dirt in a manner comparable to a bulldozer or
road grader; she has, however, on many occasions
demonstrated her ability to push aside or run over any
opposition in her path. With figurative comparisons, the
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hearer thus 'squares the context with the utterance' by
ignoring standard salient features, and interpreting the
assertion of similarity in terms of only those more general
or subsidiary qualities of the one item that may be
considered applicable to the other. In this way, offers
Fogelin, 'the target thought-act or speech-act is produced
in the respondent as part of his participatory response,
rather than merely given to him in the form of the speaker's
direct speech act.' (89)
The novelty and interest of this account lies in its
use of speech-act categories to present and defend a
renovated version of the enduring comparison view of
metaphor, whose lineage can be traced to Aristotle.
Metaphors are elliptical similes; they present figurative
comparisons, which elicit a doubly active response on the
part of the hearer. First, the hearer assumes that in
uttering what would otherwise appear to be a pointlessly
false statement, the speaker intends to identify a subtle or
remote 'similarity in dissimilars . ' Second, the hearer
contemplates the dissimilar objects in question, in order to
ascertain the shared feature or features in virtue of which
the implicit assertion of likeness is justified. The
intellectual and aesthetic power of figurative comparison
emerges in this activity, as 'the respondent is made to
arrive at the result himself.' (92)
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While this account bears considerable intuitive force,
it nonetheless harbors certain familiar problems that render
it ultimately untenable. For one, it offers no way around
the standard dilemma facing any comparison view, namely,
that of identifying the statement of comparison believed to
correspond to a particular metaphor. In evaluating
traditional (literal) comparison views above, we noted that
a great many instances of metaphor do not take the form of
an identity or predication ('A is B'); many of these, in
turn, resist the same easy transposition to simile. In a
passing reference to this dilemma, Fogelin considers it an
advantage of his account over previous comparison views that
figurative comparisons are often loosely drawn, and thus
capable of accomodating the many 'accidental ways' in which
a comparison can be expressed.
Whether we say Achilles is like a lion, say
he is a lion, refer to him as a lion, or
speak about him as if he were a lion, we are
drawing a comparison (a figurative
comparison) between him and a lion. How the
comparison is couched grammatically is of
relatively less importance. (97-98)
Grammatical form is of less importance for these instances
but these instances only begin to approach the dilemma at
hand. What of more complex formulations lacking any such
immediately evident terms of comparison? Consider, for
example, the sportscaster ' s claim that 'when he was young
Sandy Koufax could throw a strawberry through a locomotive,
or Virginia Woolf's sketch of a highbrow as 'a man or woman
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of thoroughbred intelligence who rides his mind at a gallop
across country in pursuit of an idea.'^^ In making sense of
these metaphors, we do not seek to identify dissimilars in
order to inspect them for relevant shared properties. We
simply find ourselves imagining what Sandy Koufax or a
highbrow would have to be like--that is, how each would have
to be--for these descriptions to be accurate. In such
cases, comparison would seem to play little or no role. As
indicated in section 1.1 above, most notably, in reference
to phrases along the lines of Whitman's 'lilac and star and
bird entwined with the chant of my soul,' and Eliot's
'yellow smoke that rubs its muzzle on the window-panes,'
metaphors often admit of no equivalent statement of
comparison at all, or at least, no such statement that may
be assured of evading reasonable charges of arbitrary
reductionism or interpretive prejudice.
A more general tension in Fogelin's view concerns his
express desire to classify metaphor as a type of indirect
speech. With figurative comparisons, he urges, 'the point
of the comparison lies in the indirect speech act--what I
mean rather than simply what my words mean.' (96) Clearly,
then, if a hearer is to get the point of a figurative
comparison, she must have recourse to a shared procedure
^^I borrow these examples from Tirrell (1991) and Davidson
(1978) respectively.
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enabling her both to identify an utterance as such, and
determine the sense in which it is intended. Fogelin does
adopt a Gricean principle of identification ('With
figurative comparison, the speaker flouts, or at least
violates, standard conversational rules and thus engages the
respondent in the task of making adjustments that will
produce a good fit.' (96)), but he can offer no assured
means of fixing a speaker's communicative intent. The most
one can say about the informative content of the indirect
speech act--for Fogelin, the very point of speaking
figuratively--is that it asserts an obscure likeness, which
must be decided by the hearer.^®
^^Fogelin concedes as much when he writes:
The comparativist has no difficulty in giving
a paraphrase of the metaphorical expression 'A
is a B.' It means, literally means, that A is
like a B. Critics seem to think, however, that
somehow the comparativist is committed to
giving an adequate paraphrase of the content
of the indirect speech act that may be the
point of the comparison. This simply is not
true, and, again, the point can be made with
respect to non- figurative comparisons. I say
that someone runs like a gazelle to indicate
that he runs with effortless speed and grace.
If asked if that is what I meant, I may say
yes, feeling that nothing, or at least nothing
important, has been left out. At other times,
because of the problems of ineffability
discussed in the previous chapter, no literal
paraphrase can be found that captures the
content of the intended indirect speech act in
an adequate way. (96-97)
Fogelin would thus deny that his (comparativist) indirect
speech account of metaphor is committed to providing a
determinate content for metaphorical indirect speech acts,
apparently on the grounds that metaphors are comparisons, and
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Thus, even for the restricted range of metaphors that
may be acceptably transposed to simile, there can be no
reliable or final access to authorial intent. Here again
any number of examples may be called upon as evidence.
Consider, for instance, Schelling's comment that
'architecture is frozen music,' or Sartre's 'hell is other
people.' Research and reflection might convince us that we
are reasonably sure of knowing what these utterances were
intended to convey; our attempts at elucidation, however,
are more than likely to be imprecise, multi-layered, and
capable of constant elaboration. Moreover, as earlier
indicated in evaluating the work of Searle, perfect
ignorance of (or indifference to) authorial intent in no way
prevents us from appreciating these and other metaphors in a
variety of possible ways commensurate with the vagaries of
individual experience and imaginative response.
no comparison can be assured a paraphrase that would
adequately capture its intended content. This reply will not
do, however, for two reasons. First, it obscures his earlier
distinction between simile and literal comparison (according
to which literal comparisons identify likeness in terms of
obvious salient features, whereas similes require that the
hearer respond to an apparent violation of Gricean ^
conversational maxims by seeking to 'square the context wit
the utterance'), with which he was able to differentiate his
view from a traditional reductive (literal) comparison
view of
metaphor. Second, as above, it defeats the very purpose
of an
indirect speech act, which is to say one thing while both
meaning and producing an understanding something more.
(Cf.
Searle 'Indirect Speech Acts, ' in Davis (1991), p.
266.) I
return to this second point in assessing Fogelin's
obDections
to Davidson's account of metaphor in section
2.2 below.
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In general, communication succeeds when speakers and
hearers arrive at a mutual recognition of intentions.
Metaphors are quite often forcibly employed and fruitfully
interpreted where no such transaction occurs. In addressing
themselves to the most important pragmatic aspects of
conversation, the theorists included in this section offer
valuable analysis of ways in which parties to an exchange
manage to convey and discern communicative intentions that
are not stated explicitly. Along the way, however, all run
headlong into the intractable problem with any attempt to
understand metaphor as a form of indirect speech. They are
unable to explain our use of metaphor for purposes other
than stating beliefs, expressing desires, and conveying
messages. The problem with theories of metaphor as indirect
speech, in short, is their inability to account for the non-
communicative functions of metaphor. My next section is
concerned with a series of views that would remedy this
defect
.
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2.2 Irreducible Non-Sense
Her speech is nothing,
Yet the unshaped use of it doth move
The hearers to collection; they aim at it,
And botch the words up to fit their own
thoughts.
Which as her winks, and nods, and gestures
yield them,
Indeed would make one think there might be
thought.
Though nothing sure, yet much unhappily.
- Gentleman to Gertrude, Hamlet
,
IV, 5
An alternative pragmatic approach renounces any effort
to explain the work of metaphor according to principles of
cooperative linguistic practice, by denying that
metaphorical utterances are used to transmit information,
either directly or indirectly. Vital to this position is
the claim, associated primarily with Donald Davidson and his
followers, that metaphors convey no coded message, nor
indicate anything other than what they literally say.
Instead, they provoke or inspire us to 'see as' rather than
'see that', imposing a new perspective that prompts us to
imagine familiar things in wholly unfamiliar ways
inaccessible to literal translation or paraphrase.
Before elaborating on a few prominent versions of this
position, we may distinguish it from the two preceding sets
of views as follows. Adherents to this type of pragmatic
account agree with ' semantic— interactionists ' (section 1.2
above) in holding that metaphorical assertions cannot be
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accurately translated into literal terms--but this agreement
is not because they share the idea that such assertions bear
an irreducible cognitive content, rather, it is because they
believe that there is nothing nonliteral in a metaphor to be
translated. So evidently, these two positions differ over
the issue of the cognitive status of metaphor: against the
interactionists, supporters of this latter pragmatic view
deny that metaphors express a distinctive metaphorical
meaning
—
yet they deny it not because they accept the
’indirect speech' reduction of metaphor to speaker’s
intended meaning (section 2.1 immediately above), but
because they hold that metaphor achieves its wonders with no
more than ordinary word meanings, albeit employed in
imaginative new ways.
To maintain a significant pragmatic role for metaphor
apart from that of vehicle for the communication of ideas,
proponents of this approach tend to emphasize the importance
of imagery in metaphor. This emphasis is apparent in their
frequent use of descriptive terms pertaining to sight and
visibility, a use perhaps nowhere more evident than in the
central claim that metaphors prompt us to ’see as’ rather
than ’see that’. To understand this position well, it will
be necessary to develop a clear idea of the meaning of this
claim, and of the role of imagery in metaphor. While most
of the theorists discussed to this point have alluded to the
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importance of imagery in metaphor, few have sought further
elucidation. A notable exception is Paul Henle, whose
interaction view was considered briefly in section 1.2
above. Henle, we may recall, argued that metaphors describe
iconic objects, whose capacity for indirect signification is
the source of a unique and irreducible metaphorical meaning.
By presenting one object or event in terms of another,
metaphors compel us to conjure an original image of the
first bearing an extended range of features parallel in
structure to the second. Notwithstanding his identification
of this 'iconic element' with the cognitive content of a
metaphor, Henle 's account anticipates the idea that well
before being provided with an interpretation, metaphors
effect new and original ways of seeing otherwise ordinary
things
.
The most detailed analysis of the notion of 'seeing as'
in relation to metaphor has been carried out by Marcus
Hester, whose work draws heavily upon insights provided by
Ludwig Wittgenstein. In developing his views on language,
Wittgenstein was concerned with only literal forms of
expression;^® Hester presents his account as an attempt to
^^Cf. Marcus Hester, The Meaning of Poetic Metaphor (The
Hague: Mouton and Company, 1967)
.
rare mention of metaphor in the Investigations
suggests that Wittgenstein may have unreflectively held a view
of metaphor close to that which I have labelled the
traditional view' (in section 1.1) above:
136
extend and adapt certain of these views to the language of
poetry. In his famous discussion of Jastrow's duck-rabbit
drawing, Wittgenstein distinguishes ordinary seeing from
seeing as’ (or 'seeing an aspect’) by remarking that the
latter is akin to ’having an image’; like imagining, it is
’subject to the will.’ (213) When presented with the
ambiguous figure of the duck-rabbit, he observes, it is one
thing to say ’I see a duck’; it is quite another, however,
to say ’Now it’s a duck,’ or 'I see it as a duck’. While
the former statement simply reports a perception, the latter
statements would appear to report a sudden new perception:
they describe a change of aspect. ’The expression of a
change of aspect,’ he notes, ’is the expression of a new
perception and at the same time of the perception’s being
unchanged.’ (196) In this respect, ’the flashing of an
aspect on us seems half visual experience, half thought.
(197)
Taking his cue from these passages, and from a
suggestion for extending their range of application in an
If I say ’For me the vowel e is yellow’ I do
not mean: ’yellow’ in a metaphorical sense,
—
for I could not express what I want to say in
any other way than by means of the idea
’ yellow’
.
(216)
References, here and below, are to Ludwig Wittgenstein,
Philosophical Investigations . Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe;
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958.
137
article by Virgil Aldrich/' Hester proclaims that ' seeing
H i^ the fundamental distinguishing characteristic of
metaphor bn poetry .
'
(175-76) To explain, he asks that we
let A, B and C stand for duck, duck-rabbit, and rabbit
respectively, and then comments as follows: 'In
Wittgenstein's example we are given B and the problem is to
see A and C. In metaphor the problem is different though
the act of seeing as is similar. In metaphor we are given A
and C and the problem is to see B.
'
(179) At first glance,
this would appear to be no more than another version of the
comparison view, not unlike that of Fogelin (outlined in
section 2.1) above. A key difference emerges, however, with
Hester's emphasis upon the sensible aspect of metaphorical
expression. Following Wittgenstein, he underlines that
'seeing as' is at once an experience of seeing and an act of
selection. It is thus both active and passive: an
ambiguous image is presented to us, independently of our
control, and yet we manage to organize it in a particular
way. Metaphors, he claims, exhibit this same inherent
duality. ' Seeing /s ^ intuitive experience-act by which
one selects from the quasi-sensory mass of imagery one has
on reading metaphor the relevant aspects of such imagery .
'
(180) In hearing or reading a metaphor, we experience an
^'Virgil C. Aldrich, 'Pictorial Meaning, Picture-Thinking,
and Wittgenstein's Theory of Aspects,' Mind , LXVII (January
1958), pp. 70-79.
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ambiguous 'mass of imagery' which, though evoked in us
involuntarily, requires our 'active interrogation' to
determine its relevant sense. We succeed in making sense of
the metaphor only once we are in this way able to see its
'vehicle' as its 'tenor'.
As an intuitive ability, however, metaphorical 'seeing
as' cannot be reduced to a set of procedural rules. ' [I]n
my calling [it] an intuitive experience-act,' notes Hester,
'I mean that seeing as is an irreducible, primitive
accomplishment that either occurs or does not occur.' (181)
Making sense of metaphor cannot, therefore, be taught; at
best, it can be assisted, in a manner inversely analogous to
helping someone see the ambiguity in the duck-rabbit figure.
To illustrate, Hester cites a passage from Emily Dickinson:
'After great pain a formal feeling comes-- / The nerves sit
ceremonious like tombs'. Just as we might help someone to
see the duck-rabbit as a rabbit by tracing the ears and so
on— that is, by pointing out rabbit features in the shared
form--here we might assist a struggling reader by pointing
out features shared by nerves and tombs.
The hypothetical conversation might run:
'Don't you see that a great pain, a great
tragedy, stuns one into a stupor. One goes
about one's daily tasks in a formal,
unfeeling way. The nerves sit like tombs.
Instead of the warmth of life which they
formally felt, now all is precise, numb,
®°Hester here invokes the familiar terms set down by I. A.
Richards, whose views are discussed in section 1.2 above.
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ceremonious and cold like stones in a
cemetery.
'
(182)
With statements like these we might succeed in directing
attention to relevant aspects of the figure in question.
Hester stresses, however, that although this manner of
assistance may be useful, it can never adequately capture
the experience-act of reading a metaphor. Our most
enlightened attempts at explication 'can no more get the
totality of an experience-act of seeing as than can
statements about red get the sensation of red. Both types
of statements have, in Wittgenstein's terminology, ostensive
meaning.' (178) Here language can only point to a way of
reading; it cannot provide a complete analysis, or
equivalent replacement, for the reading itself. The reading
itself is an intuitive talent, requiring above all 'an
openness to the text, a sensitivity to the imagery
involved.' (182) It is at once a perception and ordering of
this imagery--an experience-act in which 'thought and
sensation are inseparable because the object of reading is a
sensuous obj ect interpreted . ' In this way, the 'seeing as'
prompted by our reading of a metaphor achieves a fusion of
verbal and visual; in metaphor, '[t]he same imagery which
occurs also means .
'
(188)
The principal virtue of this account lies in the
decisive role it provides for the imagination. Interpreting
a metaphor is a creative activity, requiring only openness
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to the range of visual images aroused in memory by the words
It employs, and heed for the free play of the imagination,
in Its capacity to extend and organize this flow of imagery,
thereby to give it sense. An obvious advantage of this view
over so many of its rivals is that it offers a more accurate
description of what occurs as we encounter and attend to the
most strikingly novel cases of metaphor. By way of example,
we might consider the report, in surrealist verse, of 'Eyes
capable of cracking pebbles / Smiles without thinking / For
each dream / Squalls of snow cries / Lakes of nudity / And
uprooted shadows.'®^ Making sense of these lines is not a
matter of adherence to established procedure or principle;
it is a wholly innovative undertaking in response to the
vision they release in response, that is, to the profusion
of images evoked in the reader by the poet's words. With
this insistence upon the vital sensible character of
metaphorical language--in particular, its power to call
forth stirring visual images--Hester ' s account recalls the
speculation of G.W.F. Hegel concerning the historical
origins of metaphor. Hegel believed that metaphors 'arise
from the fact that a word, which in the first instance
merely designates something entirely sensuous, is carried
®^Paul Eluard, 'Amoureuses, ' from La Vie Immediate , cited
in J.H. Matthews, Surrealist Poetry in France (Syracuse, New
York: Syracuse University Press, 1969), p. 110; translated by
J.H. Matthews.
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as a
over into a spiritual sphere, means of representing
abstract ideas in terms more concrete and thus more readily
comprehensible
.
Although such speculation remains plausible for many
cases of metaphor, it cannot be taken to identify the
sustaining feature of current practice. Hester's view,
likewise, is mistaken in contending that metaphors are
invariably evocative of visual images. Some may fail to do
so because they have fallen into a regular pattern of use.
When I say that I'm feeling a little blue this morning, or
that Wagner is not my cup of tea, my words are unlikely to
summon rousing images for anyone familiar with idiomatic
English. Of course, one might deny that these are metaphors
at all, by arguing that an expression is only as image-
evocative as it is free from standards of conventional use.
That these expressions fail to evoke images, or perhaps more
accurately, that we can make sense of these expressions
without forming images, would thus only indicate that they
are former (or dead) metaphors. This argument fails,
however, when we consider certain other problem cases.
®^G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Fine Arts (London: G.
Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1920; F.P.B. Osmaston trans.), volume II,
p. 139. This passage marks a significant point of departure
for Jacques Derrida's indictment of metaphor in philosophy as
a form of 'white mythology.' Cf. Jacques Derrida, "White
Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy," in his Margins
of Philosophy (F.C.T. Moore translator; Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 207-271.
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Take, for instance, Wallace Stevens's pronouncement that
'Death is the mother of beauty,' or Nietzsche's remark that
Some are born posthumously.' Though plainly concerned with
the subject of death, or a type of birth in death, these are
not dead metaphors; yet neither are they terribly (or
necessarily) evocative of imagery. Further examples in
poetry are not lacking: 'Beauty is truth, truth beauty'
(Keats); 'For Mercy, Pity, Peace and Love / Is God, our
father dear, / And Mercy, Pity Peace and Love / Is Man, his
child and care' (Blake); 'Wisdom and Spirit of the universe!
/ Thou Soul that art the eternity of thought!' (Wordsworth).
In these three selections, we find metaphors in which
'tenor' and 'vehicle' are equally abstract. Few, if any,
visual images are awakened by the words they employ; each
would thus appear to suffer a distinct scarcity of sensory
content for imaginative construal. Yet this in no way
inhibits our efforts to make sense of these lines, which
proceed according to the many various associations and
implications we may attach to the terms they provide. The
point here, in any event, is that many a metaphor is
delivered and decided without eliciting the 'mass of
imagery' or 'sensuous object' that Hester would deem
indispensible to its comprehension.®^
®®Paul Ricoeur has nonetheless identified in Hester's
account a key step toward understanding 'the semantic role of
imagination (and by implication, feeling) in the establishment
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The most prominent version of the alternative pragmatic
approach to metaphor that I have labelled 'irreducible non-
sense' has been advanced by Donald Davidson.®* Metaphorical
seeing as,
' on his view, is less a matter of ordering
visual imagery than it is of attending to the full range of
imaginative activity prompted by what a metaphor says.
Davidson's leading thesis is that 'metaphors mean what the
of metaphorical sense.' (229) This role, he claims, comprisesthree steps: first, imagination in what Kant called its
productive mode schematizes (that is, provides a procedure
for) a synthetic operation of understanding, permitting us todistinguish a relevant similarity in dissimilars. Second, it
produces images, both aroused and yet controlled by the clash
of verbal meanings, which depict the new intended relation— in
Kant's terms, it provides a concept with an image. Finally, it
suspends ordinary reference in order that novel meaning may
take hold in a projected (or redescribed) world. With his
analysis of metaphorical 'seeing as, ' in which verbal meanings
generate bound' images displaying or depicting an intuitive
grasp of a new and original predicative connection, Hester
places the emergence of metaphorical meaning on 'the
borderline between a semantics of productive imagination and a
psychology of reproductive imagination.' (237) Ricoeur
proceeds to sketch what he takes to be the parallel three-step
semantic role of feeling, in order to defend his central claim
that ' feeling as well as imagination are genuine components in
the process described in an interaction theory of metaphor.
They both achieve the semantic bearing of metaphor.' (242)
This proposal for an expanded semantic-interaction view of
metaphor, while impressive for the sheer range of insight it
aims to assimilate, nonetheless relies (by its author's own
admission) upon 'a theory of imagination and of feeling which
is still in infancy.' (246) Cf. Paul Ricoeur, 'The
Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling, '
Critical Inquiry 5, no. 1 (1978): 143-159. Page references
here are to its reappearance in Johnson (1981), pp. 228-247.
^‘’Donald Davidson, 'What Metaphors Mean, ' Critical Inquiry
5, no. 1 (1978) : 31-47. Page references below to its reprint
in Johnson (1981), pp. 200-227. Also reprinted in Davidson,
Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1984), pp. 157-175.
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words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and
nothing more.' (201) with this claim, he registers his firm
opposition to the idea of metaphorical meaning, as well as
to any view that would treat metaphor as a form of
communication. 'The concept of metaphor as a vehicle for
conveying ideas, even if unusual ones,' he remarks, 'seems
to me as wrong as the parent idea that a metaphor has a
special meaning.' Metaphors are incapable of equivalent
literal paraphrase 'not because [they] say something too
novel for literal expression but because there is nothing
there to paraphrase.' (201) This is not to say that
metaphors are pointless; it is only to deny that they
transmit encoded information. This denial, moreover, should
not be taken to imply that metaphors are inappropriate for
certain types of thought or expression. 'In the past,' he
adds, 'those who have denied that metaphor has a cognitive
content in addition to the literal have often been out to
show that metaphor is confusing, merely emotive, unsuited to
serious, scientific or philosophic discourse. My views
should not be associated with this tradition.
'
(201-02)
Although the tradition in question goes nameless, this
reference to separate cognitive and emotive uses of language
indicates that Davidson is concerned to distance himself
from a key tenet of logical positivism. Prior to assessing
Davidson's own account, it will be worthwhile to digress
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briefly, in order to clarify his relation to this legacy of
positivist views in the matter of metaphor.
Positivists sought above all to rid philosophy of the
exaggerated claims of speculative metaphysics, by accepting
only literal statements capable of verification as
legitimate knowledge claims. To this end, they adopted as
their central principle that the meaning of a proposition is
identical to the set of experiences that are together
equivalent to its being true. Assertions lacking any such
possible verification in experience were deemed neither true
nor false; instead, they were considered devoid of cognitive
significance, at best, expressions of (cognitively)
meaningless subjective sentiment. This famous positivist
distinction between the cognitive (or 'representative') and
emotive (or 'expressive') functions of language is invoked
by Rudolf Carnap in his Philosophy and Logical Syntax
(1935), when he claims that
Metaphysical propositions are neither true
nor false, because they assert nothing, they
contain neither knowledge nor error, they lie
completely outside the field of knowledge, of
theory, outside of truth or falsehood; but
they are, like laughing, lyrics, and music,
expressive
For positivists, metaphor provides an equally clear instance
of the emotive use of language: even when the attitudes or
®^Rudolf Carnap, Philosophy and Logical Syntax (London:
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1935), p. 29.
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emotions expressed by a metaphorical statement are
reformulated in approximate literal terms, the underlying
assertion itself remains incapable of either verification or
falsification, and thus entirely without cognitive content.
In reference to the figurative language of poets, Carnap
maintains that
The aim of a lyrical poem in which occur the
words ’sunshine' and 'clouds' is not to
inform us of certain meteorological facts,
but to express certain feelings of the poet
and to excite similar feelings in us . A
lyrical poem has no assertional sense, no
theoretical sense; it does not contain
knowledge. (29)
Critics have often pointed to the appeal of positivist
ideas, and in particular, the dualism of cognition and
emotion, in literary theory.®^ As early as 1923, for
instance, Ogden and Richards employed this distinction in
order to assign metaphor to like status.
If we say 'The height of the Eiffel Tower is
900 feet' we are making a statement, we are
using symbols in order to record or
communicate a reference, and our symbol is
true or false in a strict sense and is
theoretically verifiable. But if we say
'Hurrah!' or 'Poetry is a spirit' or 'Man is
a worm, ' we may not be making statements, not
even false statements; we are most probably
using words merely to evoke certain
attitudes
.
®^Cf. Fred Dallmayer, Language and Politics (Notre Dame:
Notre Dame University Press, 1984), chapter 6, most notably
pp. 152-155.
®"^C.K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning
(8th edition; New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1946), p.
149.
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Of course, prior indications of this separation of two
distinct uses of language are pervasive in Romanticism, most
notably, throughout the early nineteenth-century rebellion
against the neoclassical idea of poetry as imitation, in
favour of a conception of artistic production as an
essentially personal act of self-expression, to be judged
according to the spontaneity and intensity of feeling both
emitted and evoked. Wordsworth's rejection of the
traditional dichotomy of poetry and prose in support of
' the
more philosophical one of Poetry and Matter of Fact, or
Science, along with his characterization of poetry as
most vitally a means 'to rectify men's feelings, to give
them new compositions of feeling, to render their feelings
more sane, pure, and permanent'®^ offers a representative
instance. Here a crucial difference must be noted, however,
between positivist and Romantic views of metaphor. While
both maintain that metaphor serves a function quite distinct
from that of standard cognitive expression, positivists
consider that this distinctness relegates metaphor to a
comparatively diminished status in relation to the pursuit
of knowledge. Romantics, by contrast, praise metaphorical
^^Frorn the 1800 Preface; cited in Monroe Beardsley,
Aesthetics from Classical Greece to the Present (New York:
Macmillan, 1966), p. 252.
®^Letter to John Wilson, 1800; cited in Beardsley (1966),
p. 252.
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expression as the unerring testimony of a type of direct
intuition, offering insight into a higher order of supra-
rational truth, to which the poet maintains privileged
access. Perhaps nowhere is this contrast more evident than
in Shelley's magnificent 'Defense of Poetry,' which
concludes with the opinion that
Poets are the hierophants of an unapprehended
inspiration; the mirrors of the gigantic
shadows which futurity casts upon the
present; the words which express what they
understand not; the trumpets which sing to
battle, and feel not what they inspire; the
influence which is moved not, but moves.
Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of
the world.
Indeed, with this celebration of the unique power of poetic
language, its pervasive influence in shaping language and
thought, and above all, its role in promoting heightened
sensibility, expanded awareness, and the possiblity of human
self-realization through expression, the Romantics managed
to inspire many of the same philosophical systems that
positivists would later organize themselves to attack.
Davidson's account of metaphor bears an important
affinity with each of these views. Though he is by no means
^°Percy Bysshe Shelley, 'A Defence of Poetry, ' in David
Bromwich ed.. Romantic Critical Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987), p. 243.
^^Cf. Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1975), especially chapter one, pp. 3-50; cf.
also Isaiah Berlin, 'Herder and the Enlightenment,' in Earl
Wasserman ed.. Aspects of the Eighteenth Century (Baltimore:
John Hopkins Press, 1965)
.
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a positivist, he holds a similarly restricted view of what
it is for an utterance to have a meaning, one that excludes
metaphor. And while neither is he a Romantic, he agrees
that it is this very exclusion which accounts for the power
of metaphor to confer original insight, engage the
imagination, and transform the way we think and act. In
order to maintain these views as one, he writes,
I depend on the distinction between what
words mean and what they are used to do . I
think metaphor belongs exclusively to the
domain of use. It is something brought off by
the imaginative employment of words and
sentences and depends entirely on the
ordinary meanings of those words and hence on
^^Davidson's own view, which has seen many forms over many
years, is that meaning can be successfully analyzed in terms
of truth conditions; or, more precisely, that a theory of
meaning for a natural language is provided by the truth
conditions for the sentences of that language. In outline,
this view might be elaborated as follows: once a speaker
learns the semantic role of each of a finite number of words
or phrases, and in addition, the semantic consequences of a
finite number of modes of composition, she is able to
interpret utterances of sentences she has never heard before.
Since modes of composition can be endlessly repeated, there
will be no limit to the number of such novel sentences. She
thus has a system for interpreting arbitrary utterances,
within certain parameters (relative to speaker, time and
place) provided by context. To model this system, and
therefore, the abilities of a competent speaker, Davidson
proposes that we follow a Tarski truth definition, which
provides a recursive characterization of the truth conditions
of all possible utterances, by analyzing those which can be
made up from the finite vocabulary and modes of composition.
Cf. Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), particularly the
essays grouped together under the title 'Radical
Interpretation', pp. 123~179. The technical details of this
theory do not concern me here; as noted both in my
introduction and at the opening of chapter one, I have sought
to avoid any commitment to a particular analysis of meaning.
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the ordinary meanings of the sentences they
comprise. (202)
Metaphors mean only what they say; what they say, however,
is generally absurd or nonsensical.^^ Strictly speaking,
then, metaphors are meaningless--they tell us nothing.
True, they are often put to very effective use, for
instance, in prompting us to entertain new thoughts and
ideas, or discern aspects of things we had not previously
noticed. But the thoughts, ideas and aspects a metaphor
prompts us to consider must not be mistaken for a hidden
meaning of the words it employs. Here Davidson is
insistent: 'It is no help in explaining how words work in
metaphor to posit metaphorical or figurative meanings, or
^^Davidson in fact claims that 'a metaphor says only what
shows on its face—usually a patent falsehood or an absurd
truth.' (214) As I have argued above, however (in the second
full paragraph of section 2.1), this is a misleading claim,
which pragmatic theorists would do better to replace with the
claim that metaphors are semantically anomalous, and thus
simply absurd. Here I accept Samuel Levin's judgement, in
reference to the example 'The earth pirouettes around the
sun, ' that
there is here no propositional falsity; there
is only a lexical misuse. The point is that it
is improper to say of the earth either that it
pirouettes around the sun or that it does not
pirouette around the sun. Yet this is not
because as a matter of fact it does not
pirouette around the sun but because what the
earth does is not properly described as
pirouetting—around the sun or an^^here else.
Cf. Levin (1988), pp. 13-15. I take it that Davidson,
notwithstanding his above remark, would agree that when
confronted with a metaphorical sentence (such as 'The earth
pirouettes around the sun'), our first instinct is not to
assign it a truth-value, but to attempt to mak_e sense of it,
by asking what it could be construed to mean.
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special kinds of poetic or metaphorical truth. These ideas
don't explain metaphor, metaphor explains them.' Our
tendency to speak of metaphorical meaning in reference to
what a metaphor provokes or inspires is misleading, he adds
wryly, for 'simply to lodge this meaning in the metaphor is
like explaining why a pill puts you to sleep by saying it
has a dormative power.' (202)
This remark neatly summarizes the principal objection
to the range of semantic-interaction theories presented
above in chapter one. Talk of metaphorical meaning is just
talk about the effects a metaphor has on us; to call these
effects a meaning is to abandon the explanatory function
that provides the rationale for the concept of meaning to
begin with. The point of the notion of linguistic meaning
to explain what can be done with words, in accordance with
conventions that apply independently of any particular
context of use. Metaphors are identified on the basis of a
transgression of these conventions. Talk of metaphorical
meaning, therefore, is empty; it explains nothing. (210) To
believe otherwise is to fall victim to the 'central error
about metaphor ... the thesis that associated with a metaphor
is a cognitive content that its author wishes to convey and
that the interpreter must grasp if he is to get the
message.' (217) For Davidson, this thesis is not only
false; given the chronic difficulty of deciding just what
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the cognitive content of a metaphor is supposed to be, it is
manifestly implausible.
[W]e imagine there is a content to be
captured when all the while we are in fact
focusing on what the metaphor makes us
notice. If what the metaphor makes us notice
were finite in scope and propositional in
nature, this would not in itself make
trouble; we would simply project the content
the metaphor brought to mind onto the
metaphor. But in fact there is no limit to
what a metaphor calls to our attention, and
much of what we are caused to notice is not
propositional in character.' (217-18)
The difficulty we experience in attempting to provide a
metaphor with an equivalent literal translation is not
simply that ' there is no end to what we want to mention, ' it
is, more importantly, that 'no proposition expresses what
[we are] led to see.' (218) It is in this respect that
metaphors may be likened to a type of visual perception.
Seeing as is not seeing that. Metaphor makes
us see one thing as another by making some
literal statement that inspires or prompts
the insight. Since in most cases what the
metaphor prompts or inspires is not entirely,
or even at all, recognition of some truth or
fact, the attempt to give literal expression
to the content of the metaphor is simply
misguided. (218)
Those who would explain a metaphor by appeal to its hidden
message are thus 'fundamentally confused. . .because no
such
message exists.' (218) Davidson is quick to add,
however,
that this conclusion should not be taken to disparage
the
role of the critic. In his proper role, the
critic helps us
to share the experience of a more sensitive
or educated
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reader. As a result, he finds himself in a type of 'benign
competition' with the author of the metaphors under
discussion. 'The critic tries to make his own art easier or
more transparent than the original, but at the same time he
tries to reproduce in others some of the effects the
original had on him.
' (219)
The key benefit of Davidson's account is that it
succeeds in avoiding the liabilities of the views considered
in the preceding sections. Those liabilities, we may
recall, follow from the attempt to designate a procedure or
mechanism for linking the literal non-sense of metaphor with
a determinate meaning or intention. Davidson would have us
abandon any such project. Rather than seeking to explain or
decipher a concealed message of some sort, he urges that in
thinking about metaphors, we limit ourselves merely to
describing what they evoke. Most theorists of metaphor
would agree that upon hearing a new metaphor, we tend to
find ourselves forming new ideas, and occasionally even new
beliefs. For Davidson, metaphors are best understood as
causes, rather than expressions, of such changes. His
minimal positive contribution to our discussion, in summary,
is to have provided a causal view of how metaphors work.
Metaphors incite new thoughts, ideas, images and beliefs,
without expressing them either directly or indirectly.
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Several minor objections have been raised against this
position. Lynne Tirrell, for one, has claimed that
'Davidson mistakenly conflates what is seen with what the
metaphor prompts.'^'’ With metaphor, she argues, we see one
thing, X, as another, Y. What we see, X, is clearly non-
propositional ; what the metaphor prompts, however--a seeing
of X as Y--is less clearly so. To illustrate, she proposes
that we consider Romeo's assertion 'Juliet is the sun.'
It is a fast and illegitimate slide from
denying that seeing-as is seeing-that to
claiming that no propositional content is
associated with seeing-as. We cannot agree
that propositional content is associated
with seeing Juliet as the sun. In seeing
Juliet ^ the sun, Romeo may, for example,
see that she brings warmth to his life. For
that matter, his seeing that she brings
warmth to his life may be what enables him to
see her as the sun. (146)
Tirrell is right to point out that there may be a
propositional content associated with seeing as, but this
rather obvious claim in no way contradicts Davidson's
position. Her objection is plausible only to the extent
that her use of the vague phrase 'associated with' serves to
obscure Davidson's key distinction between what words mean
and what they are used to do. Davidson denies that
metaphors express a propositional content; he stresses,
however, that they may prompt, incite, suggest, evoke,
^^Lynne Tirrell, 'Seeing Metaphor as Seeing As: Remarks on
Davidson's Positive View of Metaphor, ' Philosophical
Investigations 14:2, April 1991, p. 146.
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stimulate, and inspire thoughts, ideas, images, and indeed,
propositions. So in claiming that Juliet is the sun, Romeo
may be motivated by the belief that she brings warmth to his
life, just as his statement may prompt its audience to
embrace the same belief; in neither case, however, does the
statement 'Juliet is the sun' possess as a hidden meaning,
or express in coded form, the proposition that she brings
warmth to his life.
Nelson Goodman has taken issue with Davidson in similar
fashion, objecting to his argument that if metaphors had
special meanings distinct from their literal meanings, then
we would be able to specify those special meanings in
metaphors that have died--as Davidson puts it, '[t]he
figurative meaning of the living metaphor should be
immortalized in the literal meaning of the dead. ' But this
consequent does not hold: the once-metaphorical expression
'He was burned up,
'
for instance, 'now suggests no more than
that he was very angry. When the metaphor was active we
would have pictured fire in the eyes or smoke coming out of
the ears.' (208) Goodman responds as follows:
Davidson's argument seems at odds with his
thesis that the metaphorical and literal
applications of a term cannot be different.
For if when 'burned up' becomes a literal
term for angry people, it has the same
application as when metaphorical, then its
metaphorical application must have been
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different from its other (original) literal
application to things consumed by flame.®^
On this reading, consistency requires that Davidson either
back up and implausibly deny that 'burned up' is a former
metaphor that now applies literally to angry people, or
abandon his thesis that the literal and metaphorical
applications of a term are the same. This reading is
mistaken, however; it poses no problem for Davidson, who
nowhere holds such a thesis. Goodman incorrectly assigns to
him the view that literal and metaphorical applications
cannot differ, when in fact, he denies that there can be a
metaphorical application at all. Davidson's leading thesis,
we may recall, is that metaphors have no meaning beyond what
they literally say. Transposed to Goodman's strictly
referential terms, this amounts to the claim that metaphors
have no application other than their standard literal
application. Davidson's argument in relation to the above
example is quite consistent with this claim. The evocative
power of 'burned up' when it was initially employed as a
metaphor issued precisely from the fact that it then applied
only to things consumed by flame. The gradual decline of
this evocative power, moreover, coincided precisely with its
^^Nelson Goodman, 'Metaphor as Moonlighting, ; in Sheldon
Sacks ed.. On Metaphor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1979), p. 177. Here I concur, for the most part, with David
Cooper's assessment of this objection; cf. Cooper (1986), pp.
126-127.
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acquisition, over time and with wear, of a distinct
application to angry people.
Robert Fogelin, while granting to Davidson's causal
theory a certain originality, has objected to his
accompanying refusal of the view that metaphors can be
understood as figurative comparisons. The problem with
comparison views in general, Davidson writes, is that
They make the hidden meaning of the metaphor
all too obvious and accessible. In each case
the hidden meaning is to be found simply by
looking to the literal meaning of what is
usually a painfully trivial simile. This is
like that—Tolstoy is like an infant, the
earth like a floor. It is trivial because
everything is like everything else. (209)
Fogelin distinguishes two criticisms here, in order to
consider them separately: 'The first is that comparativism
in either form makes the hidden meaning of a metaphor too
easy to interpret; the second is that hidden meaning, when
revealed, usually emerges as triviality In response to
the first, he correctly points out that only the reductive
comparativist
,
who conflates simile with literal comparison,
stands guilty as charged. Fogelin, by contrast, advocates
an elliptical simile view of metaphor that differentiates
literal and figurative comparison according to
considerations of salience. In response to the second of
^^Fogelin (1988), p. 58.
^^As noted (in section 2.1) above, Fogelin holds that
literal comparisons identify likeness in terms of obvious
salient features, whereas figurative comparisons, or similes.
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Davidson's criticisms, Fogelin argues that there is no
reason to suppose that the simile associated with a metaphor
is 'painfully trivial, ' since it is not true that everything
is similar to everything else. To be clear, Fogelin does
not deny that, given any two entities, it is always possible
to find something that is true of both; rather, he denies
that this shows them to be similar. He describes his
strategy in doing so as follows: 'if similarity is a
universal relation, it follows trivially that it is a
symmetrical relation; thus by showing that similarity is not
symmetrical we refute the doctrine that everything is
similar to everything else.' (62) It is important to note
that by symmetry, Fogelin means reversibility, 'namely, that
if a is similar to b, then b is similar to a.' (62) To show
that similarity claims are not reversible in this way,
Fogelin cites a lengthy passage from the work of
psychologist Amos Tversky, which reads (in part)
:
Such a statement [of the form 'a is like b'
]
is directional; it has a subject, a, and a
referent, b, and it is not equivalent in
general to the converse similarity statement
'b is like a.' In fact, a choice of subject
and referent depends, at least in part, on
the relative salience of the objects. We tend
to select the more salient stimulus, or the
require that the hearer respond to an apparent violation of
Gricean conversational maxims by seeking to ' square the
context with the utterance, ' that is, by ignoring standard
salient features in order to interpret the assertion of
similarity in terms of only the more general or subsidiary
qualities that the items in question may be considered to
share
.
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prototype, as a referent, and the less
salient stimulus, or variant, as a subject.
We say 'the portrait resembles the person'
rather than 'the person resembles the
portrait.' We say 'the son resembles the
father' rather than 'the father resembles the
son.' We say 'an ellipse is like a circle,'
not 'a circle is like an ellipse, ' and we say
'North Korea is like Red China' rather than
'Red China is like North Korea.
Tversky here appeals to the concept of salience to account
for the directionality, and hence, asymmetry, of similarity
statements. Features are salient, he proceeds to explain,
when they are prominent or conspicuous, or play a central
role in classification. In discussing this passage, Fogelin
concedes that salience 'is a rich and diverse concept--
perhaps in need of regimentation.' (66) His conclusion,
nonetheless, is that '[Tversky's] list of clear examples of
similarity claims that are not reversible. .
.
alone is
sufficient to refute ... Davidson ' s claim that everything is,
after all, similar to everything else. (64)
This conclusion is unwarranted, however, as Fogelin'
s
argument turns on equivocal use of the terms 'symmetry' and
'reversibility'. To establish the falsity of the claim that
everything is similar to everything else, Fogelin proposes
to show that (at least some) similarity claims are
asymmetrical, or non-reversible . He thus needs to show that
for some A and B, it is true that A is similar to B, but
^®Amos Tversky, 'Features of Similarity,' Psychological
Review 84 (1977), p. 328; cited in Fogelin, p. 64.
160
false that B is similar to A. Yet Tversky's examples show
only that for some A and B, the intended sense of 'A is
similar to B' may differ from the intended sense of 'B is
similar to A. ’ This difference, moreover, does not show any
similarity claim to be false. Choice of subject and
referent may indeed depend on relative salience, but
salience in turn depends on what one wants to say. For
instance, we might say 'the father resembles the son' to
berate the father of a notoriously immature son, or 'the
person resembles the portrait' after she has had her hair
styled in a manner not seen since the time of the portrait.
The fact that certain pairs are more often directed certain
ways tells us something about what is more often being said,
but nothing to contradict the claim that everything is
similar to everything else. In any event, it is worth
recalling that Fogelin's objections are not directed against
Davidson's leading thesis; consequently, the accuracy or
inaccuracy of Davidson's criticism of the comparison view
has no bearing on that of his own causal theory.
The principal objection to Davidson's causal theory is
that it fails to explain how we produce and understand
metaphorical utterances. Defenders of rival viewpoints have
accused Davidson of brazen disregard for the fact that
metaphors are pervasive in our everyday thought processes
and communicative practices, where they are used quite
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commonly to convey messages, in both ordinary and
specialized contexts. Given this fact, any satisfactory
account of metaphor must determine, by reference to some
form of general procedure or mechanism, just how such
content is successfully transmitted. Yet Davidson would
simply evade this vital question entirely. Thus, for
instance, Karsten Harries has argued that in denying to
metaphors a cognitive content, Davidson cannot account for
our frequent use of metaphor in slang:
[SJomeone is called an AC/DC. Literally
understood the claim would have to be
considered false or perhaps meaningless. Once
the figurative meaning of the term has been
understood, however, the expression is
recognized as an assertion that may be true
or false.
As we have seen throughout the preceding sections, most
theorists of metaphor have based their views upon cases no
less time-worn and familiar— 'man is a wolf,
'
'Sam is a
pig,' 'time flies,' and so on. Indeed, for many such
theorists, ' [m] etaphor is a tool so ordinary that we use it
unconsciously and automatically, with so little effort that
we hardly notice it. It... is an integral part of our
ordinary everyday thought and language Metaphors, they
hold, are used to communicate, to convey meanings. Since
^^Karsten Harries, 'The Many Uses of Metaphor,
' in Sheldon
Sacks ed.. On Metaphor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1979)
,
pp. 166-167
.
^°°Lakoff and Turner (1989), p. xi.
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the meaning a metaphor conveys is distinct from the usual
meaning of the words it employs, however, it follows that
'in addition to the literal meanings of words, we require
rules for the second-order discourse specific to
metaphor Davidson's causal view is defective because it
provides no such rules. In an essay entitled 'How Metaphors
Work: A Reply to Donald Davidson, ' Max Black has summarized
this point quite simply: 'The gravest objection to
Davidson's vigorously argued standpoint then is that, while
rejecting current views, it supplies no insight into how
metaphors work...'^°^
Of course, to this charge, Davidson can only plead
guilty, as he wants to deny the very existence of what he is
being asked to explain. His leading thesis, once again, is
that metaphors mean nothing other than what they literally
say. Attempts to designate a procedure for decoding a
hidden message in what they say are therefore, as he puts
it, 'fundamentally confused.' From the very outset of his
essay, Davidson emphasizes the irreducible creativity of
both metaphorical construction and construal; indeed, in a
clever— if conspicuous--ef fort to demonstrate this point, he
opens with a striking metaphor of his own.
^°^Kittay (1989), p. 143.
^°^Max Black, 'How Metaphors Work: A Reply to Donald
Davidson,' in Sacks (1979), p. 189.
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Metaphor is the dreamwork of language and,like all dreamwork, its interpretation
reflects as much on the interpreter as on the
originator. The interpretation of dreams
requires collaboration between a dreamer and
a waker, even if they be the same person; and
the act of interpretation is itself a work of
the imagination. So too understanding a
metaphor is as much a creative endeavor as
making a metaphor, and as little guided by
rules. (200)
More recent defenders of metaphor as a type of 'irreducible
non sense have sought to extend and reinforce Davidson's
view by elaborating in one way or another upon these
remarks. Before presuming to pass judgement over the
principal objection to this type of position, it will be
useful to consider a few such elaborations in brief.
Marcia Cavell has offered an interpretation of
Davidson's opening metaphor that draws upon certain of
Freud's ideas concerning dreamwork
. 'On Freud's theory,'
she notes, 'a dream is the representation, or the
visualization, of a wish fulfilled.' (496) This wish is not
easily recognized by the wakened dreamer, since it is
usually infantile (and thus foreign to the wishes and
desires of the conscious adult)
,
surrounded by anxiety (at
the thought of having such a wish)
,
and presented in a
'visual or fictive mode.' (497) For this distinctive mode
^°^Marcia Cavell, 'Metaphor, Dreamwork and Irrationality, '
in Ernest Lepore ed.. Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives
on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1984), pp. 495-507.
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of presentation, ’the dream is the prototype of what Freud
sometimes calls 'hallucinatory wish-fulfillment' and
sometimes unconscious 'phantasy',' (497) a peculiar type of
imagining in which some state of anxiety, lack or need is
represented as having been set right. Such hallucinatory or
unconscious imagining differs from ordinary imagining in
that it fails to distinguish between belief and make-
believe, or wishing something were so, and it being the
case. This is not to say that in so imagining, one believes
the situation represented to have been obtained. One is,
rather, of a mental state indifferent to reality, for which
questions of assertion and belief are suspended. 'One does
not hallucinate--as one believes-- that something is the
case; one hallucinates the world as being a certain sort of
way.' (499) Thus, in calling metaphor the 'dreamwork' of
language, Davidson encourages us to think of metaphor in
terms of not only dreams, but more importantly, alongside of
our experience of phantasy, works of art, and certain types
of wishful thinking--instances of the kind of dreamwork, or
waking mental process that Cavell calls ' non-propositional
envisioning.' (495) 'In dreamwork,' she concludes, 'wishing
causes one to describe the world in a certain way, and one s
description is mistaken for the world.' (507)
Samuel Levin has taken up a similar line of thought, in
proposing that interpreting a metaphor is not a matter of
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imagining a metaphoric utterance meaning to fit the actual
world, as most theorists contend, but of imagining a
metaphoric world to fit the actual utterance meaning. In
particular, he urges not only that the language of metaphor
be taken literally, but that to this demand, implicit in
Davidson's view, there be added 'the further requirement
that we accept the epistemological consequences that ensue
from adopting this course, where this means that we try to
conceive of the state of affairs actually described by the
language of the metaphoric expression.' (17) For Levin,
nowhere is the need for this manner of reading more evident
than in the poetry of Wordsworth. In a well-known passage
of the 1805 Prelude
,
for instance, the poet turns from
lamenting his inability to apply himself to the poetic work
of which he feels capable, in order to ask:
Was it for this
That one, the fairest of all rivers loved
To blend his murmurs with my nurse's song.
And from his alder shades and rocky falls,
And from his fords and shallows, sent a voice
That flowed along my dreams? For this didst thou,
0 Derwent, travelling over the green plains
Near my 'sweet birthplace', didst thou,
beauteous stream.
Make ceaseless music through the night and
day.
Which with its steady cadence tempering
Our human waywardness, composed my thoughts
To more than infant softness, giving me
Among the fretful dwellings of mankind,
A knowledge, a dim earnest, of the calm
^°'‘Samuel Levin, Metaphoric Worlds: Conceptions of a
Romantic Nature (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), p.
3.
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Which Nature breathes among the hills and groves?
(I, 269-85)
Here Wordsworth is concerned to impart something of 'the
refuge and comfort ('the calm') that nature offers from the
disappointments and frustrations {'Was it for this') of
human affairs.' (224) In particular, he recounts how the
river Derwent 'loved to blend his murmurs with my nurse's
song,' 'sent a voice that flowed along my dreams,' and 'gave
knowledge, a dim earnest, of the calm which Nature breathes
among the hills and groves.' One way to read these
metaphors would be to treat them as pathetic fallacies, in
which the poet transfers to inanimate Nature a range of
terms pertaining properly to the impressions and sentiments
evoked in him as he contemplates it. On Levin's view,
however, such a reading not only 'fails to do justice to the
strong poetic feeling of these lines, ' it also 'degrades and
trivializes' the heightened experience and disposition of
mind they would prompt us to share. (224-225) Taking them
literally, on the other hand, 'implies a universal
interanimation, a sense of something 'deeply interfused','
as all at once 'nature and the river are transfigured: the
river does speak, nature does breathe. No longer are their
concepts lifeless, of objects existing outside and apart
from us; they become vitalized with the same forces that
animate human nature.' (226) A literal reading of
Wordsworth's metaphors thus summons us to reflect upon
'the
167
oneness, the integrity of the created world, the idea of man
and nature as participating in a unity of sovereign
disposition.' (228) In so doing, more generally, we are
forced 'to conceive of a world or state of affairs whose
nature... is estranged from common notions of reality and may
rightly be termed metaphoric.' (237)
That metaphors inspire us to conceive of things as
never before is an idea of no less importance to Richard
Rorty, who has sought to provide an account of 'intellectual
history viewed as the history of metaphor This account
proceeds from his central ' antifoundationalist
' argument,
which he summarizes as follows: 'since truth is a property
of sentences, since sentences are dependent for their
existence upon vocabularies, and since vocabularies are made
by human beings, so are truths.' (21) At 'the level of
criterion-governed sentences within language games, ' he
observes, the world may cause us to be justified in holding
a particular belief. Yet when we consider
alternative language games--the vocabulary of
ancient Athenian politics versus Jefferson's,
the moral vocabulary of St. Paul versus
Freud's, the jargon of Newton versus that of
Aristotle, the idiom of Blake versus that of
^°^Richard Rorty, Contingency, irony, solidarity
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 16; page
numbers in parentheses below refer to this text. Cf. also
'Unfamiliar Noises: Hesse and Davidson on Metaphor,'
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , supplementary vol. 61
(1987) : 283-296; reprinted in his Objectivity, Relativism and
Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 162-
172.
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Dryden--it is difficult to think of the world
as making one of these better than another.
(5)
Vocabularies are not chosen by reference to criteria; they
are acquired, and gradually adjusted, in the service of
various human purposes. To accept this view of the
'contingency of language,' we are told, is to embrace 'a
picture of intellectual and moral progress as a history of
increasingly useful metaphors rather than of increasing
understanding of how things really are.' (9) In support of
this picture, Rorty urges that we see the distinction
between the literal and the metaphorical as just the
difference between 'familiar and unfamiliar uses of noises
and marks.' Literal uses of language 'are the uses we can
handle by our old theories about what people will say under
various conditions'; metaphorical uses, on the other hand,
are those 'which make us get busy developing a new theory.'
(17) This distinction he takes to be a consequence of
Davidson's leading thesis, that metaphors mean nothing other
than what they literally say. 'To have a meaning is to have
a place in a language game. Metaphors, by definition, do
not.' In this respect,
tossing a metaphor into a conversation is
like suddenly breaking off the conversation
long enough to make a face, or pulling a
photograph out of your pocket and displaying
it, or pointing at a feature of the
surroundings, or slapping your interlocutor s
face, or kissing him. Tossing a metaphor into
a text is like using italics, or
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illustrations, or odd punctuations or
formats
.
All these are ways of producing effects
on your interlocutor or your reader, but not
ways of conveying a message. To none of these
IS It appropriate to respond with 'What
exactly are you trying to say?' If one had
wanted to say something--if one had wanted to
utter a sentence with a meaning--one would
presumably have done so. But instead, one
thought that one ' s aim could be better
carried out by other means. (18)
Of course, this is not to say that an unfamiliar noise or
mark will never acquire a habitual use, or familiar place in
the language game into which it has been introduced. In
time and with frequent repetition, it may well do so, once
our theories about the linguistic behaviour of others have
been modified to accept it. It then will have become just
another literal utterance, a successful contribution to the
gradual process of 'changing the way we talk, and thereby
changing what we want to do and what we think we are.' (20)
Much more could be said about each of these views, in
particular, concerning the extent to which each departs from
Davidson's stated position. Putting such differences
aside, however, and returning to matters at hand, we may
note that each endorses a version of his causal theory of
how metaphors work. Metaphors incite new thoughts, ideas.
^°®For persuasive argument of the opinion that Forty's view
of metaphor, for its exclusive emphasis on the discontinuity
between linguistic creativity and cognition, is a distortion
of Davidson's, cf. Gabe Eisenstein, 'Contingency and
Pessimism: Rorty on Creativity and Understanding, ' The
Philosophical Forum Volume XXIII, No. 3, Spring 1992.
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images and beliefs, without expressing them either directly
or indirectly; they mean only what they literally say,
which, though absurd or non-sensical
,
may nonetheless prompt
us to envision fanciful states of affairs, project
metaphoric worlds, and look for ways to revise our theories
about linguistic behaviour. One notable consequence of this
type of position is that so-called 'conventional' or 'dead'
metaphors (such as those cited and analyzed by advocates of
the preceding rival views) are not metaphors at all. They
are, to borrow Rorty's terms, just once-unfamiliar strings
of marks and noises that have become familiar, by having
been successfully fixed within a predictable pattern of
behavior. It is therefore pointless to look for rules that
would explain how metaphors work. Against those who persist
with this project, only to end up taking such established
utterances as paradigm cases, supporters of the causal view
point out that metaphors are rather more like good jokes or
hidden frogs: though initially quite provocative, they tend
to die when dissected.
To summarize: the principal objection to the causal
view assumes that metaphors are used for communicative
^°^Cf. Davidson (1978), p. 200: 'there are no unsuccessful
metaphors, just as there are no unfunny jokes.' Cf. also Rorty
(1987), pp. 290-91: 'you may not have to kill a platypus to
get a satisfactory theory of how it works, but you do have to
kill off a metaphor to get a satisfactory theory of how i±
works .
'
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purposes
-that is, to convey messages--and then deems
inadequate any account that does not explain, by reference
to some form of general procedure or mechanism, just how
this occurs. In response, defenders of the causal view
maintain that once successful communication does occur, the
expression in question loses its metaphorical status. What,
then, the status of such an expression? No longer a
metaphor, they claim, it becomes just an ordinary polyseme,
a word or phrase with more than one established sense, whose
intended sense on the occasion of a particular utterance is
readily discernable in reference to the sentence (or broader
context) in which it is used. A glance at any standard-
usage dictionary shows that polysemy is a pervasive feature
of our language.^®® Most polysemy is the result of distinct
related meanings of a word, such as that which exists for
words denoting both actions and objects ('stone', 'slice',
or 'slide'), or words having multiple analogous meanings
('cells' of an organism, prison or political group, the
'neck' of a person, sweater, or bottle)
.
In other cases,
distinct meanings appear to be quite unrelated ('pen'.
^°®My own O.A.D. paperback, for instance, lists four
meanings for the entry 'pig': '1. a domestic or wild animal
with short legs, cloven hoofs, and a broad, blunt snout. 2.
(informal) a greedy, dirty, or unpleasant person. 3. (slang,
contemptuous) a policeman. 4. an oblong mass of metal from a
smelting furnace, pig iron. ' Cf . Oxford American Dictionary
(New York: Avon Books, 1980), p. 675.
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'match', 'bank' or 'bat') Whether and how the multiple
meanings of a word may be associated, however, while perhaps
an interesting question of etymology, does not alter the
fact that we do frequently encounter and readily
disambiguate polysemes. For defenders of the causal view,
this is just what occurs in the circumstance misleadingly
described by their opponents as 'using a metaphor to convey
a message.' Once such utterances are properly recognized as
mere polysemes, they contend, use of the term 'metaphor'
will be restricted to the novel case, for which no governing
rules or principles can be had.
The simple problem with this response, however, is that
it is disconfirmed by an enormous amount of empirical
evidence. Between the most obvious cases of stone-dead
metaphors that have become polysemes (such as Searle's 'Sam
is a pig') and strikingly novel metaphors that can only be
imaginatively pondered (such as Breton's 'My wife with the
sex of a mirror / / With eyes that are purple armor and
^°^Some linguists invoke this contrast to distinguish
polysemy from homonymy: the former exists where a word or
expression has more than one distinct sense, the latter where
distinct words or expressions are phonetically and
orthographically identical. Owing to the difficulty of
deciding many cases, this distinction has been abandoned by
others in favor of a single standard of lexical ambiguity that
would assimilate all cases to either one or the other. Here I
follow the general trend in the literature on metaphor of
adopting 'polysemy' for all such cases. For a more detailed
discussion of the distinction, cf. John Lyons, Semantics , Vol.
2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 550ff.,
and Cooper (1986), pp. 123-126.
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a magnetized needle')/ there stands an extended range of
ordinary metaphorical talk that is neither firmly
established nor entirely original— talk, that is, which is
used to convey messages, though it is not quite assimilable
to polysemy. To gather examples we need only recall our
frequent tendency to describe one type of experience or
activity in terms of another: talk of amourous
relationships 'going nowhere,' 'off track,' 'on the rocks,'
at a 'crossroads' or a 'dead-end', or for that matter,
'blasting off,' 'sailing smoothly,' or 'cruising into
overdrive, ' all governed by the underlying conceptual
correlation 'Love is a Journey,' according to which lovers
are travellers, and their relationship a vehicle of some
kind; or similarly, reports of how someone known to have no
involvement in theatre 'stole the show,' 'brought the house
down,' 'held the spotlight', or alternatively, 'played the
fool,' 'missed his cue,' or 'suffered stage fright,' all
regulated by the implicit correlation 'Life is a Play,' for
which that someone is an actor, and his behaviour at some
key moment a performance . Each of these expressions can
be used to communicate a clear message; few, if any of them,
^^°Cf. Lakoff (1993), pp. 209-212, and Lakoff and Turner
(1989), pp. 20-21 respectively. Cf. also my discussion of the
views of Lakoff, Johnson and Turner concerning the priority
and ubiquity of conceptual metaphor in section 1.2 above, and
the instructive commentary on their work provided by Cooper
(1986), most notably, in his section on 'dead metaphor,' pp.
118-139.
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however, may rightly be counted as polysemes (akin to the
examples of the preceding paragraph, which can be found in
any standard English dictionary)
. True, they are employed
as analogous extensions of their standard literal meanings,
and this manner of employment is often a source of polysemy.
But there is an important difference: here an entire array
of related expressions is organized around a single analogy,
which authorizes indefinitely more talk conforming to the
same inferential correspondence. Our habitual ways of
describing one experience or activity in terms of another
thus allow us to produce and understand ever new extensions
of the same practice. In virtue of the above correlations,
for instance, we have no trouble making sense of Aretha's
refrain 'we're in the fast lane on the freeway of love,' or
Sinatra's 'and now I face the final curtain,' just as we can
easily infer what it might mean to describe a marriage as
having 'had a frozen 0-ring at lift-off, ' or to claim that a
sudden delay in plans was 'not in the script.' The same
applies equally to innumerable novel utterances, which are
readily understood to convey a message, though there can be
no question of multiple established meanings.
In answer to this reply, defenders of the causal theory
might be expected to concede the obvious--that certain types
of idiomatic or colloquial metaphor can in fact be used for
communicative purposes--in order to retreat to a qualified
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version of the view that metaphors convey no message, nor
mean anything other than what they literally say. We can
imagine such a qualified version to hold, more plausibly,
that the causal view applies only to poetic metaphor. This
position is no less defective, however, as many terms and
expressions used in poetry retain a symbolic value that
enables us to determine with reasonable assurance what
certain metaphors are intended to mean. The word 'rose',
for example, in ordinary speech denotes only a type of
flower; in poetry, however, it has over the years come to
signify youth, beauty, perfection, and evanescence of life.
This kind of specialized poetic signification may be
distinctive to the work of a particular poet or period, or
it may be drawn from the myths of a widely shared culture or
tradition. Many poetic metaphors can be understood as
elaborations upon the same habitual ways of describing one
experience or activity in terms of another that turn up in
our everyday speech. The frequency and ease with which we
produce and understand utterances conforming to the
correlation 'Life is a Play,' for instance, helps us to
ascertain what kind of future 'role' in life Prufrock
imagines for himself when he tells us 'No! I am not Prince
Hamlet, nor was meant to be; / Am an attendant lord, one
“^Cf. J. Paul Hunter, ed.. Poetry (New York: Norton,
1973)
,
pp. 521-22
.
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that will do / To swell a progress, start a scene or two, '
in the same way that our familiar euphemistic talk of 'Death
as Departure' informs our understanding of his statement 'I
have seen or the eternal Footman hold my coat, and snicker,
/ And in short, I was afraid. The point is that we do in
fact understand these (and a great many other) poetic
metaphors to convey a message. In reading poetry, just as
in everyday conversation, we generally take it for granted
that the author of a metaphorical statement intends to
communicate a belief, desire or informative content distinct
from what that statement literally says; in doing so,
moreover, we tend to assume that there are interpretive
procedures available to us for determining what that content
is, even if our best determinations occasionally turn out to
be imprecise or in want of elaboration. For failing to
provide insight into the nature of these procedures, the
causal theory of metaphor, even in its restricted form, is
inadequate
.
^^^Cf. Lakoff and Turner (1989), pages 22 and 10,
respectively.
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CHAPTER 3
A PLURALISTIC ACCOUNT OF METAPHOR
In this concluding chapter, I outline a pluralistic
account of metaphor. An important preliminary question for
any attempt to explain the work of metaphor is whether there
is in fact only one relevant kind of linguistic phenomenon
that may properly be called a metaphor. Each of the four
general types of position examined above maintains that
there is just one such phenomenon, which may be explained
within a single, unified theory. Before proceeding to argue
for what I take to be the comparative advantages of a
pluralistic account of metaphor, it will be worthwhile to
review the strengths and weaknesses of the monistic theories
we have been concerned with to this point.
The traditional view of metaphor, in defending the idea
of 'reducible metaphorical sense,' affirms many of our basic
intuitions about metaphor. Metaphors are ornaments of
language, produced by a transfer of terms that are related
in virtue of an underlying similarity among their referents,
a similarity which might have been alternatively expressed
in equivalent literal terms. Metaphors are thus employed
primarily for aesthetic or rhetorical ends, in order to
persuade, please or influence— though occasionally, they may
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be of value as models, as a kind of suggestive heuristic
fiction. For all such uses, however, they must be
considered with caution, for in shifting terms from one
referent to another, metaphors suggest that something is the
case when it is not, and thus tempt us with confusion and
deception. The problem with this common-sense approach, as
we have seen, is that adequate literal translations are
simply not available for most instances of metaphor. Our
efforts to provide such translations, whether they assume
the form of straight literal substitutions, or abridged
literal comparisons, tend towards approximations that are
indistinct, prejudicial, reductive or incomplete.
Metaphors, it seems, are capable of conveying something that
literal language cannot.
Semantic-interaction views of metaphor seek to account
for this capacity with their support for the idea of
'irreducible metaphorical sense.' In metaphor, they
contend, features normally associated with disparate
subjects are brought together in a unique and original
synthesis, giving expression to a distinctive metaphorical
content that is unattainable in ordinary literal terms.
Such views thus emphasize the importance of metaphor for
cognition. By engaging old words in imaginative new ways,
metaphors are responsible for the production of meaning and
the evolution of language. Indeed, once adequately
179
generalized, metaphorical interaction might even be
considered to disclose the associative procedures that give
coherence and structure to all of our language, thought and
experience. The problem with this type of position,
however, is that no metaphor can be both irreducible to
literal terms and yet expressive of a cognitive content.
The cognitive import of an utterance is not an association
that holds individually or idiosyncratically--it is a matter
of public convention. Words do not momentarily change their
meanings on the occasion of a particular utterance.
Metaphors either express a cognitive content because they
are conventional, and thus literally reducible, or they are
irreducible to literal terms because no known conventions
apply, so no cognitive content can be discerned. This
dilemma is substantiated in the efforts of interaction
theorists to lay bare the mechanism according to which we
produce and understand an allegedly irreducible metaphorical
content. Their analyses of a range of examples show
invariably that where a cognitive content can be identified,
it follows from associations established in advance in
accordance with convention.
The indirect speech approach, in treating metaphor as a
form of 'reducible non~sense, ' would offer a corrective to
the various semantic-interaction views. Metaphors, we are
told, express no cognitive content: utterances are
180
recognized as metaphorical only on the basis of the well-
formed absurdity, or semantic incongruity, they profess. In
virtue of this transgression of the limits of sense,
metaphors function effectively as a type of indirect speech.
The non-sense they express is reconfigured as we apply a
pragmatic calculus, or set of interpretive principles
implicit to context, to reveal the communicative intentions
of their authors, the cognitive content that metaphors are
used to indicate. So-called 'metaphorical meaning' is
therefore just speaker's intended meaning, which is
determined by the hearer when semantic conventions of
meaning yield to pragmatic conventions of use. The problem
with this type of indirect speech approach, however, is that
for a great many metaphors, no such pragmatic conventions
are available. Speaker's intended meaning is frequently
elusive or inaccessible; in some cases, it may not even
exist. Knowledge of authorial intent, moreover, does not
prevent additional or divergent interpretation. Metaphors
are often entertained, appreciated and interpreted in
perfect ignorance of the intentions of their makers, by
hearers or readers who rely solely upon the thoughts, images
or feelings aroused in memory by the words employed, and
upon the free play of the imagination, in its capacity to
extend and organize this response in a coherent way.
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Und6rstanding metaphor, it seems, no less than producing ir,
is a vitally creative matter.
The causal view of metaphor is fashioned to recognize
this creativity, by treating metaphor as a type of
'irreducible non-sense.' Metaphors are said to convey no
coded message, nor mean anything other than what they
literally say. What they say, though without sense,
nonetheless serves to ignite the imagination, and inspire
novel ways of seeing and conceiving that defy literal
paraphrase. Metaphors thus evoke new ideas and images,
without expressing them either directly or indirectly. They
cause us to imagine familiar things in strikingly unfamiliar
ways, against all prior procedure or principle. The problem
for this type of causal view, however, is that not all
metaphors serve exclusively as evocations. Metaphors are
also prevalent in everyday conversation, where they are used
quite commonly to transmit information. Our habitual ways
of describing one experience or activity in terms of another
tend to endorse ever new analogical extensions of the same
habits, enabling us to generate novel metaphorical
utterances that are readily understood to convey a message
even when first heard. An adequate theory of metaphor must
therefore attend to the interpretive procedures employed by
speakers and hearers to produce and understand such
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expression; for its failure to do so, the causal view is
inadequate
.
Each of these four types of position may be considered
a source of valuable insight for understanding metaphor.
Yet each in turn fails to provide a satisfactory explanation
of how metaphors work. Only the semantic-interaction views,
in defending the idea of ' irreducible metaphorical sense,
'
fail for reasons of internal consistency. The other three
types of position, by contrast, are defective for ruling out
utterances that most of us would consider legitimate
examples of metaphor. At best, each of these (traditional,
indirect speech and causal) views can offer only an
incomplete picture of how metaphors work. These findings
thus suggest a pluralistic account of metaphor, which would
differentiate three relevant kinds of linguistic phenomena
as authentic cases of metaphor. Such an account might be
elaborated as follows.
’Established' metaphors are conventional utterances
that describe something of one category or class of things
in terms more appropriate to another. Here I employ the
qualifier 'established' rather than 'dead' in order to avoid
any negative predisposition that may be attached to the
latter. Roughly speaking, established metaphors are those
taken as paradigm cases of metaphor by representatives of
the traditional view. They can be distinguished from
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standard literal language only by those who remain aware of
the original or primary meaning of the term or terms that
have been analogically displaced. For these users,
established metaphors convey a secondary conventional
meaning that is based upon a selective range of associations
drawn from this original or primary sense. As these origins
are forgotten or disregarded, established metaphors pass
over into ordinary literal usage.
'Colloquial' metaphors are syntactically well-formed
utterances which, though in violation of all relevant
meaning conventions, are nonetheless both intended and
understood to convey a message. Here I employ the term
'colloquial' in order to emphasize the prevalence of this
type of metaphor in everyday conversation, where it is used
quite commonly--though not exclusively--to transmit
information. Roughly speaking, colloquial metaphors are
those described by advocates of the indirect speech accounts
of metaphor. They occur where an absurd or non-sensical
utterance is reinterpreted on the basis of knowledge and
inferential procedures implicit to context to accord with
its speaker's intended meaning. While this intended meaning
might have been stated in precise literal terms, such terms
clearly would not have achieved the same effect as a
colloquial metaphor, which requires that the hearer
calculate the alternative interpretive possibilities
184
provided by context in order to infer what is meant from
what is said.
'Open' metaphors are syntactically well-formed
utterances, also in violation of all relevant meaning
conventions, to which no determinate interpretation can be
assigned. Here I employ the term 'open' rather than 'novel'
in order to underscore the open-ended range of interpretive
possibilities that this type of metaphor supports.
(Novelty, moreover, is not at issue, since novel metaphors
generated from previously established metaphorical
correlations are often promptly understood to convey a
determinate message, just as many familiar and enduring
metaphors are memorable precisely because they continue to
resist a single determinate reading.) In general, open
metaphors are those taken as paradigm cases by advocates of
the causal view of metaphor. They escape not only semantic
convention, but any evident means of pragmatic construal;
their intended meanings, consequently, remain difficult or
impossible to decide. The words they employ thus express no
beliefs, nor convey any information. Instead, they merely
evoke thoughts, ideas, and images that may cause us to
imagine fanciful states of affairs or conceive of old things
in new ways that defy literal description.
These are distinct uses of language. Yet all three are
exemplified by linguistic phenomena we do not hesitate to
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identify as metaphor. The rationale for classifying these
three types of utterance as one would seem to be that each
stands out as inappropriate on a literal reading, and
thereby prompts us to provide it with a nonliteral
interpretation. Yet this rationale and manner of
classification obscures important differences. As we have
seen, established, colloquial and open metaphors are
inappropriate to ordinary literal language in fundamentally
different ways. The distinctive way in which each is
inappropriate, moreover, tends to produce equally
distinctive effects for human language use and social life.
Before considering these effects, it is important to
recall that an expression can be inappropriate (in the ways
outlined above) only in relation to a given set of
linguistic conventions. Linguistic conventions include the
shared beliefs of parties to an exchange concerning the
various ways in which certain marks and noises pair up with
certain communicative intentions. As these shared beliefs
are variable over time and from place to place, no
expression can be considered a metaphor in an absolute
sense. Rather, an expression can be properly called a
metaphor only in relation to a particular discourse. In the
course of an average day, we tend to move freely in and out
of a range of distinct, yet overlapping discourses— for
instance, those specific to a particular occupation.
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activity, or interest, to a given text, author or tradition,
or to speech transactions involving others with whom we
share different types and degrees of experience. This
movement from one discourse to another will often alter the
meaning of a word or expression. As a result, an expression
inappropriate or non-sensical in one linguistic setting may
be perfectly clear and acceptable in another.
This point renders much of the discussion of the
preceding chapters problematic, since the examples there
cited may be considered cases of metaphor only when uttered
in the context of a discourse to which they are
inappropriate in one of the ways outlined above. Of course,
it would be misleading to say only that what counts as a
metaphor is determined by the composition of a discourse.
The relationship is in fact a reciprocal one, for it is
^^^One way to illustrate this point is to follow
Wittgenstein in likening discourses to games. A description of
someone having 'put it in the top hand corner' is apt to be
construed (as metaphor) or dismissed (as nonsense) in the
context of billiards, bowling, basketball or bridge— though it
has a perfectly determinate sense when uttered in reference to
a hockey game. Similarly, allusion to a 'veil of ignorance' in
a linguistic context adequately removed from contemporary
American political philosophy— say, that of a typical wedding
ceremony, bank transaction, auto-repair manual, or travel
brochure—will almost certainly be considered puzzling non-
sense, worthy of corresponding construal or refusal. The same
type of contrast applies for innumerable expressions in
relation to a given geographical region, historical period,
literary text, religious tradition, political ideology or
technical skill—or for that matter, in relation to the
special code shared only among small groups of friends,
colleagues, family members and so on.
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equally true that the composition of a discourse is
determined in part by what counts as a metaphor. Metaphors
do play an important role in the evolution of language;
indeed, this role might be considered an additional reason
for classifying the three types of metaphor identified above
as one.
To see this, it will perhaps be useful to draw an
analogy-one requiring that we extend Wittgenstein's famous
image of our diverse speech situations as games, bound by
local limits to clear expression. During an English
football match in 1823 at Rugby, a boy named William Webb
Ellis is said to have been the first player to catch the
ball and run with it, thus originating the distinctive
feature of 'the Rugby game'. Although William's act was a
clear violation of football rules, play somehow continued
anyway, as opposing players sought to release the ball by
physically arresting him. Amid the confusion, William's
teammates responded in kind, surrounding him tightly and
pushing away adversaries, thereby assisting his slow advance
upfield. Startled observers undoubtedly saw all of this as
just an unfortunate, chaotic brawl. Moreover, this
judgement was in fact correct, insofar as these events had
no significance under football rules beyond their status as
obvious violations. Yet these actions, wholly inappropriate
or unintelligible in the context of the game, were in fact
188
the very first manifestations of what would only later be
integrated and refined
—under transformed rules, in a
reconstituted game--as tackling, scrummaging and mauling.
The lifetime of a successful metaphor may be considered
in similar terms. An open metaphor begins as no more than a
provocative violation of meaning conventions, to which no
determinate interpretation can be assigned. Eventually,
after a certain amount of research or reflection, it may be
interpreted to convey a particular message--that is, it m.ay
be construed as a colloquial metaphor. Over time, if
retained and frequently repeated in association with a
regular context of use, that colloquial metaphor may come to
acquire a fixed role in a given discourse; in other words,
it may attain the conventional status of an established
metaphor. Finally, should these metaphorical origins be
forgotten or disregarded, the very same expression will pass
over into ordinary literal usage. In this way, established,
colloquial and open metaphors might be understood as just
three synchronic moments in the same diachronic process of
linguistic innovation, conflict and change.
Why, then, should we adopt a pluralistic account of
metaphor? There remain at least two good reasons. First,
as I have argued in some detail, the three types of metaphor
identified above constitute three distinct uses of language
that resist assimilation to a single, unified theory. In
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their efforts to carry out such an assimilation, proponents
of the monistic theories discussed throughout the preceding
chapters invariably offer explanations that are either too
general to be useful, or too specific to hold true. As a
result, no single, definitive account of metaphor is
available
.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, these same three
types of metaphor tend to serve distinct social functions.
This becomes apparent when we recall that discourses are
bound by local conventions of correct usage, which determine
the limits of what can meaningfully be said. These
conventions, and the limits to clear expression that they
establish, are fluid: they develop over time as the product
of a variably consensual project to give expression to the
publicly-recognized roles and norms, goals and interests,
practices and purposes--in short, the social reality--of a
particular linguistic community and context. Established
metaphors, as they fade into ordinary literal usage,
inaugurate new meaning conventions that tend to garner
unreflective acceptance for the particular goals and
interests those conventions may happen to promote.
Colloquial metaphors, insofar as they are accessible only to
those in possession of the supplemental knowledge required
to determine their intended meanings, at once disclose and
reinforce the shared identification of speaker and hearer
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with a particular speech community, and with the practices
and purposes endorsed in and through its discourse.
Finally, open metaphors, by effecting a suitably well-
designed failure to communicate, employ language as a
provocation, a selective moment of non-sense that
effectively displays and implicitly calls into question the
meaning conventions of a discourse, thereby suggesting a
reconstitution of the particular goals and interests they
frame
.
These are distinct functions, worthy of further study.
In this project, I have argued that none of the dominant
contemporary theories of metaphor is satisfactory, and
moreover, that in attempting to explain the work of
metaphor, we would do best to adopt a pluralistic approach.
To the extent that I have been successful, perhaps interest
in a general theory of metaphor might be replaced by
questions about the workings of specific metaphors, in
relation to the particular discourses in which they are
issued, and the various social functions they are used to
perform.
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